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Burkina Faso. At the Ministry of Justice, Philippe Somé gave me of his time repeatedly and 
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help, and generosity in making this PhD project possible. And of course, the four interpreters 
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figure here as well. Thank you all. 
 
A short word on language use is warranted: All four interpreters I worked with in Bobo are 
men. I have encountered one woman who used to work as a court interpreter in the 1990s, 
Bintou. We will get to know her shortly. Since all interpreters today are men, I use the 
masculine form to describe the work and role of court interpreters. All names in what follows 






CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Prologue – A day in court, Part 1 
 
Commercial court, Bobo Dioulasso, Burkina Faso, 8am. A Monday morning. It is dusty and hot 
and the ceiling fans seem to suffer from old age, they squeak rhythmically. We had arrived 
just in time, the judge and I, for him to pull the black robe over his head, sign of his profession, 
grab the files of the cases to be heard today and to briefly introduce me to his colleagues. I 
am allowed to take pictures, he tells everybody, a privilege that was not to repeat itself. So I 
settle myself in the audience of the courtroom, notebook on lap and camera ready, waiting 
for the first trial to start. An orderly snaps his fingers at me, gesturing for me to uncross my 
legs. The long row of black plastic seats, fixated to the floor and with a slight frontward slant, 
allows for minimal sitting comfort. Finally, the court members walk in and there, among the 
three judges, the scribe, and the prosecutor is another man, who seats himself between the 
judges and the scribe. The interpreter. The play begins.  
Later he will tell me how he feels called to help the innocent: “Quand tu interprètes 
là, tu es en train de sauver un innocent qui ne comprend pas quelque chose”. It sounded like I 
had found the new Messias. Jean, who feels that he is saving innocents who do not 
understand something fundamental, is a member in one of the newly founded evangelical 
churches that have sprung up all over Bobo. He is also the interpreter for the commercial 
court. Jean had been translating at his church before starting the job as court interpreter. For 
this reason and because he is very vocal about his calling, the judges at the commercial court 
jokingly call him le pasteur, the preacher. 
My friend Mohamed, the judge presiding the trials at the commercial court today, 
speaks Jula fluently – in fact, he is also imam at his local mosque, where he preaches in Jula, 
the language of everyday communication in Bobo. The language the defendant knows. 
Watching the interpreter, I am fascinated by his presence and the fact that Mohamed keeps 
telling the defendant – in French – to look at him, the judge, while talking, not at the 
interpreter. This the interpreter translates for the defendant, who turns his head back and 
forth between the judge and the interpreter who are both talking to and at him. Knowing 
Mohamed speaks Jula makes the situation really strange to me. The defendant – glasses, 
shaved head, bulky body – seems quite intimidated. He is standing with his back to the 
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audience and in front of the three judges, who are seated behind a long desk on a raised 
platform at the head end of the courtroom. Who would not be intimidated? Here is a 
defendant who quite obviously has no clue as to what is going on and how he should behave. 
Defendant speaks Jula, interpreter translates into French for the benefit of the judges and 
prosecutor, who have already heard and understood the defendant’s Jula version, the judge 
continues his questioning in French, the interpreter gets his turn translating this into Jula for 
the benefit of the defendant and so on and so on. It was absurd. The interpreter is saving an 







OFTEN what we see or hear makes sense only later, or at least after we have had time or 
distance or other experiences with which to interpret and understand what we have been 
witness to. In Burkina Faso, the court, as a state organization, defines and sets the rules of 
the game in what regards the handling of trials. Just like anywhere else. What seemed so 
bizarre in this first encounter was that the court apparently held on to a procedure that 
complicated communication instead of making it clearer. Why would court personnel want 
to keep this situation upright?  
In spite of around 60 languages (or 71, depending on who counts) being spoken in 
Burkina Faso, French is the only official language, codified as such by the constitution. What 
“official language” concretely means is not defined and nobody seems to be able to tell me, 
either. Because it is the official language, French needs to be used in court, I am told. 
Watching my friend Mohamed, the judge at work during the trial described above, speaking 
French and having an interpreter translate him into Jula, was so fascinating it became the 
subject of my four year long search for answers and explanations, for an understanding of a 
situation that seemed to be so absurd – somewhat kafkaesk.1 
On the one hand, I will describe daily bureaucratic practices in the judicial system in 
Burkina Faso and their forms of rationalization, drawing on the work of the court interpreter. 
On the other, I will analyze the challenges to and shortcomings in these rationalization 
processes. The goal is to understand the place of French in Burkina Faso’s courts and, by 
extension, the role the interpreter is supposed to play – who insists or demands on using 
French in the courtroom? Why? In a highly plurilingual society such as Burkina Faso 
interpreting is and always has been a mundane practice, by citizens generally, by specialized 
groups of professionals, and by specifically educated and trained individuals. It is, in this 
sense, an occupation which has known different degrees of formalization by society or the 
state and different degrees of acceptance or skepticism by them as well. In this research, the 
court interpreter, his work, and interpretation will serve to illustrate another formalization 
process, namely the ongoing bureaucratization of a state institution, the justice system. 
 
1 That the justice system can become an elaborate – and infinite – run through the state’s bureaucracy is shown 
in the movie Kafka au Congo (2010) by Arnaud Zajtman and Marlène Rabaud, see trailer here: 
https://www.moviesthatmatter.nl/english_index/festival/programma_en/filmprogramma_en/film_en/487/ka
fka-au-congo or here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UiUfrvIZjb4  
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In order to do this, I will focus on aspects specific to today’s courtroom 
communication, asking how court interpreters operate within the larger bureaucratic domain 
which is the judiciary in Burkina Faso. Interpreters are both part of the court and they are not; 
they are employees of the Ministry of Justice, hired by the state. At the same time, their 
profession as court interpreters is not officially recognized by the state that has hired them. 
It all seems somewhat confusing. It makes this research all the more exciting, however. Court 
interpreters are variously lauded, ignored, despised, praised, forgotten about, and reluctantly 
accepted by other court members. My immediate field of analysis is the courthouse in general 
and the courtroom in particular, which are the two action arenas of court interpreters. There 
they can explore their options in terms of what decisions to take, whom to ally themselves 
with, and how they present themselves. The only space in the courthouse where they in fact 
can act as interpreters and are treated as such is in the courtroom, we will see.  
As anthropologists we are trained to stay tuned to the pitfalls of eurocentrism and to 
avoid comparing social phenomena in our research to what we know from home. When 
looking at court interpretation in Burkina Faso we need to take the justice system and, more 
generally, the Burkinabe state and its functioning “as it is”, to say it with Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 108). Taking it as it is, then, includes stating that 
the justice system in Burkina Faso is modelled on a European, a French style system. So even 
while avoiding normative characterizations of the Burkinabe justice system, which, in the end, 
would boil down to an enumeration of its deficits, it is a fact that the official Burkinabe state 
justice system has been imported to West Africa with French colonization and it remains a 
French system in structure, organization, procedure, definition of posts and careers, laws, 
regulations. And, most importantly to this description and analysis of the court interpreter 
and his work, the imported system creates the conditions for the court interpreter to emerge 
while it settles in Burkina Faso. What, exactly, needs to happen locally for the court 
interpreter to become necessary and how the bureaucrats running the justice system deal 
with, apply, or uphold the structural form of the imported system, is the object of the 
following discussion. 
Burkina Faso has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 
1999, which, among other things, is a Human Rights law guaranteeing one’s right to the free 
assistance of an interpreter if one does not understand or speak the language used in court. 
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This human right is mandatory only in penal2 courts. The Ministry of Justice in Burkina Faso 
mandates the individual penal courts, the tribunaux de grande instance (TGI) and the appeals 
court, la cour d’appel, to recruit interpreters in order to fulfill this ratified Human Rights 
convention. This poses serious challenges to the individual courts because there are no 
trained court interpreters in Burkina Faso for the simple reason that no interpreter training 
for court interpreting exists, neither in Burkina Faso nor in any other West African state – with 
the noteworthy exception of Senegal. The decision to hire a court interpreter in Burkina Faso 
is based solely on bureaucratic criteria and not upon merit or education and training.  
What lends the presence of standard French3 in court in Burkina Faso a special touch 
is that it is the language of the minority. In practice, French is indeed the language used in 
court; court personnel speak and use only French, particularly in all public encounters, but 
also among colleagues. So French is also the language of what I will refer to as the educational 
elite, those citizens having obtained higher education degrees through several years of 
schooling at university level. We will get into a detailed description of elite research in chapter 
three. The educational elite in Burkina is also referred to as intellectuels by citizens, a 
respected, almost revered designation reserved for those who have, variously, a university 
degree and, if lucky, also a good job corresponding to this university degree. Interpreters 
again are hard to categorize – it is in the eye of the beholder. While citizens might see them 
as important members of the court, others and particularly those court members we will get 
to know as the experts of the system, do not see them at all beyond trials. 
Penal trials, like most trials, are public hearings allowing for an audience. In fact, a 
court trial does not only have an audience, but the individuals participating in the trial – 
judges, prosecutor, court scribe, defendant, and interpreter – can very well be seen as actors 
in a play. The performance they stage is not limited to the simple speaking of justice but is 
much more than that. A penal trial in Bobo is a complex and elaborate play put on in French; 
the language itself plays its own, specific role. One recurring explanation I got for the fact that 
French is used in court, is that all people present in the courtroom, audience included, need 
 
2 I use the somewhat unfortunate terms penal court (and not criminal court) and penal law in order to avoid 
confusion with and to differentiate the institution (the court) and the process (penal law, in French droit pénal) 
from the two branches of penal/criminal law in the French system, termed criminel and correctionel.  
3 Sometimes written with a capital S, Standard French. Here, I do not want to engage in a linguistic debate, but 
rather want to make explicit the difference between the standard form of French as taught in school and the 
oral form as used in the everyday, which I will refer to as Burkinabe French.  
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to be able to follow what is being said. This explanation is absurd or at best astonishing in a 
country where the majority of citizens can use only rudimentary French, or what we will refer 
to as the Burkinabe variety of French, and much less follow what is being discussed in a court 
proceeding with its complex procedures, incomprehensible rituals, and legal French. 
What I am describing here is also the encounter between a highly formalized 
institution – the court – and lay people, a phenomenon we can find in many places in the 
world. In Burkina Faso, the French language adds another, a complicating layer. Here, we will 
look at the role and work of the court interpreter, how he acts and is made to act, in order to 
get an understanding of how the employees of the court deal with this complex phenomenon 
that is the imported justice system and how they make it work in the local setting of Burkina 
Faso and Bobo Dioulasso. What we are also looking at is how the work of the court interpreter 
is functional to the reproduction of the system of justice as it is run by the state.  
Traditionally and in the past, interpreters as intermediaries had and were accorded a 
lot of power as linguists (jeli/jeliw in Jula4) – the French call them griots – and as colonial 
interpreter-translators or écrivains-interprètes as they were called in colonial French West 
Africa, the Afrique occidentale française (AOF). The rise of nation states in the late nineteenth 
century in Europe came with a redefinition of belonging, which was also defined and enforced 
from above via language. Ideas of nation – often conceptualized as monoglot – came with 
linguistic homogenization and the elaboration of standards, all of which flowed into the 
creation of the idea of national languages. Language politics became ubiquitous in Europe at 
this time. They were also carried into and imposed in the colonies. 
Today’s court interpreters in Burkina Faso resemble traditional linguists in that they 
need to translate between parties who are both speakers of the same language, but for 
reasons of protocol cannot use this language to communicate directly with each other. They 
resemble colonial interpreter-translators in that they are employees of the state, who defines 
their working conditions. Today, the state hires them in order to comply with ratified 
international laws. International laws, moreover, based on an ideology of national language 
and on the idea that only this single national language can express legal concepts. In the 
colonies, interpreters were needed to assure communication between the colonial 
 
4 The ending on -w ist he Jula plural form.  
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administration and the colonized. Interpreters thus worked and work for state-run 
institutions and to reproduce the status quo.  
But contrary to linguists or colonial interpreter-translators, today’s court interpreters 
occupy the lowest rung in the court personnel hierarchy. During trials they are controlled by 
judges and outside the courtroom they have little bargaining power, as this study will show. 
This includes the fact that court interpreter as a professional category does not exist in 
Burkina Faso – or rather, it is not officially recognized by the Ministry of Justice, i.e. the state.5 
All men working at the two penal courts in Bobo had been hired for another job and came to 
add interpreting during trials to their workload somewhat by chance, we will see.  
None of the four men have trained either as interpreters or court interpreters, and 
their individual itineraries and backgrounds are widely different. Not being trained as a court 
interpreter is nothing out of the ordinary, however. Training programs for court 
interpretation into languages other than the usual “big” ones are rare also in Switzerland and 
Europe. What is unusual is the fact that an interpreter needs to be present in the first place 
in a situation, where everybody could communicate without his intervention. 
What I want to look at is how interpreters operate, how they handle not only the 
position they are accorded by the institution that has hired them, but also the very concrete 
situation of translating during trials. My very first assumptions and hypotheses were based 
on the per chance visit to the commercial court in March 2015 described above. At the time 
I was in Bobo gathering information for my MA thesis. Watching this day of trials and the 
interpreter Jean at work was fascinating and the beginning of four years of intense thinking 
about state institutions, court interpreting, and how bureaucrats function.  
Many ideas circulated in my mind before heading out to Bobo Dioulasso for research 
to look into the daily lives and work of people working at the penal courts, particularly the 
four court interpreters. Concretely, my first hypothesis was that interpreters saw themselves 
and acted as self-appointed lawyers of defendants, assisting them during their trials so they 
could find their way through an incomprehensible justice system. This idea germinated in my 
mind after having spoken to Jean about his work as court interpreter at the commercial court. 
 
5 As of 11. September 2019, this professional category does officially exist, albeit with no practical or concrete 
consequences for interpreters and their work as to date. See https://gulmu.info/conseil-des-ministres-du-
mercredi-11-septembre-2019/, accessed 23 September 2019. 
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He had described himself as the savior of innocents, we saw. So, I set out for my fieldwork, 
looking out for the interpreter-savior as I had first encountered him.  
The situation is, of course, not as transparent or straight-forward as it had seemed to 
me after my first talk with Jean. I came to see interpreters and their work in new, often 
changing ways; it took other, different hypotheses, I had to evaluate and test various 
analytical tools until I got a clearer picture of how interpreters operated that also fit with the 
way they presented themselves, the way their superiors talked about them, and what I saw 
and could watch. Not all interpreters in Bobo see themselves as saviors of innocent 
defendants. 
The focus of my research is thus the work and role of the court interpreter. Specifically, 
I am looking at how he carves out a space for himself in his local court surroundings and 
hierarchy, among the educational elite in particular and the civil servant or fonctionnaire 
landscape and system of justice in general. Through interpreters’ work and role, I will show 
how the justice system as a foreign imported state institution is appropriated by certain 
individuals within the system, how they make it work. Each chapter is preceded by a prologue, 
a continuing story in six parts based upon my field notes and diary, observations, daily 
encounters and talks I had with people and with the court interpreters, particularly Antoine, 
whom I watched in action for uncountable hours. The story describes one day at court from 
his perspective and from the perspective of Musa, the defendant whose case study we will 
look at in chapter four. Or rather, the story is how I imagine or deduce or conclude Antoine 
and Musa would describe their day at the courthouse. 
This written part of my thesis is subdivided into four thematic themes: After the first 
chapter, which is this introduction, chapter two deals with the theoretical frame and concepts 
that underlie this description of interpretation and bureaucratization at court. In the third 
chapter, I will elaborate on the qualitative methods I used. Here, a discussion of gaining access 
to conduct ethnographic work in the judiciary is elaborated on, particularly the concept of 
“researching up”. In chapter four, we will travel back in time, to how the French language 
came to be institutionalized in the AOF. Here, the educative system and the historical 
implementation of a specific variety of language in state institutions is our focus. A detailed 
description of the work of interpreters then and now concludes this section. Then, in the fifth 
chapter, I will show how communication during penal trials is made to function, with 
examples of what I will refer to as courtroom speak. Chapter six, drily entitled “Discussion”, 
 9 
brings together these four themes to illuminate how the justice system is made to work by its 
experts in Burkina Faso through our understanding of the court interpreter’s role therein. The 
story ends with what is usually entitled “Conclusion”; I prefer the designation “Outlook” 
because interpretation at court in Burkina Faso and the bureaucratization of the state 
institution of justice is nothing conclusive or finished, it is ongoing. In this story, I give glimpses 
into these ongoing processes via the lives and work of four court interpreters in Bobo. 
The first topic in chapter two describes the fields of research and the concepts in 
which the present discussion is embedded: (court) interpretation and the bureaucratization 
of state institutions. Quite an amount of literature exists analyzing aspects of courtroom talk. 
All of the published literature is based on research carried out in Europe, the United States, 
or Australia. Some few texts on court interpreting in Africa exist, but they are scarce. Since 
interpreting in plurilingual Burkina is not a new concept, an overview of the historical 
literature will show the many faces interpreting has taken in Africa. I will limit this discussion 
to the literature describing interpreting and interpreters in the former French colonies. 
Indeed, there is a vast amount of historical literature, consisting not only of scientific 
publications, but also of autobiographies, stories, ethnographic reports, and works of fiction 
and faction (fact + fiction = faction; we will discuss faction and literature later). These accounts 
enrich this research in a polyphonic way, adding points of view to the academic analyses of 
the work of interpreters and interpretation across time. They also constitute a historical 
narrative, description, and account from Africans’ point of view, the majority of written 
documentation of French colonialism having been done by Europeans. Works of faction thus 
allow insights into the lives and the work of men working as interpreters and clerks for the 
colonial administration in French West Africa, the AOF, as they themselves recount it.  
The literature on what we might summarize under the label “bureaucratization” will 
be of particular interest. First, we will look at how imported, foreign systems are appropriated 
or domesticated into a new reality and how those who run these systems make them work 
locally. This research has been carried out mainly by German social scientists, all men, who 
have elaborated theories on domestication. On the micro-level of trials, Erving Goffman, 
another man, has a prominent role by lending his Presentation of Self in Everyday Life to our 
description of interaction and communication in the courtroom. Goffman’s insights into 
impression management are valuable as well to understand how court members in general 
and interpreters in particular present themselves.  
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Describing in detail the methodology employed during work in Bobo is elaborated on 
in the third chapter, particularly the “how” of going about gaining and maintaining access to 
the judiciary. By gaining and maintaining access I refer for the most part to the logistical, 
bureaucratic-administrative itinerary needed to legitimize my presence in this particular 
place, but also to its discussion in the literature and of how my interlocutors chose to interact 
with me. Like in other delicate terrains such as researching migrants’ lives in refugee camps 
(e.g. Fert 2020; Massa 2016), court personnel employed various techniques to avoid saying 
anything substantial or allowing me to obtain detailed accounts of courtroom 
communication. As such, it seems for example, that all important sociolinguistic publications 
on court interpretation can base their analyses on audio recordings of trials. These texts 
feature elaborate transcripts of courtroom talk. How did these researchers obtain permission 
– what bureaucratic itinerary did they need to follow – to be allowed to record court 
proceedings? Most researchers are silent on this subject. Access to the judiciary in Bobo was, 
at best, viscous. Audio recordings were largely out of the question, we will see. 
Why the judiciary should be delicate terrain is, of course, an empirical question. 
Negotiations to conduct field research, i.e. the series of steps (making contacts, oral or written 
exchanges, introducing oneself to stakeholders, etc.) taken to obtain the right to carry out the 
research, is an essential preliminary step of any data collection. Often perceived just as “a 
condition for carrying out the investigation” and not as “an object of research in its own right 
and ... real material for analyzing the field itself” (Darmon 2005: 99), I argue that these field 
negotiations themselves are rich in information (Derbez 2010). Therefore: how do 
researchers negotiate their entry into the field and maintain it? How do these negotiations 
engage in the very nature of research, problematizing it and its methodology? And what 
happens when anthropologists become potential spies? How to deal with a denial of access 
to a particular institution? For instance, can being refused access to one of the penal courts 
in Bobo lead me to define my chosen research topic as “delicate”? But why should this be 
more sensitive than other topics?  
The fourth chapter is dedicated to a detailed look at how the French language became 
what it is today – the official language used in all government run institutions, thus having 
attained an indexical position denoting speakers’ (hierarchical) place in society and, by 
extension, in the courtroom. Here the interpreters themselves will describe their work and 
present themselves to the reader. We will also get to know how other court members see 
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interpreters and their work. Then we travel back into Bobo’s and western Africa’s past, 
looking at how linguists or griots assured kings’ communication with their peoples. Later, 
French conquest and colonization came with its own rules and how to go about doing things, 
also interpretation. Colonial interpreters occupied a prominent place in the conquest of 
territory and the installation of colonial rule, they were crucial to French administrators who 
did not speak any African language. This background knowledge is needed for a description 
of courtroom speak I will describe in chapter five. 
Here I describe how trials are conducted at one of the two penal courts in Bobo in two 
case studies selected from the corpus of transcribed audio recordings. The transcription of 
audio recorded trials – I was allowed to do so for some few trials – will show us moments of 
interpreted courtroom communication, which is analyzed in light of the interpreter’s 
contribution to the construction of a specific type of defendant.  
In chapter six, Discussion, I bring together historical background and a description of 
today’s penal trials in order to describe and come to an understanding of the court 
interpreter’s role working in the justice system. Communication at court is, on the one hand, 
a mirror image of how citizens interact outside the courtroom space and it is, on the other, 
its motor. This discussion flows into the last chapter, entitled Outlook (or Ongoing Discussion), 
pointing to the unfinished nature of courtroom talk, the continuous choices experts are 
dealing with when appropriating the justice system to the terrain of Bobo and Burkina Faso, 
and particularly pointing to the ongoing negotiations interpreters engage in to find their role 
and place at court.  
 
THE following pages describe individuals’ strategies to obtain, maintain, or further their social 
standing within and through a state institution. In other words, they describe how civil 
servants advance, promote, and use bureaucratic processes to their advantage. The 
institution is both aim and tool. They also describe the processes of how these same civil 
servants adhere to a system they deem worthy of upholding. Most prominently, with this 
research I hope to illuminate the life world of today’s court interpreters and how they 
navigate the institution that employs them. 
This book is the first to focus explicitly on the life and work of court interpreters in the 
former French colonies in West Africa today; language at court in a postcolonial setting 
remains a largely neglected topic in linguistic anthropology and the social sciences in general. 
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I thus address a significant gap in the literature on the history and lives of interpreting at 
court. By looking at civil servants at work from a linguistic anthropological viewpoint, this 
study adds to the field of “states at work” from an innovative, a new angle. The perspectives 
of French West African court interpreters as civil servants have been mostly ignored, at best 
marginalized within the disciplines of linguistic anthropology and cultural anthropology, 
translation and interpreting studies, and in the study on bureaucracies.  
Hence, this text contributes first of all to the field of research looking at the workings 
of state institutions in Africa. Moreover, it contributes to the literature published on court 
interpretation, but from an angle largely neglected so far, namely court interpretation for 
citizens needing to use a foreign language at home. And as importantly, this text on court 
interpretation in Burkina Faso closes a research gap by giving insights into the work and lives 
of present-day court interpreters working in so-called francophone West Africa, contributing 
and adding to the literature on African interpreters that we know from historical research. Up 
to date (2021), there are no publications in linguistic anthropological or in the language-
related scientific literature that look at court interpreters and interpreting in francophone 
West Africa.6 So, my research is innovative on two planes: it contributes to the existing 
literature looking at states at work in Africa through a language lens and it gives innovative 
insights into both the languascape of the judiciary in West Africa and into court interpreters’ 
lives. This combined look – interpretation at the state-run institution of the justice system – 
allows us to see bureaucratization processes at work from a new and different angle, namely 
through the work of court interpreters, who are both a part of the system and outside of it.  
  
 
6 Thanks to my PhD supervisor Elísio Macamo at the University of Basel, I was made aware of a recent paper by 
sociologist Habibou Fofana (2018) discussing interpretation at court in Burkina Faso. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAME AND DEFINING CONCEPTS 
 
Prologue – A day in court, Part 2 
 
Quartier Bolomakote, a large, popular neighborhood in Bobo Dioulasso, one of the oldest 
parts of town. It is six am and the usual ffffffft fffffft of sweeping brooms signals the start into 
a new day. Roosters crow, goats bleat, women carry wood, firing up stoves and girls sweep 
compounds. Antoine gets up as well, his wife has already put a large pot of water on the fire 
and is now outside their chambre salon – a one-bedroom railroad apartment with a living 
room – busying herself around the inner courtyard of their compound. Their small daughter 
is still asleep, profiting from the last minutes before having to get up and get ready for school. 
Antoine sits down on the couch, waiting for Rosine to bring him his warm bath water in a 
bucket. Then he disappears to the other end of the courtyard to the shower, towel over his 
shoulder. Across from his chambre-salon, his mother is feeding the chickens and guinea fowl 
he keeps in a pen on the other side of the huge mango tree sitting in the middle of the oblong 
courtyard. Antoine has always enjoyed raising chickens and used to have a small business 
selling animal feed before coming to work at the court of appeals almost ten years ago. 
Animal feed and cassettes. A rare combination.  
After his bath, he sits back down on the couch, Rosine brings him his cup of tea. They 
do not exchange many words. Antoine has put on a pink, long-sleeved shirt and black pants 
today, accurately ironed down the middle of the leg. He sips his tea, waiting for his wife to 
bring him food, and listens to his mother outside, clicking her tongue at the chickens. Today 
there are leftovers from yesterday’s evening meal, Antoine is happy to see, so that he can put 
something in his stomach before heading out to the courthouse for work. That is good 
because today is Tuesday and a long day of trials awaits him at court. He knows the deal. 
Today’s team of judges is headed by judge D.M. He never inserts any breaks into the working 
day, only short, five-minute sessions, during which the audience does not even leave the 







Antoine is ready, grabs his jacket and heads out to fetch his motorcycle. On his way, he goes 
to check on his animals, one guinea fowl had a near escape yesterday, hysterically flapping 
around, hacking at the chickens and trying to get by and out the door when his mother went 
in to feed them. And now, towards the end of the year, he gets many orders. People 
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appreciate his chickens because he makes fair prices and the fowl is well fed. Maybe he’ll 
expand and get some turkey as well. His mother comes out of the chicken coop and calls for 
his older brother: “Sogossira!?”. Irritated, Antoine asks himself once again, why everybody 
always calls him by his Christian name while his brother François is addressed with his 




2.1. Basic texts on the two main topics: court interpreting and the bureaucratization 
of state institutions 
At the courthouse, the annoyance Antoine feels at home by being addressed with his Christian 
or French name, gives way to a diffuse sense of pride. It is a feeling that he puts into words 
by describing himself as being part of something important. At court, the language used is 
French, so being addressed as Antoine here evaporates the feelings of exasperation he always 
experiences at home.  
Researchers who have analyzed language use in court have found that court personnel 
have a distinct view of interpretation – of the how and the when, but particularly the how. 
Antoine, too, is subject to these views when he interprets trials at the penal court in Bobo, 
views put into practice by his immediate superiors, the judges. They, like judges the world 
over, believe it imperative that he translate their questions or interrogations verbatim. 
Indeed, the judiciary in many, very different places throughout the world is astoundingly 
similar in its attitudes towards court interpretation and its ignorance or non-interest in what, 
exactly, the work of interpreters entails. So not just Antoine, but interpreters in many other 
places as well are expected to act as so-called conduits, translating judges’ and prosecutors’ 
words faithfully, to use the term employed in Bobo. 
In the following I want to introduce the main topics and concepts that are at the heart 
of this investigation. Next to considerations pertaining to interpreting and bureaucratization, 
as the title of this chapter suggests, I will extract those concepts from the infinities of social 
scientific deliberations that are pertinent to my description and, later, analysis. Translation is 
one such concept, or rather, it is the one concept that ties this entire investigation together. 
It is at the same time a sibling to interpretation, carrying a message from one language to 
another, but it is also a lot more. As a sibling, translation is referred to as being the written 
transmittal of a text into another language, while interpretation is relaying a spoken message 
from one language into another. Indeed, we are looking at the work of the court interpreter 
– how he carries out and is allowed to carry out his job – which will help us understand how 
a foreign bureaucratic system is appropriated locally.  
And this is where translation as more-than-a-sibling to interpretation comes in. 
Academically, translation has been opened up to include more and other meanings, like 
translating ideas across disciplines or concepts across cultures. Translation has also come to 
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mean the integration into a new environment of objects, ideas, institutions that have been 
moved across space, i.e. geographically from one place to another. Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan call these moved objects, ideas, institutions transversal objects (Bierschenk and Olivier 
de Sardan 2014: 24). A modern state bureaucracy is a wonderful example for a transversal 
object. For us here this means bringing to light how the Burkinabe have and are continuing to 
appropriate the justice system, a modern state bureaucracy that has come to them from 
someplace else, to fit local reality and their needs. And not only the justice system per se, but 
all that comes with it – how it is administered, the jobs, the rules and regulations. Before we 
go into any more detail on that, however, we will look at court interpreting – what it means 
to translate during a trial, the role interpreters have played in West Africa in the past, and 
how interpreters and interpretation is discussed also in works of fiction. 
Legal professionals and particularly judges stress the importance of word-for-word 
translation and the unalterable nature of laws and paragraphs (Angermeyer 2014: 434; Eades 
2003: 118; Gibbons 1999: 162-163; Hale 1997: 39-40; Hale and Gibbons 1999: 206). These 
studies have been carried out in migration (Angermeyer 2008, 2009, 2014) and asylum-
seeking contexts (Inghilleri 2005; Määtä 2015; Merlini 2009; Rienzner & Slezak 2010) or deal 
with the situation of linguistic minorities (Berk-Seligson 2008; Hale 1997; Hale & Gibbons 
1999; Hale et al. 2011). One aspect found in all of these studies and which I will elaborate on 
shortly, is civil servants’ strict adherence to the rules of a state-run bureaucracy.  
Another aspect these studies have in common is that they look at court proceedings 
in which the defendant comes from somewhere else: asylum seekers, newly arrived 
foreigners, temporary workers (“saisonnier”) and thus speaks a language different from the 
one spoken in the place s/he is being judged in. The communication problems encountered 
by these foreign defendants and the potential (negative) impact on their hearings do not 
much differ, however, from a situation in which different varieties of one language meet in 
the courtroom. 
Diana Eades has been investigating court hearings conducted between speakers of 
different varieties of English in Australia since the early 1980s (she wrote her PhD in 1983), 
the standard English spoken by judges and defendants’ Aboriginal English (cf. e.g. Eades 2000, 
2003, 2008). Eades demonstrates how and why Aboriginal witnesses are silenced in court by 
both the judge and their own lawyers (Eades 2000). A combination of cultural 
misunderstandings, insistence on the question-answer format of communication, and an 
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obsession with legal procedure contribute to a situation, in which Aboriginal witnesses are 
not allowed the space necessary to be able to recount their side of the story. Moreover, Eades 
shows that we need to look more closely at our stereotype of the judge as neutral arbiter 
(Eades 2000: 187). He or she, together with lawyers, contributes to the silencing of Aboriginal 
witnesses, she found. 
Eades has also found that not only do official court transcripts record only standard 
English utterances so that the original utterances have no legal status (Eades 2000: 187), but 
that the decision to use an interpreter lies solely with the presiding judge (Eades 2003: 115-
116). She also repeatedly stresses that we cannot ignore the context in which courtroom talk 
takes place, the wider societal power structures and social inequalities that get carried into 
the courtroom (Eades 2008: 37, 42). In her research on Aboriginal witnesses being heard in 
court, she stresses that “[a]t macro-level analysis, there is no denying that Aboriginal people 
are the most powerless social group in the country and the group most dominated by the 
legal system” (Eades 2000: 190).  
When analyzing communication during trials, we need to show – and not only mention 
– how a powerful group can limit the freedom of action of others and also influence their 
minds (Eades 2008: 40 and chapter 2). Hierarchical language concepts – French first, then 
Jula, Moore, and all other national languages including Burkinabe French – and the invention 
of bounded linguistic entities such as standard French, popular Burkinabe French, or Jula are 
indexical for social classes. Indexicality describes the “real linkage of language to culture”, as 
Silverstein put it (1976: 12). How we speak denotes for example etiquette, or where we come 
from – it marks a speaker’s identity. The indexical form of an utterance only makes sense 
within a specific context (see i.a. Eckert 2008; Hanks 2000). For us this becomes pertinent 
when we look at communicative practices in the courtroom, and particularly how speech 
variety (“accent” or “dialect”) puts speakers’ in certain so-called indexical categories, which 
are also highly ideological. For instance, historically dominant languages became standards 
for comparison, relegating all other languages to subordinate positions (Howland 2003; 
Mignolo and Schiwy 2003). In the courtroom, Jula speakers can only participate in their trials 
through the mediation of an interpreter. 
Angermeyer for example describes interpretation into Spanish at small claims courts 
in New York, showing how the core principle of language ideology in US society is 
monolingualism (Angermeyer 2014). Bilingualism is positioned as a skill only interpreters are 
 19 
supposed to possess, all other courtroom actors cannot benefit from their bilingualism 
because the societal importance of Spanish is not acknowledged. Here we find parallels to 
social reality in Bobo, were Jula and all other national languages are not recognized as 
functionally equivalent means of communication to French in government-run institutions 
such as at court or in school or in politics. Monolingualism is seen as the norm in Burkina 
Faso’s state institutions as much as it is in the USA (Angermeyer 2014: 444). These 
monolingually constructed situations prepare the ground for interpretation; it becomes 
necessary. The interpreter is vital to the very functioning of the monolingually conceptualized 
space. Next to describing the reasons for (Halaoui 2002: 352), we also need to look at the 
consequences interpreting can generate (Eades 2008: 37). These consequences – good or bad 
– of interpretation from legal or standard French into Jula for illiterate or barely educated 
defendants during trials at the penal courts in Bobo will be examined in detail in the empirical 
chapter entitled “Is this Jula?”.  
Linguistic anthropologists such as John J. Gumperz had, as early as 1974, pointed out 
how social realities have an effect on communication. Dell H. Hymes as well had always 
insisted on a contextualized study of language use, on a sociolinguistic or linguistic 
anthropological view on how humans actually use language (see a.o. Hymes 1963). In fact, it 
was Dell Hymes who eventually coined the designation sociolinguistics in 1974 after having 
used the term linguistic anthropology a decade earlier (Bucholtz & Hall 2008: 402). What 
today are seen as the two intersecting, largely overlapping, sometimes distinct disciplines of 
sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, have a long-term common history, in which 
sociolinguistics from the very beginning was making use of anthropological methods, 
Gumperz and Cook-Gumperz (2008) contend. The two disciplines “shared a theoretical view 
of the local community as the site of language use and a methodological commitment to using 
fieldwork as the best way to obtain information about such language use” from the 
beginnings of research on language, culture, and society (Gumperz & Cook-Gumperz 2008: 
534). Together, John Gumperz and Dell Hymes edited a collection of pioneering essays into 
what has become a classic in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, Directions in 
Sociolinguistics: the ethnography of communication (Gumperz & Hymes 1972). They have 
thus contributed considerably to bringing society into the courtroom, so to speak.  
Mary Bucholtz has looked at how recorded telephone conversations between 
suspects speaking a non-standard variety of English in the USA are transcribed by the police 
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into standard English for the police log (Bucholtz 2009). These transcriptions for legal reasons 
foster an ideology of institutional neutrality by presenting recorded talk as objective facts. 
Bucholtz also finds that “[t]his process allows legal institutions to create their own reality by 
regimenting talk through textual representation in order to promote their own authority and 
interests” (Bucholtz 2009: 503). 
During penal trials in Burkina Faso, the court scribe responsible for the protocolling of 
trials carries out this legal transcription in French and in a highly prescribed form, writing by 
hand in the trial logbook, le plumitif. Since this record is written in French, defendants’ Jula 
utterances get recorded – and thus preserved – in the interpreter’s translated, French version 
only. “Transcripts obscure the voice of the transcriber and privilege the voice of the speaker, 
while logs subordinate the voice of the speaker to the narrating voice of the institutional 
monitor” (Bucholtz 2009: 517). This is what happens during trials in Bobo, so following this 
definition by Bucholtz, the court’s written protocol, the plumitif, can be thus designated as a 
logbook and will here be referred to as such in English.  
The manipulation of legal documents is also investigated by Mirco Göpfert, who 
describes how gendarmes in Niger go about writing their reports (Göpfert 2013). They are 
guided by a sense for the aesthetic value of their written creations and not only by pragmatic 
and legal considerations. First of all, Göpfert found, gendarmes translate the everyday 
language of their (mostly illiterate) clients into a “legally exploitable text” (Göpfert 2013: 329). 
And not only do interrogations at the police station need to be translated from spoken into 
written language, they also need to be translated from “a local language” (ibid. 2013: 329; 
Göpfert does not specify which African language) into French. For the gendarmes themselves, 
this manipulation of written records is an expression of their self-esteem and respect for their 
work; writing the report in good and readable French by leaving out the detours, the 
gendarme is giving the document and thus the case it documents legal credibility (Göpfert 
2013: 329f). 
That the official language gives legal documents credibility when put into writing is 
not a thought unique to the West African judiciary. Also in German speaking Switzerland 
police officers are expected to write their reports in German, translating their clients’ Swiss 
German variety into the so-called high language. They need to write in a way so that a judge 
can immediately understand the police report without leaving room for unanswered 
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questions.7 What is different in the West African context is the double translation that is 
needed, a formalization that takes place from an African language into French and from an 
oral version into a standard, written version of French. The place the French language is 
accorded in the justice system in Bobo today is that utterances only have any legal weight in 
a written, formalized form, which, by definition, is in French. The written police reports and 
the written protocols of trials are the legal basis upon which a case rests and according to 
which any potential future appeal can be formulated.  
There is an ever-growing amount of literature, which looks at variations of “states at 
work” (book title by Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 2014; see i.a. Alou 2001; Halaoui 2002; 
Le Roy 1997). How bureaucrats go about their jobs and the often intricate, everyday 
corruption, is the subject of study in publications writing about the justice system (Alou 2006; 
Bierschenk 2010; Blundo 2001; Hamani 2014) and beyond (for example in the health sector 
in the South West of Burkina Faso, see Ouattara 2002 or during elections in Ouagadougou 
and Pô, see Kibora 2019). Also anthroplogist Sten Hagberg, who has been conducting research 
in Burkina Faso for decades, has published on what he terms big and petty corruption 
(Hagberg 2002: 218). Of course, the justice system in Africa is not only discussed in terms of 
corruption (Gijsegem 2006 for example describes witchcraft trials in today’s Côte d’Ivoire). 
Publications pertaining to translation and interpretation specifically at court in Africa remain 
rare, however.  
In States at Work, Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014) ask themselves the general 
question what do states do when they work? They unite articles in their book which look at 
this through an exploration of the jobs of public or civil servants, how they carry these out. 
By studying the public service, the state at work “in its empirically existing form” (Bierschenk 
& Olivier de Sardan 2014: 11), we are looking at the real power center of the state, they 
believe. States deliver services through bureaucracies which are managed by public servants. 
The public servants, whom we are dealing with here are the judges, prosecutors, clerks, and 
particularly the court interpreters working for the Ministry of Justice. Here, I refer to all state 
employees as civil servants, fonctionnaires, as is generally agreed upon in the literature as 
well as colloquially. Not all civil servants are bureaucrats, however, this designation being 
 
7 See www.tagesanzeiger.ch/zuerich/stadt/deutsch-macht-polizeibewerbern-muehe/story/12738736, accessed 
3 February 2020. 
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reserved for those individuals, who are an active part of how the state institution is made to 
function.  
Alou in his 2001 exploration of the justice system had lamented the fact that this 
terrain of the public service industry as well as bureaucracy is still largely ignored by the social 
sciences (Alou 2001). This has changed over the past 20 years and quite some research has 
been dedicated to both the justice sector and to bureaucracy, as stated above. Alou had, 
innovatively at that time, looked at how and if citizens in Niger are granted access to justice. 
He did this by looking at the daily work and individual strategies of actors within the justice 
system – the judges, clerks, secretaries – and without, those who need to use the system, the 
users or citizens, and also of those that are in a sort of in-between position. These are the 
lawyers, interpreters, or the judiciary police as known in the former French colonies in West 
Africa, whose job it is, at least in theory, to serve both the users and those within the system 
of justice.  
Alou found that there are many factors that make it difficult for citizens to access 
justice, be these of a structural nature like poor coverage geographically, the plurality of 
norms or the opacity of colonial texts still in vigor, or be this by certain restrictions imposed 
on the conditions of delivery of justice, such as insufficient funds allocated to the justice 
sector. Almost the entire budget, according to Alou, that the justice sector has at its disposal, 
goes to the payment of salaries (Alou 2001: 64). The “symbolic opacity” as Alou terms the 
complexity and maze of rules, the theatrical and impressive demeanor of court personnel 
during trials, and the texts of different origin (French, Muslim, customary or traditional) all 
confuse and intimidate users and contribute to a negative image of state rendered justice in 
their eyes. 
It would of course have been interesting for us here if Alou had described in more 
detail what he had found in 2001 in terms of the plurality of norms he cites. That professional 
bureaucratic norms are particularly heterogenous in West Africa, often contradictory, equally 
often outdated (inherited from colonization), or also incomplete (leaving important sectors 
outside official regulations), makes these norms ill adapted to the local context (see also 
Bierschenk 2010: 13). This, in turn, leaves more room for informal practical norms and for the 
translation and appropriation of the system according to local social ideas. Alou’s focus had 
been another one in his article. Concluding, he notes that the justice system as it is run today 
– or was run in 2001 – is far removed from the norms and ideals that are its foundation (Alou 
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2001: 78). This seems to be still valid today, as we will see below in Fofana’s text (2018) about 
the distance of the justice system from/to its users.  
There is a vast amount of historical research that has been carried out on the role of 
interpreters and clerks during colonialism in Africa (Austen 2011; Bandia 2005; Diagne 2017; 
Lawrance et al. 2006; Mopoho 2001; Osborn 2003). The role of colonial interpreters in the 
British colony of Nigeria has been made into a movie series called Icheoku by the Nigerian 
Television Authority and discussed by researchers from literary-linguistic (Akoma 2009) and 
historical points of view (Akinwumi 2017; see anecdote below). There is also historical 
scientific work dedicated to the French system of justice in colonial French West Africa, the 
AOF (Conklin 1998; Ginio 2006; Jézéquel 2006; Mann 2009; Rodet 2011; Spittler 1973). 
There are quite some works of faction8 – accounts, stories, reports – recounting the 
lives and jobs of African clerks working in the colonial administration. They comprise 
autobiographies and biographies, most prominently Hampâte Bâ’s Mémoires I and II (1991, 
1994) in which he describes how he grew up in the French Sudan and entered the colonial 
service as clerk in the early 1900s. Wangrin, the colonial translator-interpreter par excellence, 
was eternalized in Hampâte Bâ’s seminal work of faction9 L’étrange destin de Wangrin in 
1973. Here, Hampâte Bâ describes the life of a colonial interpreter who helped colonial rule 
establish its control over the West African territories in the early 1920s (Hampâté Bâ 1973). 
As a high-ranking African clerk, he enjoyed great prestige – and was feared as well – among 
the local population and the colonial administrators alike. Wangrin had received a specialized 
education at the French colonial schools, which we will look at in our chapter on the educative 
system (chapter 4.2.). 
Also Bernard Dadié’s autobiographical novel Climbié (1952) or L’Odysée de Mongou 
by Pierre Samy (1977) narrate the lives of men working during and for the French colonial 
 
8 I had referred to faction as fact + fiction = faction. In the literary sciences, faction is a genre that uses historical 
events or people and recounts these in fictional form, albeit against a historically accurate background. One 
doyen of this genre might be Tom Wolfe, who started his career as an investigative journalist and intellectual. 
Thanks to him, we get a glimpse into investment banking, capitalism, and the lives of the super-rich in 1980s 
New York City (Bonfire of the Vanities 1987) and again in the 1990s, this time in the US American South (A Man 
in Full 1998). 
9 On the classification of Hampâté Bâ's work L'Etrange Destin de Wangrin as novel or biography, fiction or non-
fiction, see Jean-Marc Moura (2006). In anthropology, the method of transcribing observations or lived 
experiences long after the actual happening is considered debatable as reliable source of information. That is 
why I prefer designating the work Wangrin as faction and not as the "autobiography of a dead man" (Moura 
2006: 91). 
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administration, while Le vieux nègre et la médaille by Ferdinand Oyono (1956) describes the 
workings of the colonial administrative apparatus through the story of old Meka, who is 
supposed to be honored with a medal from the French administration. The colonial 
interpreter features prominently, not only translating – more often than not ending his 
translations of the French commander into Mvema with a “… and something like this” – but 
also ordering the African inhabitants around, telling them how to behave in the company of 
whites, a behavior not appreciated in the least by the colonial interpreter’s compatriots. 
In fact, what they did not appreciate was being bossed around by a fellow they 
considered to be their inferior and, anyway, “who does he think he is, this grandson of 
Pygmies? Since when do slaves impose silence upon princes? The whites have completely 
turned traditions in this country upside down! So now a good-for-nothing allows himself to 
impose silence upon kings!...” (Oyono 1956: 122).10 We note the promotion from princes to 
kings within the same paragraph. We will see how existing Burkinabe social hierarchies are 
equally overruled by bureaucratic decisions when jobs are allocated to individuals in state-
run institutions. 
Amadou Kourouma eloquently describes the unstoppable crumbling of a fictive 
kingdom in western Africa and the take-over and installation of colonial power in Monnè, 
outrages et défis (Kourouma 1990) and the role the interpreter plays in this decline. The 
interventions, the way the colonial interpreter Moussa Soumaré interpreted and translated 
helped this process considerably. Some few publications can be classified as ethnographic 
reports by literate Africans, written by schoolteachers or native chiefs, giving us insights into 
their ideas and lives and how they worked with and also profited from the colonial 
administration (Jézéquel 2006).  
By the 1930s, Jézéquel (2006) writes, the French colonial administration believed it 
important to study customary law and this mainly for practical reasons. The French 
administration believed to thus better be able to control their colonies. It subsequently 
established a committee in which European administrators and literate Africans published 
monographs to facilitate the codification of customary laws. Jézéquel cites the example of the 
native chief in Fouta Toro, who, supporting the French colonial administration and also 
 
10 “Qu’est-ce qu’il se croyait, ce petit-fils de pygmées ? Depuis quand les esclaves imposaient-ils silence aux 
princes ? Les Blancs avaient bouleversé les traditions dans ce pays ! Voilà qu’un rien du tout permettait 
d’imposer le silence aux rois !...” 
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knowing how to benefit from it, codified and reinvented customary law so that he could stay 
in control of land (Jézéquel 2006: 142f). 
By now, a system of courts had been long set up throughout the colonies. The 
installation of the so-called indigénat, a regime of administrative sanctions applying to 
colonial subjects, had followed on its heels and, by the 1930s, had been in vigor for half a 
century already (Mann 2009). About the indigénat, Mann says it provided the “legal cover, 
however scant” (Mann 2009: 334) for colonial coercion. It was “perhaps the most important 
element of the administrative tool kit” (Mann 2009: ibid.), allowing colonial administrators to 
react quickly and often violently to any challenge to their authority.  
That the position of native chief itself has been established by the colonial 
administration, including who was to occupy this post, is demonstrated by Mamdani (1999). 
The French colonizers invented and supported native chiefs and the aristocracy (Jézéquel 
2006: 147), but they did not invent native custom from scratch. More subtly, they dissected 
individual, existing customary laws in order to utilize that part of each, which served their 
colonizing interests best. This dissection and support of one specific part of tradition was done 
mainly by the African allies of the colonial administration, the so-called native chiefs 
(Mamdani 1999: 865). 
As the civilizing mission ran into resistance, the colonizing power … was compelled to 
seek local allies. Thus began a protracted process of thinking through “tradition” 
analytically, of separating its authoritarian from its popular strands. The construction 
of a “customary” law, whereby authoritarian strands in tradition would form the 
building blocks of a legal regime disciplining “natives” in the name of enforcing 
“tradition”, began in India, not in Africa (Mamdani 1999: 869). 
 
Some publications also look at the work of interpreters and intermediaries – in the widest 
sense – in pre-colonial times (Austin & Derrick 1999; Bandia 2005; Bidima 1997; Diagne 2017; 
Yankah 1995). The situation in the larger Mande world, to which Bobo belongs, is noteworthy 
because of the role linguistic and cultural brokers have always played in society. Linguists, 
griots or jeliw in Mandekan11, used to be important mediators between authorities and 
foreigners, kings and the people, religious leaders and the faithful, interpreting, advising, 
 
11 With Mandekan I refer to all inter-intelligible varieties of Mande languages, which include Jula, Mandinka 
(Amadou Kourouma’s mother tongue), and Bamana, for instance, and which are spoken in a large part of West 
Africa. Mande stands for the ethnic group, the suffix kan for language; see also faransikan = French language or 
julakan for the Jula language etc.  
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praising and thus also intervening (see Bornand 1999, 2011; Bornand et al. 2015; Conrad 
2006).  
Protocol demanded that the king do not address his people directly but pass through 
his linguist to transmit his message to the populace. Linguists had specific positions as 
embellishers of sovereigns’ words (see Yankah 1995). In the Mossi kingdoms in today’s 
Burkina Faso, for example, the Naaba, the king or chief, was expected to give orders by 
nodding his head, remaining silent, and letting his spokesperson, the linguist, speak for him. 
Hagberg calls the West African linguist the master of speech (Hagberg 2002: 237), the art of 
relaying messages being confined to this specific socio-professional category. Often, the 
people see the linguist as the servant of power-holders, as the side-kick of a king or other 
sovereign, in his employ.  
According to Bandia (2005), the linguist might embellish the king’s words, make them 
understandable and also palatable to the people, but he never altered the meaning the king 
wanted to convey (Bandia 2005: 959). This notion is at best problematic. Particularly during 
conquest, but also later on in colonial times, African sovereigns relied on the oratory skills of 
their linguists and interpreters, while the French administrators were at the complete mercy 
of and had to depend on (and trust) their interpreters since the system of rotation in vigor 
hardly left French colonial administrators enough time for language learning. The French 
colonial administrators hardly ever stayed in one place longer than one year (Lawrance et al. 
2006: 10; Spittler 1973: 211), a situation, which has not much changed in state-run institutions 
– like the justice system – in Burkina Faso today. 
With increasing Arabic influence, also other members of society such as religious 
figures like marabouts needed the intermediation of a linguist who thus became key to elitist 
intracultural (and also transcultural) communication. The marabout’s esoteric and religious 
language was not intelligible to the people but needed interpretation through a linguist. In 
the Wolof speaking world, the marabout’s linguist is called jottalikat, the relayer of the 
marabout’s message to the community (Ly 2008; see Bornand 1999: 293ff. for linguists in 
Niger and their competitive relationship with marabouts).  
It is possible to compare the work of linguists with that of today’s court interpreters 
in Burkina Faso only with regard to the triadic nature of communication. Kings, marabouts, or 
most of today’s judges spoke and speak the language used in wider society – they could use 
the language of the populace, but for reasons of protocol they did and do not speak it when 
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addressing the communities (see e.g. Yankah 1995 for the king’s linguist). This is where the 
parallels or similarities end. The actual job and particularly training for the job of a linguist can 
hardly be compared to that of today’s court interpreter. While today’s court interpreters are 
hired according to no set or agreed upon criteria and receive no formal training, linguists had 
to go through a long, hard training process. Some still do so nowadays. Since their work is 
hereditary, it often was fathers who trained their own sons in the art of and the work of a 
linguist – a linguist is not made, he is born (see Bornand 2011). 
In addition, linguists were and continue to be highly respected experts in a domain 
reserved for them, a domain which consists most visibly and well known of praise singing and 
recounting, in elaborate artistic form, the history of a people (Conrad 2006).12 Here it is 
important to insist that a specific feature of this group of intermediaries was their 
competence in both the dominant, colonial language as well as in African languages, which in 
this context were relegated to a position of language of the subalterns. Contrary to what 
Bandia (2005) writes, interpreters’ position enabled them to influence decision-making 
processes of the most important political institutions in society, as we will see shortly with 
Moussa Soumaré and Omar Sy. 
The French realized that they could not rule the vast West African territories, the AOF, 
by direct rule, they needed native allies to impose their administration and way of going about 
doing things. Or, to say it with Mamdani, “indirect rule was born of the crisis of direct rule”, 
never actually replacing it totally, but the two forms of power co-existed (Mamdani 1999: 
862). Native chiefs played a crucial part in establishing and keeping French colonial power in 
place, taking a central role in the “arena of power” (Mamdani 1999: 866).  
We just have to look at Moussa Soumaré, a former tirailleur sénégalais having served 
in the French army, who subsequently became the conquering French army’s interpreter. In 
Monnè, Ahmadou Kourouma modelled the interpreter translating for the French in their 
conquest of the fictitious Malinké kingdom of Soba on this man, retaining his real name 
Moussa Soumaré (Lievois 2007: 45-46). In the Keita kingdom, the known order is being 
disturbed by incomprehensible happenings occurring with the advance of the French 
invaders. Nothing the people do, nothing the diviners and the king foresee, makes any sense. 
 
12 Many griots today have careers as internationally acclaimed and celebrated musicians, like Salif Keita or Sidiki 
Diabate, both from Mali and to name just these two. 
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What is happening is incomprehensible, by its very nature, because in the Keita kingdom the 
people have no words with which to express what is going on. Here Soumaré has all the 
power, being the only person capable of communicating in both the conquerors’ and the 
peoples’ language; he functions as intermediary between the king of Soba and the colonial 
powers, assisting them in taking over and occupying the land by his monopoly on language. 
Soumaré addresses Djigui, the king of Soba, as his joking cousin, telling him that, 
indeed, he, Soumaré, had not translated one single word of what Djigui had said while 
“bragging” to the French (Kourouma 1990: 37).13 Kourouma, having known the interpreter, 
tells us that Soumaré was convinced that he was doing a good thing, siding with the French 
and being part of their civilizing mission. Soumaré earnestly believed that “bringing 
civilization” to his people, which he translates as “becoming tubab” (Kourouma 1990: 57) for 
lack of a better word, was the good and right thing to do. With this comment, Kourouma 
shows us that the position of colonial interpreter is not as clear cut as it might seem either 
way – Soumaré did side with the French, helping in the subjugation of his own people, and he 
did this for reasons he sincerely believed in. But he also made sure, at different occasions, 
that king Djigui keep his dignity and is spared a death sentence. His role is altogether 
ambivalent, even though he clearly assists the French in establishing themselves as the new 
masters of the territory. Interpreters’ power diminished when conquest turned to occupation 
(Lawrance et al. 2006: 20-21), but nevertheless their position continued to be crucial to the 
maintenance, the perpetuation, and establishment of colonial rule (Lawrence 2016; Conkling 
1998; see also Mamdani 1999 on indirect rule). 
Omar Sy was also a colonial interpreter, working for the French commander of Mopti, 
and was involved in an incident not quite as dramatic as the one described above with 
Soumaré, but which also demanded he take a translational decision. Sy was very attached to 
his marabout Tierno Bokar, a well-known Sufi spiritual leader of his time. Tierno Bokar was 
also a constant source of advice and spiritual guidance for Hampâté Bâ, who had been a pupil 
at Bokar’s Coran school as a child. Hampâté Bâ later wrote about his lifelong attachment to 
 
13 “Je suis ton frère de plaisanterie, donc je te connais. Comme tous les Keita tu es un fanfaron irréaliste. Je n’ai 
pas traduit un traître mot de tes rodomontades”. 
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Tierno Bokar in his autobiographies (Hâmpâté Bâ 1991, 1994) as well as in various other 
publications, including a book dedicated to Bokar’s teachings (Hâmpâté Bâ 1980).14 
It is in this book, entitled Vie et enseignement de Tierno Bokar (1980), that Hampâté 
Bâ describes the incidence involving the French commander’s interpreter Omar Sy in detail, 
starting out by describing him as being an interpreter of some renown and “[l]ike all grand 
interpreters, he was an insider to the secrets of the gods and of commanders” (Hampâte Bâ 
1980:102).15 The affair to be dealt with was a difference of opinion in how to pray, which had 
created disharmony in the Muslim community that the French commander believed to have 
to eradicate officially. Bokar was seen by the French commander of having incited this 
disharmony and was subsequently brought to trial in front of the French commander-as-
judge. 
The interpreter Omar Sy decided to intervene translationally in Tierno Bokar’s trial, 
saving Tierno Bokar from himself, so to speak. When the French commander asks Bokar a 
yes/no question, Sy understands that Bokar needs to answer with yes and so makes sure to 
elicit from Bokar this visible yes answer that will release him from punishment and end the 
affair (Hampâté Bâ 1980: 104f). Sy falsely translates the interrogating French officer’s words 
to provoke this positive answer that the French commander wants to hear. Omar Sy 
understands the context, he takes the big picture into account and had prepared the ground 
for his translational intervention accordingly. This incidence also “illustrates the challenges of 
translation in particular cultural contexts … particularly against the background of asymmetric 
relations such as that of colonialism – where the work of translation is differently deployed 
by the dominant and the dominated to serve their different locations in the political economy 
of colonial relations” (Diagne 2017: 309). 
In addition, colonial interpreters, just like court interpreters today, were expected to 
carry out their jobs by translating verbatim, like a machine, by the authorities they worked 
for – like a truchement, a tool or instrument, as Diagne names it (Diagne 2017: 311). 
Interpreters’ function was always seen as linked to, as an extension of, and thus as biased by 
authority, a view that does not do justice to interpreters’ agency (see for example Akoma 
 
14 See for example an interview given by Hampâté Bâ, recorded on vinyl: www.discogs.com/de/Amadou-
Hampaté-Ba-Tierno-Bokar-Le-Sage-De-Bandiagara-Entretiens-Sur-Tierno-Bokar-Avec-Amadou-
Hampat/release/9680415, published in 1957, last accessed 21 January 2020. 
15 “Le ‘grand interprète’ du commandant de Mopti était alors Oumar Sy, lequel était fort attaché à Tierno qui 
était son marabout. Comme tout grand interprète, il était dans les secrets des dieux et des commandants.” 
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2009) or self-serving behavior (Akinwumi 2017; see also Rottenburg 1996: 208). What these 
examples also show is that the definition of “authority” and whom to side with or serve lay 
largely with the interpreter himself. If and how it continues to be possible – or relevant – for 
court interpreters in today’s Burkina Faso to choose whom to side with is up for discussion. It 
will be deliberated on when we look more closely at language use at court in chapter five. 
In the following satirical anecdote, I want to take a small step back and briefly illustrate 
the position and role colonial interpreters created for themselves in the translating process. 
The Nigerian Television Authority created a series set in the middle stages of British 
colonialism, in roughly the period from 1842 to 1926. The court clerk commissioned to 
interpret uses his own linguistic form, mixing Igbo and English when speaking to the local 
community. He also gave this soap opera his name, Icheoku. Here is a short excerpt from the 
transcription of the film videotapes (Akinwumi 2017)16: 
 
Icheoku: Court sidon and shut-up. 
Judge (passing sentence): It is sad that we have a bully amongst us in our 
community and to serve as deterrent, the defendant will be punished by 
clearing bushes around the market square.  
Icheoku (interpreting): the offender go waka naked around the market 
square and him go come my house come sweep my compound, him go carry 
300 shillings come my house, him go also bring two tubers of yam and one 
he goat. Na wetin the judge talk be that o. No be me talk am. 
Judge: Very good Icheoku, I trust your interpretation skills. 
Icheoku: All alise (Judge walks out). 
 
The link to authority is aptly illustrated by Kourouma in Monnè, where Soumaré is convinced 
of being a good interpreter doing the right thing. Also Omar Sy is linked to authority, even in 
two senses: he is, as the French commander’s official interpreter, working for the French 
authorities during colonialism, and as such is the only person comfortable in both languages. 
But for him, Tierno Bokar is the bigger authority, more important than his French employers, 
and so he translates in Bokar’s favor. As for Soumaré, he is a figure difficult to capture, he is 
cunning, even a trickster, says Le Quellec Cottier (Le Quellec Cottier 2008: 111ff). He makes 
 
16 Olayemi Akinwumi, professor of African History at Nasarawa State University in Keffi, Nigeria, kindly let me 
use his slides presented as “’The more you see, the less you understand’: Translators and Abuse of the Judicial 
System in Colonial Nigeria” at the conference African Agency in the Construction and Reappropriation of 
Anthropological Knowledge, University of Dakar UCAD, 22-24 March 2017. 
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use of his linguistic skills and of being the only speaker of both French and Malinké – just like 
Omar Sy does, just like Wangrin does – and Soumaré uses his monopoly on language in 
support of what he deems and believes to be the good and right thing to do, the French 
conquering the Soba kingdom and West Africa.  
Some few studies look at and analyze interpreting at court in African legal contexts 
today (Fofana 2018; Kiguru 2008, 2014; Lebese 2011, 2013, 2015; Moeketsi 1999; Ouattara 
2018; Simporé 2009; Tarr 2017; Tarr & Sambou 2021). Moeketsi has done pioneering work in 
South Africa through her research on ad hoc interpreters and has consequently developed 
court interpreter training programs (Moeketsi 1999). These programs never got 
institutionalized, however, as described by Lebese, who laments the fact that court 
interpreter training programs continue to be conceptualized for and by European (or western 
or northern) contexts (Lebese 2011, 2013, 2015). Like this, South African court interpreters 
do not have any adequate models to follow that take their working environment into account 
(Lebese 2015). 
Kiguru has looked at court interpreting in Kenya from a linguistic point of view, 
analyzing interpreter mistakes and their coping strategies during trials (Kiguru 2008). He also 
looked at court interpreters’ strategies when confronted with difficult translational situations, 
such as legal jargon, slang words, or culturally bound expressions (Kiguru 2014). Kiguru’s 
empirical investigations show that court interpreters act in multiple roles in the courthouse 
and during trials (Kiguru 2014: 114). In order to cope with linguistically challenging situations 
during the interpreting process, they resort to a number of strategies, not always successfully, 
as shown in the different errors they commit. 
Like Lebese for South Africa, Kiguru found that court interpreters in Kenya did not 
receive clear instructions on the role they were expected to perform during trials. And more 
than that, they, again, should carry out their work as “an objective medium through which 
information is transferred from one language to another” (Kiguru 2014: 111), just as we have 
seen above in publications investigating court interpreting in Europe, the USA, or Australia, 
or in the French commander’s attitude toward and expectations of “his” colonial interpreter. 
Ouattara has herself worked as a court interpreter in Ouagadougou in the late 1990s, 
a profession she has consequently abandoned in favor of training as chief court scribe (greffier 
en chef). She wrote her mémoire de maîtrise (roughly the equivalent of an MA thesis in terms 
of duration of training) on court interpreters and interpreting in Burkina Faso (Ouattara 2018). 
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Before her, Simporé has written on court interpreting in Burkina Faso for the same degree 
(Simporé 2009). Both of these maîtrise theses were written at and for the state-run 
administrative training school for court personnel, the École nationale de l’administration et 
de la magistrature (ENAM), and are mainly descriptive. They allow insights into the working 
day of court interpreters in Burkina Faso from personal experience. With the exception of 
Fofana (2018), social scientific research specifically analyzing how untrained court 
interpreters are selected and consequently hired by state institutions, how they operate 
professionally, and particularly the role they are expected to play by authorities, is non-
existent for the former French colonies in West Africa.  
Fofana (2018) looks at what he calls legal distance (distance judiciaire) that the justice 
system has to those that are judged, the defendants. In a courthouse in a secondary town in 
western Burkina Faso, most people being judged are rural inhabitants; they are largely 
illiterate citizens who have a hard time following the institutionalized and rigorous court 
procedure. The court interpreter’s translations into Jula do not make their trial more 
understandable or procedure clearer to them. As a consequence, many defendants are left 
stranded – they know neither how to carry themselves nor are they instructed on how to do 
this. This sounds very familiar to what is going on in Bobo, a large city, equally in the West of 
Burkina Faso, and second only to the capital. In fact, it sounds familiar to situations found the 
world over. We will get back to this point shortly. Here, Fofana insists that it is not only the 
interpreter’s linguistic know-how that can assist defendants, but that the legal system itself 
needs to be rethought and be brought closer to the social realities of defendants.  
In a comparative study conducted in the penal courts of Dakar and Bobo, Aly Sambou 
and I have looked at how interpretation at court is handled (Tarr & Sambou 2021). In Senegal, 
a court interpreter training program has been up and running since 2014, kickstarted by a 
judge, who had always felt uncomfortable having to conduct trials in French. He consulted a 
linguist at the University of Dakar, the Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD), and together they 
compiled a glossary of legal terms in Wolof. One thing led to the next and soon he was 
mandated to set up a training program for court interpreters. 
Now, all criminel trials in Senegal are translated into the six national languages 
designated as such in the constitution. Professionally trained court interpreters are on stand-
by at courthouses throughout the country. In Dakar, two of the interpreters also translate 
from and into Arabic and English. And the correctionel trials are all conducted in Wolof. 
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What the writings on the judicial system in these countries agree upon – be this in 
Burkina Faso (Fofana 2018; Ouattara 2018; Simporé 2009; Tarr 2017; Tarr & Sambou 2021), 
Niger (Alou 2001, 2006; Hamani 2014; Göpfert 2013), Benin (Bierschenk 2008), and “French-
speaking Africa” in general (Halaoui 2002) – is that the language of the court is French, in both 
its spoken version and in writing. In addition, the language of the court is not merely French, 
but a “technical French littered with archaisms inherited from the French legal tradition” 
(Alou 2006: 168). Or, to name it with linguists, in the courtroom, legalese is spoken by the 
court members – and by them alone. All courtroom participants other than court personnel 
and particularly defendants and witnesses or plaintiffs – in some cases including the 
interpreter – have to cope with and accept this formalization of French and the impact it has 
on communication during trials and beyond. Here, we just have to think of the written court 
protocol, which is the basis for any future appeal. We will look at the practical impact French 
and interpretation can have on communication during trials in select court cases in chapter 
five. 
A research gap exists in both linguistic/language studies and the social sciences in 
what regards interpreting at court in former French colonies, where the entire justice system 
is French-oriented – linguistically, administratively, bureaucratically, in terms of procedure. 
Continued and exclusive use of the official language French in Burkina Faso’s courts seems 
counterproductive in this plurilingual country. Why continue using French if most people, 
particularly defendants, cannot speak it? No recent statistics are available documenting the 
use of French in daily life in Burkina Faso; a survey conducted in 2004 states that less than 
0,01% of Burkinabe use French as a family language (Diallo 2004: 14). Hagberg remarks that 
even those citizens who can read and write rudimentarily are hardly able to read and 
understand newspaper articles (Hagberg 2002: 227); these same citizens would not be able 
to follow court proceedings, either. And why is Wolof spoken in court in Dakar in the 
correctionnel trials, while Jula is banned from the courtroom in Bobo? Who benefits if only 
judges and prosecutors can use French?  
We need a more thick description by looking at language policies and ideologies across 
time and also at the rules a state-run institution imposes upon its members, expecting them 
to follow and adhere to them. A state-run institution imported from elsewhere, moreover, 
where it had been created according to local social realities which differ from the ones found 
in Burkina Faso. The rules and concepts, practices, and the bureaucracy created and which 
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made sense at one point in time and elsewhere are then carried along and across time and 
space. Here, it becomes pertinent to understand not just the why, but how these concepts, 
practices, and rules continue to be applied and used by individuals – court members, in our 
case, and their use of French, but also by the public, the everyday citizens. One highly visible 
example of a practice imported from elsewhere under conditions of colonialism is the wigs 
court members still wear during trials in some former British colonies such as in Ghana; a 
usage largely abandoned in Britain, from where it had been imported to Africa originally. 
The continued use of French in the courtroom might not be as conspicuous as the 
wearing of wigs, but has become a habit, a “rule of the game” citizens seem to agree upon. 
Even without it being specifically codified in writing, everybody “knows” – and agrees – that 
French is the language to be used for all government affairs. The institutionalization of French 
at court might have its origin elsewhere and in the administration of colonial rule, its 
reproduction is assured also through what Bourdieu defined as habitus (Bourdieu 2013), an 
internalization of the social order.17 The practices we are investigating here might be less 
“visible” than white wigs on African judges’ heads, but the role the French language plays at 
court and during penal trials in Bobo today continues to interfere with and impact ordinary 
people’s lives.  
The institutionalization of French at court in Burkina Faso is more than citizens 
following unwritten rules (and/or not questioning these), however. It is also one aspect of a 
bureaucratization of government work, in which civil servants are instructed and taught to 
adhere to a set of rules and to codified laws. Constellations of power and knowledge are thus 
created through education, made visible in the present-day courtroom in the continued, 
mandatory use of French, the Amtssprache in Burkina Faso. I prefer this German term because 
it captures more honestly the functional and bureaucratic nature of a language of the state, 
of what is designated as official language in English or langue officielle in French. 
The power asymmetries inherent in an institution using and imposing an Amtssprache, 
a language of state bureaucracy and of the fonctionnaire, the civil servant or bureaucrat, are 
 
17 Olivier de Sardan does not believe the concept of habitus as defined by Bourdieu is really applicable in the 
way Bourdieu had intended it. Olivier de Sardan finds that is has “two major weaknesses: (a) it has no real 
empirical foundation and remains a black box; (b)… it is almost exclusively centered on the internalization of the 
process of domination" (Olivier de Sardan 2014: 408). I have a hard time agreeing with Olivier de Sardan and 
believe that, indeed, Bourdieu has something to offer us in terms of understanding the use of French by citizens 
in Burkina Faso. 
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immediately graspable, it is almost palpable, in the designation Amtssprache. Only those who 
have trained for a state job, an Amt, often for many years in addition to formal basic 
schooling, have also been trained in and can use this language in their working life and outside 
with ease. But to those Burkinabe, who have had little schooling in formal education and who 
are confronted with an Amt in form of the court, this language used in state institutions is not 
accessible. Designating French as langue officielle hides these inherent power asymmetries 
between the (educated) fonctionnaire and state institution and the (uneducated, illiterate) 
citizen. And indeed, the majority of defendants being tried at either of the two penal courts 
in Bobo are illiterate or barely educated young men (see also Fofana 2018). 
In practice, French is the language of the public service and it continues to “colonize” 
peoples’ lives. In Burkina Faso, this colonization-through-language starts with the first day of 
school, when children are confronted with the official language French, often for the first time 
in their lives (see Mayrhofer-Deák 2009) – we will discuss the Amtssprache in the formal 
educative system in chapter 4.2. below – and it continues in everyday situations such as on 
written street signs or at any government office. And it culminates in the written French 
instructions glued to the courtroom wall prohibiting the use of cell phones in the TGI in Bobo 
– not as a pictogram, but in writing. Indeed, the irritation Antoine experiences in being 
addressed with his French or Christian name at home gives way to very different feelings 
when he is at court because here, being called Antoine is proof of him belonging, being a 
member of the court and by extension a member of the larger community of Burkinabe 
fonctionnaires.  
By researching interpreting practices in a courtroom in Burkina Faso, we are looking 
at procedures and how they are adhered to by court members, bureaucrats who are 
employees representing the state. In order to understand why French is the mandatory 
language in court, we need to look at these procedures and analyze them as social-political 
and discursive processes which deal with the past and with the institutional setting of order 
and protocol – of how things are done. And of how things that were once imposed become 
internalized habits (Bourdieu 2013). We are also looking at how the state is represented. 
This representation has created a space for the institutionalization of specific power 
relations, which pose challenges to some actors and offer opportunities to others. This 
specific aspect of how a government institution is run, we will look at more closely when we 
discuss the translation or appropriation of a system into a new place below. The situation at 
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court and during trials in Burkina Faso is quite extraordinary because the vast majority of trials 
need interpretation. What we are looking at are procedures in a highly prescribed 
environment that are obsessively (Eades’s words, see Eades 2000: 189) adhered to by the civil 
servants working at court– as if they were following a script in a play. 
In fact, the justice system functions in a highly formalized manner – be this in 
Switzerland or in Burkina Faso, or anyplace else, for that matter. It functions as an institutional 
apparatus based on norms which are, on the one hand, derived from a specific culture, but it 
also pursues specific normative objectives. And lastly, the justice system only operates in the 
way that its functionaries, the civil servants and especially the bureaucrats among them, 
interpret it locally. They, as representatives of the state, are the performers or “imposers” of 
these rules that have been authored by the state. They do this – they appropriate the justice 
system – also to their own ends. 
 
2.2. Translation, appropriation, domestication: the travelling bureaucracy 
We have spent a lot of time discussing translation and interpretation in its purely linguistic 
meaning. The literature presented above is by far not exhaustive, but allows us a pretty good 
grasp and an understanding of what interpretation entails practically and how those who 
commissioned it expect interpretation to be carried out. We could now, of course, go into 
detail on what exactly interpretation entails in practical-technical terms – how Antoine and 
his colleague Salomon at the appeals court consult the penal code or talk about legal terms 
with their superiors, the judges, and also the memorization, quick thinking and decision 
making during trials. For a description of the work of court interpreters in Bobo and Burkina 
Faso, on the institution and bureaucracy that guides and dominates it, more detail on the 
actual act of interpretation is not conducive. We get the picture. As announced earlier, I will 
rather bring our discussion to another concept or theory in the social sciences which is also 
referred to as translation and which directly applies to our investigation at hand – cultural or 
ethnographic translation (Asad 1986; Bachmann-Medick 2009; Clifford and Marcus 1986; 
Leavitt 2014; Mignolo & Schiwy 2003 also speak of colonial translation). What role do the 
court interpreters play in this, what is their part – will we find the savior of innocent 
defendants? 
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With the increasing globalization of world society or increasing global cultural 
encounter, it has become more and more important to develop and put a name on the 
translation of concepts across cultures (and disciplines) that the social sciences and 
particularly anthropology have in fact always engaged in. In academia, various and varied 
debates on inter- or transdisciplinarity, on an understanding of the contact zones that have 
emerged between disciplines and the tension therein, feed into these ruminations as well. 
The discussion came and stayed and it got a name: Bachmann-Medick designates the 
acknowledgment and the entry into academic research of new ways of conceptualizing 
translation as the translational turn (Bachmann-Medick 2009). 
This opening up of translation to a broader meaning had been under way at least since 
James Clifford and George E. Marcus curated Writing Cultures in 1986. This book might not 
have directly pertained to translation per se, but constitutes a turn in academic thinking about 
ethnography and how we anthropologists go about doing our jobs. And this includes how we 
analyze our data and how we present our findings, how we translate the knowledge we have 
gained. 
Beyond the designations cultural, colonial, or ethnographic translation, the 
translational process has yet experienced another, related nuance in that it discusses the 
transfer or the move of objects into a new environment and their embedment into this new 
place. It is variously discussed as appropriation or domestication in the literature (see i.a. Beck 
2001 Aneignung; Behrends, Park & Rottenburg 2014 venacularization, appropriation; Callon 
1984 domestication; Hahn 2004 appropriation; Kohl 2001 Aneigung; Rottenburg 1996 
intercultural translation; Kaufmann & Rottenburg 2012 Translation; Spittler 2002 Aneignung).  
Beck (2001) discusses the process of appropriating a thing into a local context, 
focusing on the creativity of the appropriators in making this thing workable, the modification 
and change it needs in order to be usable for their ends and in their environment. In “The 
Appropriation of the Machine” (Die Aneignung der Maschine), Beck describes how a diesel 
motor was reappropriated by farmers in the Nile valley in Sudan, replacing a perfectly 
functionable 2000 year-old technology they had been using to irrigate their fields. 
The introduction of new technology also necessitates a reorganization of the technical 
environment, Beck finds, and a new institutional embedment (Beck 2001: 71). The vocabulary 
Beck uses shows the direction his specific discussion of the redefinition of a technological 
apparatus takes. Next to the most prominent use of “appropriation”, he talks about 
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assimilation, recontextualization, and social appropriation. Beck also insists that even though 
creativity, a talent for improvisation, a certain affinity for technological craftmanship were all 
necessary to make the diesel motor work in its new, dry, hot environment and fulfilling its 
new function – to pump water from the river to the fields – this appropriation had nothing to 
do with inventing or making something from scratch (Beck 2001: 77). 
It is rather a redefinition of this thing the diesel motor, a redefinition that comes with 
the freedom and flexibility of those who were not instructed, educated to use it according to 
its original function. They can thus modify this thing to make it work for them and according 
to their own needs. The farmers in the Nile valley were not subject to any orthodox tradition 
defining what this diesel motor was supposed to and should do and this gave them the 
interpretive freedom of action necessary to appropriate it and to make it work for them.  
In his publication reflecting on consumption and on global goods, Hahn too talks about 
appropriation (Hahn 2004). Whereas Beck described one specific object that was 
appropriated locally, Hahn’s focus is on a more general discussion of concepts of 
consumption. He dissects the process an object is subjected to on its way from being a 
commodity available on the market to being a personal good (Hahn 2004: 218). Hahn also 
enumerates the terminology researchers apply in their discussions on appropriation: 
domestication, taming, and nostrification emphasize the active side of appropriation. In fact, 
without a creative aspect, Hahn contends along with Beck, appropriation is not conceivable 
(Hahn 2004: 221). 
At the same time, however, creativity of appropriation does not necessarily mean 
something was appropriated voluntarily. More often than not, people had never asked for 
these things, they had had no say so in their appropriation, such as soap in Zimbabwe, for 
example. It took 30 years for soap to enter the everyday lives of Zimbabweans, who today 
refer to soap as being important (Hahn 2004: 223). So, certain forms of rejection or negative 
connotations are also a form of appropriation, Hahn finds. In the end, appropriation as a 
process can explain how global goods become recognized as being part of local identity and 
can show up new ways of dealing with the familiar (Hahn 2004: 226f). 
Like Hahn, also Kohl discusses appropriation and globalization, but right at the 
beginning of his article reminds us that it would be more honest to speak of Euro-
Americanization or westernization than of globalization (Kohl 2001: 8). Globalization is often 
resisted – international scientific conferences in France receive government funds only if the 
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official conference language is French – and can equally often reinforce or revitalize local 
cultural habits (Kohl 2001: 8f). 
The appropriation of global goods into local contexts is also a very pragmatic 
undertaking and coupled with the attractiveness of specific articles allows consumers to 
partake in the prestige of the exotic (Kohl 2001: 16). Kohl here mentions that the African mask 
on a German living room wall and the refrigerator in an African house fulfill the same purpose 
of putting objects of prestige on show and thus endowing their owners with a certain air 
(aristocratic, elitist, important at the least). Kohl also emphasizes the fact that appropriation 
of objects is a creative process, a type of Levi-Straussian bricolage. Here, too, the 
“appropriators” make use of that which is already there, the original intended use of the 
appropriated object being irrelevant (Kohl 2001: 17). 
What these discussions of appropriation so far agree on is that appropriation of goods, 
be this technology like the diesel motor or consumer goods like soap or objects of prestige 
like a fridge, is a creative process in which something that already exists in some form is made 
into something new adapted to local needs and circumstances. Rottenburg (1996) 
complements this discussion by adding his description of the translation of a system of formal 
organization. Not only physical objects are transferred or moved someplace else and 
appropriated by the locals to fit their needs, also institutions and how they are run are moved 
and subsequently adapted. Rottenburg thus directs the discussion towards the present 
examination of the import or move and subsequent appropriation of the French system of 
justice and all it entails – its organization, bureaucracy, and formal/institutionalized rules and 
regulations – into local Burkinabe society. 
Rottenburg begins his discussion by laying down the fact that “the import of western 
artifacts, ideas and models has, of course, not come to an end with liberation from colonial 
rule…. However, the fact that the model of formal organization has spread all over the world 
… [allows the observation that] the structures modelled on those of the western, usually the 
ex-colonial powers, function totally differently in practice” (Rottenburg 1996: 192f). So 
organizations base their orientation upon a model that, in their view, is successful. Rottenburg 
calls this process of imitation modeling (Rottenburg 1996: 194). The goal of the imitators is to 
appear more modern and rational. Modeling does not automatically lead to success or to a 
reduction of uncertainty, however. Indeed, there seems to be a contradiction between the 
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wide distribution and popularity of certain organizational models and their ineffectiveness in 
many parts of the world (Rottenburg 1996: 202). 
This contradiction Rottenburg explains through an examination of how local 
conditions governing the emergence of formal organization must look like, particularly in the 
context of informal networks as we find them on the ground in many African societies and 
certainly in Burkina Faso (his research for these observations was carried out in southern 
Sudan). Take bureaucracy and gift exchange as related to networks. Gift exchange is one 
crucial aspect of reciprocity, which, in turn, is a prominent way of establishing, creating, 
maintaining, and grooming relationships – of networking, if you wish, and to translate it into 
a pragmatic European expression. 
When the local world view is based on an “ideology of kinship” (Rottenburg 1996: 
203), which demands certain forms of reciprocity, this does not automatically mean that all 
partners in the exchange are equals exchanging equal values. On the contrary, “in societies 
that praise generalized reciprocity people have an indisputable right to be different and to be 
treated differently” (Rottenburg 1996 ibid.). The conditions for the exchange are already 
established and have to do with aspects relating to age, social status, gender, seniority. 
Institutional organization, bureaucracy, challenges this right to be different, so the people 
working within a bureaucratic system have to negotiate between different legitimacy 
discourses, as Rottenburg terms it (Rottenburg 1996: 205) or, stated differently, they 
constantly have to navigate between the exigencies of their job as civil servants and their 
obligations towards friends and family. Different conceptualizations of hierarchy meet – or 
clash – in the courtroom; the administrative-bureaucratic exigency that all citizens be treated 
equally and local Burkinabe ideas on the social hierarchization of citizens.  
The core of formal organization as found in a bureaucratic organization such as the 
justice system lies in a certain form of rationalization. This rationalization is based on the 
principles of efficiency and of symmetry, which means selection of the most expedient means 
for any given purpose and the identical treatment of identical cases (Rottenburg 1996: 210). 
The essence of this is a certain way of organizing reality through the introduction of order, 
which is made possible by the keeping of files – only what is written down has any value and 
can be used in court, as mentioned above.  
On the one hand, then, bureaucratic organization is an ideal strived for, it bestows an 
air of modernity and prestige upon its adherents the civil servants or fonctionnaires and on 
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the bureaucrats. On the other hand, however, the functioning of a bureaucratically run 
organization is contrary to local social values such as social hierarchization or reciprocity and 
the right to be different – certain relationships can simply not be ignored, be this in the 
allocation of jobs or in how cases are treated. It is a slalom walk for actors who handle this 
tension by choosing and alternating between the different legitimacy discourses at the right 
moment. 
Ultimately, “the reciprocity ethos is only a representational model, though. There is 
always enough scope in practice for people to see to their own advantage” (Rottenburg 1996: 
208). The tension between an imported model and its installation and functioning on the 
ground are resolved by actors’ pragmatic decisions and careful weighing of options allowing 
them, ideally, the best of both worlds. This decision-making we can also designate as a kind 
of shopping – actors decide according to how they believe they can achieve a most favorable 
result, shopping among the possibilities open to them. We will later discuss tools actors have 
at their disposition and that they consequently can shop for. 
What bureaucratic organization also brings with it is a system of experts, since only 
people schooled accordingly can run the apparatus. Civil servants – in our specific case judges, 
prosecutors, court scribes – must navigate different and differing legitimacy discourses in the 
running of the imported system. As the experts who keep it running, it is them who can decide 
how, exactly, they make the system work. This aspect of appropriation is evoked by Macamo 
and Neubert in their chapter “The New and its Temptations” (2008), where they also 
elaborate on the figure of the expert. 
The diesel motor facilitating farmers’ lives in the Nile valley did not need any experts 
to function properly. On the contrary, the bricoleurs who adapted it to their needs did not 
have to undergo any kind of schooling; they were experts in their own right. The civil servant 
working in the justice system in Burkina Faso, on the other hand, is at the same time the 
expert who makes the imported system function and also the appropriator of this system, an 
expert-bureaucrat, making it function according to needs, possibilities, and personal 
preferences. 
In spite of their successful appropriation and handling of the diesel motor, the farmers 
did not construct it or make it from scratch, we have seen. They are dependent on others to 
develop and make this product; they are dependent on experts (Macamo & Neubert 2008: 
293). Macamo and Neubert discuss products of modernity and embed this discussion in the 
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concepts of globalization and modernization. Like Hahn and Kohl, they want to shed light on 
processes involved in translating a global product into a local context and on the agency of 
local actors involved in this process. The appropriation of things and influences coming from 
the outside are, in fact, a result of local actors’ agency, but individual agency is never all 
encompassing, as we have also seen with the Nile valley farmers and their machine (Macamo 
& Neubert 2008: 272). 
Macamo and Neubert’s central question here is how do people react to the new, to 
outside influences? They enumerate as examples not only things (industrial products, 
technology), but also ideas such as democracy and freedom. And an important aspect of this 
question we need to keep in mind is: is the imported thing or idea attractive or a threat or 
simply unimportant to actors (Macamo & Neubert 2008: 272)? The discussion is organized 
around the spread of institutions throughout the world, institutions which come with a 
culture of experts. The process of translation is under continuous negotiation by the experts 
the institution itself breeds. 
Along similar lines as Rottenburg, Macamo and Neubert direct our attention to the 
fact that the expert system, upon which the institution rests, introduces forms of social 
differentiation into the local community that differ from established social hierarchies 
(Macamo & Neubert 2008: 297). This forces users to rethink their own values and ideas on 
status, prestige, and the role individuals play, for example, and brings to the fore issues of 
power and trust. Tradition is not static. 
Macamo and Neubert use as an example modern medicine as the first expert system 
to be introduced in developing countries (Macamo & Neubert 2008: 294ff). Apart from the 
claim to being the first product of modernity to be transferred – we also find the designation 
transplantation in the literature, see Tamanaha 1993 (discussed later in the chapter on legal 
pluralism) – to Africa from the global north, their observations pertain to the justice system 
as well. Burkina Faso, like most African countries, cannot afford to produce or maintain what 
Macamo and Neubert call products of modernity; they are dependent on other countries for 
access to such products (Macamo & Neubert 2008: 284). Translating the justice system into 
local Burkinabe reality includes keeping a system upright and running without the resources 
required to do so (see also Bierschenk 2008).  
We have established that actors need to rethink their own value systems when they 
are confronted with an institution imported from someplace else. Some products people can 
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ignore or reject, but others they are constrained to deal with. The justice system, like modern 
medicine, have both come to stay and they influence the everyday permanently. Macamo 
and Neubert also point out that these expert systems might be alien to local thinking and thus 
remain isolated. This does not mean that local ideas and norms cannot be changed, but it 
means that we need to look closely to see if these expert systems are accessible for local 
agency (Macamo & Neubert 2008: 300). As long as they cannot be accessed by citizens they 
continue to be perceived as somewhat bizarre, exotic, or simply incomprehensible and out of 
reach. How citizens adapt and appropriate these institutions is, then, a constant balancing act 
which reaches into the very heart of societal organization, Macamo and Neubert conclude. 
Now let us look at how actors or experts within this particular expert system which is 
the justice system and the court go about their everyday jobs. To start with an example, I 
want to put a penal trial in Bobo on stage, replete with actors, props, audience. A penal trial 
lends itself wonderfully to be described as a play simply because by its very setting (the 
delimited space of the courtroom is like a theater), form (actors with their designated roles 
are on a stage; audience in its own, designated space), and procedure (recognizable beginning 
and end; script) it resembles a play. For this we will ask Erwin Goffman to lend us a hand. In 
fact, with Goffman we can see the theatrical appearance of a trial and go far beyond the 
setting, form, and procedure. Goffman will also help us understand why certain actors act the 
way they do. 
 
2.3. Erwin Goffman’s dramaturgical take on trials – performance and impression 
management 
Goffman is an analyst of the everyday, of people going about their mundane occupations, 
which he is particularly sensitive to and describes in great detail. His approach in research is 
bottom-up, says Hacking, because he “scrupulously noted the social exchanges between 
individuals, not only the words, but also the tone, the accent, the body language, the gestures, 
the withdrawals, the silences” (Hacking 2004: 278). Goffman starts with individual face-to-
face exchanges and develops an account of how such exchanges constitute lives – from the 
particular to a more general “making up people” (Hacking 2004: 278). In his The Presentation 
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of Self in Everyday Life (1956)18, Goffman quotes examples from studies conducted in 
restaurant kitchens, gas stations, shipyards, and factories.  
At the same time, Goffman is difficult to place, says Posner, describing him as a kind 
of “enigma in academic sociology” (Posner 1978: 67) because of his silence in what regards 
theory or methodology. Goffman seems to have exasperated his colleagues, who saw him as 
a snob and consequently ignored him, while students adored his accessible style and 
presentations full of real-life anecdotes (Posner 1978: 67, footnote 3). It is, indeed, a dearly 
held cliché in academic writing, particularly outside the English-speaking world, that the more 
difficult a read you are, the better and more valuable your insights must be. Goffman, who 
wrote “painstaking analyses of the nooks and crannies of everyday life” (Posner 1978: 70), 
had a style bordering on what could be termed contemplative narrative – he wrote accessibly, 
with profound insight and thoughtfulness (Goffman 1989: 124)19, providing many examples 
which were often extremely funny in an everyday or down to earth kind of way. 
Goffman employed a dramaturgical world view, outlining basic themes of social life 
that are a central aspect of many of his publications. For us, The Presentation of Self in 
Everyday Life (1956), his notions of personal front, of front region and back region or stage 
behavior and the “complex art of impression management” (Posner 1978: 69) are the lens 
through which we will look at the action taking place during penal trials in Bobo. 
These follow a predictable choreography, visible to the frequent observer and known 
to court personnel. The enactment of a trial is complete with all things needed to perform a 
play: props, costumes, roles clearly defined, an audience, and a script the actors follow, 
performing their assigned character. Often the play is a drama, like when two defendants get 
down on their knees crying, begging the judge to not send them to prison for too long. 
Sometimes it is a comedy, for example when a barely literate defendant insists on speaking 
French to the amusement of both judges and audience. But it might depend on the spectator.  
The legal system in the former French colonies in West Africa is based on civil law, 
procedure is inquisitorial. This means interrogation of defendants, witnesses, and victims or 
 
18 The published version of The Presentation of Everyday Life is 1959; it is this version authors usually quote. The 
version I am working with here is an earlier manuscript dated 1956 which is available online. To my knowledge, 
it differs only in page numbering from the later, printed version of 1959. 
19 In 1989, Lyn H. Lofland published a transcribed and edited version of a tape-recorded speech Goffman gave 
at the Pacific Sociological Association Meeting in 1974, where he talked about fieldwork, a topic he never 
published on. I will here refer to this text as Goffman 1989; see 
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/089124189018002001.  
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plaintiffs during trials is carried out by judges and prosecutors; there is no jury.20 This system 
indeed attributes clearly defined roles to the participants in the courtroom space. The 
prosecutor, who brings the case to trial as the accusing instance, is by definition the bad guy 
in this play, like anywhere in a trial, for that matter. Judges are, again by definition, the neutral 
instance or arbiters, this is their role: they need to listen to everybody’s side of the story in 
order to come to a fair and adequate decision, the verdict. This in theory at least.  
With Eades we had seen that this neutral role of judges is highly contested (Eades 
2000: 187). Indeed, in Bobo judges practically always accept the prosecutor’s accusation, 
translating it into a guilty verdict, we will see. In most cases, no defense lawyers are present. 
The whole trial is thus imbalanced, giving a lot of room to accusation, almost none to defense. 
This, too, needs to be taken into account. 
In the courtroom in Bobo, we further find ourselves in what Mary Louise Pratt calls a 
contact zone, a space where “cultures meet, clash and grapple with each other, often in 
contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power….” (Pratt 1991: 34). The institutional 
organization of the justice system meets a local world view. Two ways of conceptualizing 
social hierarchies and what (hierarchical) space specific individuals can and are allowed to 
occupy meet and sometimes clash in the courtroom; also different conceptualizations of how 
to speak justice meet here. And of course, languages meet and clash, grappling with each 
other: Burkinabe defendants speaking Jula are judged by julaphone Burkinabe judges 
speaking French. Accompanying this meeting of two different ways of conceptualizing we also 
find social class, socioeconomic background, and education of participants in the courtroom 
that meet and clash.  
In this dramaturgical model people are thus constructed as actors, their lines largely 
already written for them and their roles predetermined by the format of a play and the setting 
(Davies and Harré 1990: 54f). When people appear in court as defendants, their aim is, 
normally, to make themselves understood to the court, to being heard. For prosecutors and 
in particular for judges, the aim is to gather enough material for a solid verdict. We are 
 
20 Until recently, and while research was being carried out, during assizes trials, held ideally once or twice a year 
at the appeals court in Bobo, a jury of six men and women was sworn in from a pool of citizens who have been 
chosen prior to the beginning of the assizes’ session (field journal, Bobo 13 June 2016). It seems that this practice 
has been abandoned since, the jury now consisting exclusively of legal professionals, see 
www.facebook.com/permalink.php?id=1534293386675084&story_fbid=1714727741964980, last accessed 26 
November 2019. This defeats the very purpose of a jury, which consists of randomly chosen citizens living within 
the court’s jurisdiction. Like this, it is believed, a verdict will be pronounced more neutrally.  
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treading on judges’ and prosecutors’ territory, insiders who are clearly at an advantage, who 
know the ropes, carrying out – performing – their profession in this space daily. They know 
how to act, they have studied and learned their script by heart in years of higher education 
and subsequent professional experience. Interpreters, through years of carrying out their 
work translating trials, know how to act as well. Their position at court might be undefined or 
hazy, but since they have been performing their duties as secretaries, liaison officers, and 
interpreters, they, too, know how trials are performed and what is expected of them. 
So, the courtroom provides the space for this play, the trial, to be performed. The 
team of actors consists of three judges, one prosecutor, and one court scribe, all clad in the 
black robe, insignia of their profession. “In general … a set of individuals who co-operate in 
staging a single routine may be referred to as a performance team or, in short, a team” 
(Goffman 1956: 48). The court interpreter is not immediately recognizable either as a member 
of the team or as court interpreter. Later in our discussion we will see that the question of 
him being or not a member of the team is highly contested. For now, describing a trial as a 
play, the reason why he is not immediately recognizable as either a team member or as court 
interpreter is the simple fact that he does not wear the black robe. In addition, he also 
officiates as the clerk preparing the courtroom prior to the opening of trials, which means he 
does not enter the courtroom together with the visibly recognizable team members. He is, 
until this point, neither part of the team nor of the play.  
But then, as soon as trials are opened, this officiating clerk transforms into the court 
interpreter and acts during the show; he knows the script and the procedures to follow. In 
this sense and on stage, he is clearly a member of the performing team. Hence, as a person, 
he is both – a member of the team (as interpreter) and not a member of the team (as court 
clerk). This simultaneous belonging and not belonging is one aspect of the position and role 
of the interpreter at court. We will get back to this in more detail in chapter 4.5.  
Also defendants are difficult to place according to the three basic roles Goffman 
distinguishes according to their function and necessity for the performance of a show: 
performer, audience, outsider (Goffman 1956: 90). Defendants are both outsiders because 
they come to the courtroom from outside the building and they are performers because they 
are an integral part of the show.  
According to Goffman, anybody in the performing team can theoretically be its 
director, but usually this privilege falls to the individual who “dominates the show” (Goffman 
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1956: 60). Here, this would be the presiding judge, seated in the middle between his two 
colleagues during the performance. He is the one who allocates turns in speaking, the right 
to speak, who decides when who says what to whom and in which language. He is thus the 
director of the show, while at the same time playing an active part in the performance he 
directs. 
While the performance is well known to and thus a routine to the team performing 
the show, it is a struggle for others. The members of the court know the procedure and the 
choreography of trials by heart, but the audience, defendants, witnesses, and 
victims/plaintiffs – in short, those coming from the outside – are not familiar with courtroom 
procedure. And why should they? Going to court is not an everyday situation, but quite an 
extreme occurrence, something out of the ordinary for anybody not working at the court. 
The performative nature of trials is visible not only in the robe clad bodies of the civil 
servants working there, but also in the geographical or physical arrangement of the 
courtroom and its props, including impressive furniture, chosen according to hierarchical 
position of performing actors. The three judges’ and the prosecutor’s chairs are large black 
office chairs, upholstered in fake leather, complete with a high back you can rest your head 
against, armrests, and wheels. These chairs can swivel. The court scribe sits on a chair not 
quite as large. The interpreter also has his own, designated chair, similar to the one the court 
scribe sits on. That we are attending a play is further visible in the costumes court personnel 
wear – with the exception of the interpreter, we have seen.  
Goffman notes that court personnel “will be arranged in the manner … so that the 
eye, starting from any point in the room will be led to the royal centre of attention. The royal 
star of the performance may also be dressed more spectacularly and seated higher than 
anyone else present” (Goffman 1956: 62). Even though the star of the performance at the 
penal courts in Bobo, the presiding judge, might not be royal, he is quite impressive seated in 
his high-backed chair behind the huge desk and flanked by his two colleagues.  
In this strategic context there are two planes for activity which serve as a framework 
here to further explore courtroom interaction and communication: front region and back 
region or backstage (Goffman 1956: 13ff). During trials we are in what Goffman designates as 
the front region, open to the public, where court members behave according to front region 
rules and etiquette and where they present a personal front adapted to the occasion. They 
enter the front region from a place neither visible nor permissible to the audience, the 
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backstage. There, rules of behavior are more relaxed. Individual actors moving between the 
two spaces need to adapt their behavior accordingly. So not only do court members need to 
navigate between the local world view and the rules that come with the running of the justice 
system, they also need to switch modes of how they present themselves according to where 
and with whom they are interacting. As soon as the five court members enter the front region 
for a trial, they adapt their facial expressions and how they carry themselves to the solemn 
situation at hand, walking into the courtroom slowly and with dignity. This is, of course, not a 
particularity of Burkinabe courtrooms, but visible in Switzerland and other places as well.  
The front region thus also includes, next to the physical equipment or props, what 
Goffman designates as the “personal front” (Goffman 1956: 14ff). Actors accompany their 
performance with certain expressive equipment, like insignia of office or rank – their black 
robes – and by their posture, gestures, facial expressions, and speech patterns, among other 
characteristics. The interpreter seems slightly apart from the other court members, not only 
because he is the only one not wearing a black robe. He is not immediately placeable, or 
classifiable, and differently than the robe-clad solemn court members, his performance can 
be quite nonchalant – he lies in his chair, legs outstretched, or consults his cell phone while 
translating. What does his behavior express and what does it mean? That trials are a 
performance is thus visible both in the décor, in the dress, and in the attitude court members 
adopt – the solemn air of the robe-clad members as well as the interpreter’s apart 
performance and casual attitude.  
From the point of view of judges and prosecutors, the role the interpreter is expected 
to play is that of the so-called conduit, translating verbatim. We have read that this is the 
attitude judges and prosecutors hold in regard to the court interpreter’s work in many and 
different places the world over. Goffman describes another type of role, of “… performers 
[who] will be concerned with the appearance that they make and concerned with little else…. 
It may be remarked that an individual with [such] a purely ceremonial role need not have a 
dramatically dominant one” (Goffman 1956: 64). If, indeed, there are ceremonial roles acted 
out during trials and if we can describe the court interpreter’s role as purely ceremonial, will 
be part of our analysis.  
In the back region or backstage (Goffman 1956: 70ff), actors can let down their hair. 
In the front region activities are performed in the presence of others, so certain aspects of an 
activity need to be suppressed in favor of the impression we want to give. In the back region, 
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on the other hand, these suppressed ways of going about an activity can make an appearance. 
Commonly, the back region or backstage is located near to where the front region activity 
takes place, but is shielded and separated from it. It is here the performer knows that no 
member of the audience will intrude. Goffman goes on to note that it is a widely practiced 
technique of impression management that the entire back region be kept hidden from the 
audience since it is here that performers behave “out of character” – control of the backstage 
is vital.  
Control of access to the front region is a point Goffman takes up as well, saying that 
the original two kinds of bounded regions – front and back regions – need to be extended. A 
third space needs to be defined, a third region he names the outside (Goffman 1956: 82ff). 
The two regions front and back can be rooms within a bounded area or building and can serve 
both as a front or as a back region, depending on the situation. These rooms are cut off from 
the outside because of the natural boundary of the walls of the building. Those individuals 
who are on the outside of the building and who come inside for one reason or another we 
can call outsiders. 
Goffman’s description of outsiders conforms to how he allocates function, 
information, and place to the individuals present during a performance. In this sense, he 
differentiates between the performers, the audience, and outsiders. All contribute, in their 
own, allocated way, to the smooth running of the show. And all these roles can be described 
on the basis of the regions to which the role-players have access: the performers have access 
to both the front and back regions, the audience appears only in the front region, and the 
outsiders are excluded from both regions (Goffman 1956: 90). This poses a dilemma for us 
here because above, I have identified plaintiffs/victims, defendants, and witnesses as 
outsiders. They are outsiders but they have a part in the performance, I have argued.  
As Goffman has also warned, we need to handle the notion of outside with care or we 
might get confused or misled (Goffman 1956: 82). He concedes as well that “in actual fact”, 
description of roles according to function, information, and place is not as clear cut as theory 
would have it. There are what he terms discrepant roles certain individuals play – he names 
the traitor, turncoat, the spy, or the go-between or mediator, among others. How and if we 
can make use of a Goffmanian allocation of roles, discrepant or conforming, is left to be seen 
further on. 
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Goffman gives insights into the performative nature of how trials are conducted by 
actors. The civil servants performing this play, particularly judges and the prosecutor, work as 
experts in a system, which at the same time creates and maintains subordinate members in 
Burkinabe society. Or rather, the justice system as it is run by the bureaucrat-cum-experts, 
keeps those members of society subordinate who were already subordinate citizens to start 
out with. By looking at the language politics in vigor at courts in Burkina Faso, we can come 
to an understanding of the part language plays in the production and maintenance of 
inequality. The courtroom and trials are a mirror image of the socio-economic and linguistic 
realities of the everyday larger society in which “[l]anguage is one particularly important 
means for the construction of relations of social difference and social inequality” (McElhinny 
2016: 279) even if not the only one. By virtue of their socio-economic status, their poor 
educative niveau, their lack of funds to pay for a defense lawyer, and particularly their 
moderate or non-existent French skills, defendants are left with no bargaining power to either 
navigate or influence their trial. They, too, perform according to their allocated role. 
What Goffman cannot assist us in understanding, however, is how the system of 
justice as it is came into being “and what organizations of thought and statements have to do 
with our thinking of [it] as natural, as part more of the found order than the order of things 
made by people” (Hacking 2004: 299). For this, we have looked to other methods and tools, 
like the “appropriation school” of the German social scientists discussed above – Kurt Beck, 
Karl-Heinz Kohl, Hans Peter Hahn, or the “translation theory” as reflected upon by Richard 
Rottenburg and Elísio Macamo and Dieter Neubert.  
In addition, and in the justice system “as it is” (Blundo & Olivier de Sardan 2006: 108), 
then, judges and prosecutors are seconded by the court interpreter during trials. The role 
interpreters perform is indeed indispensable to keep the justice system as it is. Interpreters’ 
room to maneuver as interpreters – that is carrying out the work of translating from French 
to Jula and back – is delimited, being restricted to the courtroom and to the time trials are 
held on the one hand, and by the fact that the work they do there is controlled by Jula 
speaking judges, on the other.  
To these theoretical reflections on performing yourself and your profession, I want to 
add another, a strategic element: new institutionalism in social anthropology, in which the 
issue of translation is embedded. One critical question we have already hinted at in our above 
ruminations is if interpretation at court cannot be boiled down to the anti-politics element 
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(Ferguson 1994), the interpreter functioning to support the upkeep – the “as it is” – of the 
system of justice, which continues to be translated into local Burkinabe society by the experts 
running the system. 
Indeed, interpretation at penal courts in Burkina Faso functions like an anti-politics 
machine in that it supports and reinforces bureaucratic state power (Ferguson 1994: 255); 
the concept of interpretation acts as an “anti-politics machine”, hiding the historically grown 
and ideology-driven processes of dependency and subordination by powerful insiders in the 
system of justice, the experts. The problem of not understanding the language of the court is 
solved by the state in that it offers interpretation during trials. The more immediate, pertinent 
question of why the Burkinabe justice system does not switch to using national languages 
everybody speaks and understands is not asked – or is restated such that the current system 
functions well as it is and thus does not need to be replaced or questioned or updated.  
What we do not know yet is how, exactly, the civil servants go about their work in a 
system they appropriate and bend to local needs, social reality, and their own ideas. 
Rottenburg and Macamo and Neubert introduced above have allowed for first insights. Here, 
I want to introduce a tool I believe can help explain this how, complementing the insights we 
have gained. It is a tool usually applied to methodological considerations in economic or 
political science and anthropology: The New Institutionalism perspective and the idea that 
actors shop for institutions. 
 
2.4. New Institutionalism and shopping 
The anthropological part of the New Institutionalism theory is firmly grounded in the 
empirical and highlights the importance of including historical research for analysis. So far it 
does not differ from classical, basic ethnographic enquiry. In our description of 
communication at penal courts in Bobo, New Institutionalism can be the tool with which to 
tease out how the justice system is appropriated by the civil servants working in it, to attain 
their own, various ends. Institutions are understood to be all those factors, which, formally 
and informally, make up the rules of the game, “any form of constraint that humans devise 
to shape human interaction” (North 1990: 4) – laws, codes of conduct, values, norms, 
constraints (North 1990: 4; Haller 2007: 10).  
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According to political economist Ostrom (2005), institutions specify what people may, 
must, or must not do under particular circumstances and with particular costs for non-
compliance. It is important to stress that informal institutions that are embedded in the 
everyday are as successful as formal ones. One prominent example would be the informal 
rule – tacitly agreed upon – of using French in all governmental-bureaucratic settings, such as 
at court, but also in school, when you renew your driver’s license, or need to formalize your 
ownership of a piece of land. The institution we are most interested in here is language and 
how it gets used by whom and for what.  
For my analysis of how the justice system and actors within it operate, I follow Tobias 
Haller’s research on resource use in the commons, where he employs the new 
institutionalism tool to analyze his findings based on a model developed by Jean Ensminger 
(e.g. Ensminger 1992, see also Haller 2007; Haller 2019; Haller et al. 2016). His perspective 
can be applied to an account of court interpreting in Burkina Faso. Most pertinently, Haller 
has coined the concept of institution shopping (Haller 2007; Haller et al. 2016), which in turn 
I will make use of in my analysis. 
Employing the term “shopping” asks for an explanation. Shopping implies payment. 
This transactional aspect of shopping – giving something in return for the institution 
chosen/picked out – is done in its classical form, namely in kind and not in money. Payment 
in this sense can be choosing to carry or present yourself in a certain way, in compliance with 
tacitly agreed upon rules of behavior, or adhering to codified legal regulations rather than to 
social norms, or vice versa, in exchange for a job, or not losing your job, or because you deem 
this to be advantageous to yourself in one way or another. 
Actors, in our case the bureaucrats or civil servants working in the courthouse, as well 
as everyday citizens, have choices when shopping for institutions. These choices are limited 
and depend on who you are and what your role is in the particular situation at hand. At court, 
judges clearly have more choices than the everyday citizen or user of the court service in 
deciding how business will be conducted; the institution that will guide the transaction 
depends on the judge’s (or clerk’s, or prosecutor’s) choice, whim, decision.  
That it is often indeed judges or prosecutors deciding in their own best interest, we 
can look at through the lens of New Institutionalism. New institutionalists’ basic assumption 
is that the individual is a rational and self-interested actor who attempts to secure the best 
possible outcome for him or herself. The social anthropology version of new institutionalism 
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boils the issue of rationality down to the impact power relations have on the process of 
choosing this best possible institutional outcome. Communities have rules and norms 
regulating interaction. Monitoring and sanctioning boards make sure these rules and norms 
are being followed. These boards can be the neighborhood chief, age classes or councils of 
elders, as well as state institutions such as the police or the justice system. The expansion of 
the western world – the French conquest and colonization of western Africa – and subsequent 
independence from the colonial powers are two milestones significantly shaping the 
formation, evolution, decline, and use of institutions (see Haller 2007).  
Today, we find a co-existence of local social norms and of imported, appropriated 
institutions, as we have seen with Rottenburg’s example of the local world view and its rules 
as to kinship obligations meeting (or clashing with) the institutional norm of equal treatment 
of all at court. Codified laws can lead to ambivalence and insecurity among users. Macamo 
and Neubert point out that the appropriated institutions – the products of modernity in their 
discussion – are a Trojan horse. People appropriate certain products and ideas according to 
their needs but are also forced to accept that some institutions come with an expert system, 
making local users dependent on these experts’ know-how (Macamo and Neubert 2008: 290). 
Just see the Nile valley farmers in Sudan Kurt Beck discusses above. They successfully 
appropriated the diesel motor to their needs, but cannot make the thing themselves and are 
thus always dependent on engineers and designers to develop it. 
Also Macamo and Neubert mention the Sudanese farmers in their article and highlight 
the fact that here, historically grown local knowledge was replaced by scientific knowledge. 
And this indeed comes with an expert system. Citizens accept or reject appropriated products, 
always balancing adjustments society has to make to accommodate their structural features. 
Indeed, “fundamental social changes accompany the impact of the structural features” of 
imported institutions (Macamo & Neubert 2008: 290). This balancing act also contributes to 
institution shopping. 
The term institution shopping was first introduced as “forum shopping”, coined by K. 
von Benda-Beckmann (1981) in her analysis of how participants in legal (mostly land) disputes 
in Indonesia choose between customary law and western laws based on the French and Dutch 
legal systems. Here, I apply the term institution shopping as introduced by Haller (e.g. Haller 
2007; Haller et al. 2016) to the context of the imported, appropriated justice system by 
looking at court interpretation. The different actors both within and outside the bureaucratic 
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system that is the court navigate the system according to their possibilities and needs. One 
point Haller stresses is the fact that it is not always the best institutions that are selected, but 
those that survive are those which usually serve the people with the most bargaining power 
(Haller 2007: 16). French has certainly survived and is alive and kicking in the justice system.  
Here, actors shop for institutions, choosing among laws (customary, penal, religious, 
informal rules, traditional values, etc.), languages (French, Jula, Moore, Burkinabe French), 
between prosecutors when filing charges, between a state-run court or the neighborhood 
chief. The social control practiced in small scale societies or groups is also an institution. 
Institutions do, of course, change over time, they evolve and “the influence they have on the 
economic strategies of individuals and groups are issues debated by different theories in 
economic history, political science and anthropology” (Haller 2007: 10). The idea that only 
French can express the complexities of the legal system is an institution, which impacts 
ordinary citizens’ lives to different degrees. And which is referred to by specific actors within 
the justice system who have the power to choose this institution over another.  
Actors’ strategies are thus also shaped by existing power relations and the bargaining 
power individual actors have in a given situation. Individuals’ bargaining power stems from 
their social status, wealth, their ability to manipulate ideology, for example through their 
hierarchical position in a given pecking order, or from their religious practices. During trials in 
the penal courts in Bobo, judges and prosecutors have more bargaining power than 
defendants, being in their own professional domain and able to use the language that has 
become institutionalized as the language of the court system, namely French in its standard 
and legalese varieties.  
Wealthy and well-connected defendants have more bargaining power at court than 
poorer, uneducated individuals. In fact, rich, well-connected people accused of a crime have 
the resources to either appease the court before their case gets to the point of being brought 
before a judge at a trial, or they manage to not have their file become a case in the first place. 
Those with higher bargaining power do not go to court. One judge told me that he regularly 
got anonymous threats in connection with cases – or to say it laconically with Thomas 
Bierschenk, money and social status help advance or accelerate a file (Bierschenk 2008: 129f).  
The practices promoting French as only admissible language during trials replicate a 
system of inequalities, which has been developed during colonialism and translated into a 
bureaucratic and legal procedure. This process of appropriation is ongoing and very dynamic. 
 55 
Burkinabe society has, partly reluctantly, partly enthusiastically, adjusted to the fact that 
French is the language of all communication with the government. It has become an 
unquestioned, deeply ingrained habit, which Bourdieu designates as habitus (Bourdieu 2013; 
see also García Villegas 2004 on Bourdieu’s legal thought). 
Habitus is the physical embodiment of cultural capital, another concept coined by 
Bourdieu, and refers to the dispositions we have learned over the course of our life and the 
experiences we made. Habitus allows us to successfully navigate social environments. 
Growing up in Burkina Faso we learn that when we need help from a government office, like 
when we have to renew our ID, we have to ask for that help in French.  
 
2.5. Theoretical conclusion, discussion of research question and hypothesis 
In the courtroom, interpreters act and are made to act, translating between speakers who, in 
any other situation outside the courthouse, would communicate with each other in Jula. 
Interpreters, judges, prosecutors, as well as defendants, victims, plaintiffs, and witnesses 
adjust to varying degrees to the appropriated justice system as it is. Here the main question I 
ask together with Macamo and Neubert is whether and how the institution of the court “and 
the expert system linked to it [is] accessible for local agency? As long as access is precarious 
and expert systems cannot be influenced by local people, [appropriated institutions] appear 
strange….” (Macamo & Neubert 2008: 300).  
The research question pertains to just this. By looking at the work of the court 
interpreter, I am teasing out how bureaucrats and civil servants, the experts, domesticate an 
imported foreign system and what form this then takes. My first encounter with 
interpretation at the commercial court in Bobo gave birth to a first hypothesis on court 
interpreters’ work, seeing them as intermediaries called to guide ignorant defendants 
through their trials. We recall the savior of innocents. This first working hypothesis was 
somewhat diluted by the literature on court interpretation, which did not reveal any hints at 
interpreters-as-saviors of defendants. I was not to be deterred, however, so I embarked upon 
fieldwork in Bobo in June 2016 with varying ideas in my mind on how court interpreters 
operated and were made to operate. What, exactly, does it mean when the court interpreter 
sees himself as the savior of innocents?  
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How the court interpreter acts and is made to act can show how experts deal with 
codified rules that are part of the foreign, imported, and appropriated – or translated – 
system of justice. My hypothesis departs from the premise that the court interpreter-as-
institution is crucial to keep the system up and running as the experts would have it be. By 
interpreting, court interpreters are coproducing the existing social order. This aspect we will 
look at more closely in chapter 5.1. describing select court cases. Judges and other experts, 
again, translate normative assumptions of the imported justice system into local norms or 
into individual assumptions. 
Experts’ domestication efforts are geared towards keeping the system up and running 
as that what this system had originally been conceived for – keeping the social order upright 
by “speaking justice”. The organizational order of the justice system is based on an all-
pervading bureaucracy which prescribes, strictly and narrowly, how civil servants working 
within it can act. As opposed to the Nile valley farmers, who were free and unencumbered by 
ideas of what the diesel motor had originally been constructed to do, the experts of the justice 
system do not have this freedom. They come with the system itself, so their translating or 
appropriation efforts are concentrated on making the foreign system work as that what it had 
originally been intended to be (the justice system) and in the way it originally worked 
(organizational order, bureaucracy) also on local soil. 
There is a contradiction between the wide “distribution and popularity of a particular 
organizational model on the one hand, and its manifest ineffectiveness in many parts of the 
world on the other….”, Rottenburg points out (Rottenburg 1996: 202). In many non-western 
societies, he explains, a sequence of events unfolds because the objectives and structures of 
formal organization run counter to historical and socio-cultural realities. These events, in turn, 
make the organizations themselves ineffective (ibid: 202). Nevertheless, the popularity of a 
foreign model among citizens has nothing to do with its actual success.  
In the face of tensions existing between certain local social sensitivities – we discussed 
the incompatibility of reciprocity found in local ideas of gift exchange with the idea of the 
equal treatment of all cases – as well as structural constraints – such as the absence of 
technical material to conduct forensic investigations – experts need to become creative. They 
resolve this tension by being not only creative, but also pragmatic. Because in the end, there 
is always enough room to maneuver; the experts can decide to act to their own personal 
advantage.  
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We will see, for example, that at the beginning of a trial, judges ask defendants what 
language they want their trial to be held in. This is a fake choice, if you wish, since the vast 
majority of defendants cannot speak the official language French, the Amtssprache, used in 
court. This contributes to their difficulties in accessing the justice system. And it legitimizes 
the presence of the court interpreter in a space, where only local defendants are being judged 
by local judges and not foreigners with no Jula language skills. The city of Bobo has 
accommodated the imported system in its midst because the experts that the system comes 
with have translated and continue to translate the system according to their own ends and 
what they have been taught is the norm.  
Like the medical services Macamo and Neubert use as an example of an appropriated 
institution, also the justice system remains distant from the everyday lives of ordinary 
citizens. This distance or inability of people to access the justice system or the medical 
services they have become accustomed to makes them reflect on how they perceive their 
own social structures and how they relate to external influences (Macamo & Neubert 2008: 
297). So, also the existing, local social norms and values change; traditions are not static. The 
“formal models”, as Behrends, Park, and Rottenburg call these institutions, concepts, objects, 
interfere in domains such as law or organization (Behrends et al. 2014: 8). 
In terms of interpretation as the transfer of an utterance from one language into 
another, a marginalization through bureaucratic practices is happening within the translated 
justice system in Burkina Faso. It creates – or rather, it maintains subordinate members in 
society. Legal continuity, fairness, and equal treatment of all pose a dilemma for Burkinabe 
civil servants translating these normative assumptions of the foreign justice system into their 
own, local, or individual assumptions. As Rottenburg has pointed out, there is a clash between 
the foreign justice system’s idea of all deserving equal treatment and local sensitivities that 
are grounded in a right to be different and to be treated differently, according to their status 
in society (Rottenburg 1996: 203). 
But within the bounded limits of the courthouse, it is the civil servants who run the 
system, which gives them – the experts – maneuvering space and thus the most bargaining 
power within the institution. Indeed, the justice system is a system which comes with its own 
experts, who hold the knowledge relevant to the system’s functioning (Macamo & Neubert 
2008: 275). During penal trials, the expert with the most bargaining power is by procedural 
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definition the presiding judge. Beyond the fact of him calling the shots, judges’ bargaining 
power rests upon two forms of power identified by Gramsci (1971), hegemony and coercion. 
Coercion is direct domination, exercised by legislative or executive powers such as 
judges in our case, who are on their home turf at the courthouse and during trials. And 
through hegemony, a dominant group secures the consent of society. The tacit agreement 
among citizens that French is the language of administration and government is both 
internalized and upheld. It is the outcome of a long and ongoing process of positioning the 
French language as the language of civilization, learning, upward mobility, and the coveted 
accessory of a desirable social status. This process is being perpetuated both by the powerful 
– be this judges or prosecutors in our case, or teachers, professors, or the minister of 
education – and by ordinary citizens alike. Both forms of power are present in the courtroom, 
where “a powerful group may limit the freedom of action of others [coercion], but also 
influence their minds [hegemony]” (Van Dijk 1993: 254 quoted by Eades 2008: 40). That 
French is the language of the court is an expression of this ongoing process. Equally part of 
this process is that it is not questioned, neither by court personnel nor by citizens in general.  
During (moments of) interpretation, there are significant power asymmetries, like the 
top down decision of the judge who decides for the defendant that the trial is to be held in 
French (see also Eades 2003: 116) or which passages during a trial get to be translated and 
which will not. Here we see that also the court interpreter is made to act. In fact, his very 
presence is functional to the reproduction of the justice system as its experts make it work. 
The interpreter follows the instructions as to which parts of a trial need a translation and 
which remain untranslated and thus not communicated to the defendant.  
In addition, translations are never simply repetitions – the interpreter is not the 
conduit that law personnel see him as and want him to be – but like other forms of reported 
speech, translations “convert the speech of one group into evidence for another group’s 
project” (Gal 2015: 231). What this project might be and for whom we will proceed to tease 
out in our exposition of the communication happening during individual trials below in 
chapter five.  
Goffman had pointed out that his designations outsider, performer, audience, are not 
set in stone; we have seen that by coming inside the courthouse, defendants become, in 
addition to being outsiders, performers. Anderson’s concept of white space is helpful here to 
see how they become performers (Anderson 2015). Defendants-as-outsiders are made to fit 
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the courtroom space by being translated into French. So here, the interpreter plays a crucial 
functional role in achieving defendants’ fit. Vigouroux discusses the designations people who 
migrate are given by the locals depending on if they are welcome or unwelcome immigrants 
(Vigouroux 2005: 243f). Like the concept of white space, Vigouroux finds that “outsiderness” 
is a typically social construct of exclusion. Despite having been shaped to fit the courtroom 
through the intervention of the interpreter, those coming into the courtroom from the 
outside and who are part of the play, which is the trial, are not only treated as outsiders, 
which they of course are, by the insider civil servants, but they are also actively constructed 
as “others”. This active construction of an outsider or an “other” is done by the judge(s) and 
the interpreter together, we will see shortly.  
One last point on linguistics. We have seen that the civil servants in Burkina Faso’s 
justice system, be this judges or other court personnel, state that French alone has the 
vocabulary to express the terminological complexities of legal language. Saying, in short, that 
legal terms do not have an equivalent in Jula, that they are not translatable. Remains to be 
seen how, then, these civil servants conceive of interpreters’ work translating precisely these 
legal terms and concepts into Jula. Kwasi Wiredu had remarked that untranslatability, even 
though problematic, does not automatically imply unintelligibility (Wiredu 1990: 11). He 
plead that more attention be paid to conceptual universals because inter-translatability 
between different languages lies in the commonality of concepts (Wiredu ibid.).21 
How Wiredu’s idea can find entrance into court interpreting is left to the practitioners. 
It seems to be possible, in any case, to find equivalents in Jula for French legal vocabulary and 
concepts. Just see court interpreters at work in Bobo and the glossary compiled by 
Wedirawogo and Buda (2002), translating French legal vocabulary into Jula. There is thus a 
contradiction between a stated conviction, i.e. what judges say – only French – and lived daily 
practices – the interpreter translates legal expressions into Jula. So the construction of an 
outsider (or an “other”) has a structural, a functional, as well as a linguistic aspect. 
Interpreting in plurilingual African societies is nothing new – between speakers of 
different African languages, as linguist for the sovereign and the people, or for colonial 
conquerors, later administrators, bureaucrats, and Africans. Linguists and court interpreters 
 
21 A similar point is made by Barbara Cassin in the Vocabulaire européen des philosophies. Dictionnaire des 
intraduisibles (Cassin 2004), where she and a team of over 100 scientists have spent time thinking about 
concepts and their (in)translatability into different European languages. 
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today both translate between parties that speak the same language, but who cannot 
communicate with each other directly for reasons of protocol. Attempts at an explanation of 
court interpreters’ work by looking at the literature on traditional intermediaries and linguists 
does not capture how today’s court interpreters operate, we have seen. It only captures the 
fact that interpreters and interpreting are nothing new or unknown in Burkinabe society. 
A comparison of working environments of today’s court interpreter and colonial 
translator-interpreters yields a bit more concordance. Today’s court interpreter translates, 
like the colonial interpreter before him, in situations of unbalanced power and like the 
colonial interpreter, the court interpreter today is hired by the party for whom he translates, 
who is, at the same time, that party with the most bargaining power. This has implications 
not only for those being judged, defendants, but also for how interpreters can carry out their 
work.  
Colonial translator-interpreters’ itinerary – socially-culturally, educatively – was quite 
different from today’s court interpreters’, however. Often chosen from among what the 
colonial administrators thought to be the local elite, future interpreters were sent to be 
educated as clerks and interpreters to the French colonial schools in Senegal. In terms of their 
work as interpreters, they needed to translate for French colonial administrators with no 
African language skills, translating and interpreting between French and two, often more, 
African languages. They had the monopoly on language and thus the freedom to influence 
and manipulate situations to their advantage, as we saw with Omar Sy or Moussa Soumaré. 
Today, everybody in the courtroom speaks Jula; the fact that there needs to be an interpreter 
translating during trials is a construction. It also means that today’s court interpreter does not 
have the freedom Soumaré, Wangrin, or Sy had to translate as they wished because today 
the court interpreter in Bobo is supervised and controlled by Jula speaking judges.  
Hence, taking a historical perspective and looking at works of faction can only take us 
this far towards an understanding of court interpreters’ work in the present-day courtroom. 
It can, however, explain certain attitudes citizens have towards interpretation and the work 
and role of interpreters – particularly those translating for an Amt, an imported foreign 
institution. Here our focus so far has been on strategic maneuvering of civil servants and 
bureaucrats, of the experts that come with and who run the justice system. We are also 
looking at a state institution and its way of functioning which is modeled on a western 
institution. The Burkinabe justice system continues to be a western or French institution, also 
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if it has been (and continues to be) translated into the Burkinabe space and appropriated by 
the bureaucrat-experts working it. 
Everyday citizens, however, see the Burkinabe justice system as a European, French, 
or foreign institution. In the julaphone space, ordinary citizens, i.e. all individuals who are not 
civil servants or working for one or the other government institution, refer to all 
fonctionnaires as tubabubaarakela, as, literally, people doing a European or a white person’s 
job (Jula: tubabu = white person or European or French; baara = work; suffix ke = action; suffix 
la = a person). All civil servants at court are tubabubaarakelaw.22 The tubabubaarakelaw are, 
again by definition, part of the educational elite of Burkina Faso, also designated as 
intellectuels by these same, ordinary citizens. By virtue of their education at university they 
have become intellectuels (see for example Rossatanga-Rignault 1993 on the definition of 
intellectuels) and by attaining a good job reflecting this education, they are part of the elite 
of the country (see Banégas & Warnier 2001 on elites in West Africa). Judges and prosecutors 
are also civil servants and are thus seen as both tubabubaarakelaw and as intellectuels by 
citizens.  
We will also see, in the next chapter, how, exactly, I collected my information. My 
analysis relies mainly on information gathered while watching trials and during informal talks 
with the civil servants working in the two courts. You will have noted my avoidance of the 
verb “to observe”, which I am indeed reluctant to apply together with the designation of 
carrying out research abroad as “fieldwork”. Both expressions are well known to 
anthropologists, internalized expressions, which are applied, used, and reused without giving 
much thought to all they entail, I believe. Let us now look at my presence in the daily working 
lives and beyond of the civil servants/bureaucrats/experts running the penal courts in Bobo 





22 This is not a new observation, as can be seen by the entry in Dumestre’s Bambara-French dictionary, where 
tubabubaarekela is translated as Européen-travaileur [sic]/employé de bureau, commis d’administration, 




CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
 
Prologue – A day in court, Part 3 
 
It is, once again, Tuesday and when I arrive at the courthouse a bit before 8am, I find Antoine 
loitering about in the hallway on the first floor. He doesn’t have the key to the judge’s office, 
he tells me, where he needs to go get the case files for today’s trials. The defendants should 
be arriving soon from the prison, where they wait for their trial and Antoine needs to get the 
courtroom ready for today’s session. For now, he is waiting outside judge D.M.’s office, 




So I keep him company for a bit and we chat about this and that while he waits for the judge 
to arrive and unlock his door so that he can enter, grab the files, go up to the second floor, 
deposit them in the courtroom on the judges’ desk, and then go down to the ground floor to 
the chief court scribe’s office to get the plumitif, another large book, where the trial protocols 
are recorded by the court scribe. Then back up to the second floor, always hoping to be one 
step ahead of the court session’s members.  
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But for now, Antoine is waiting, roaming around the hallway, talking with me and trying to 
look busy at the same time until he can go about his job getting the courtroom ready. He also 
likes being in the room when the prisoner-cum-defendants arrive, to look after things, he 
informs me. 
The first case today will involve a young man, Musa, accused of having stolen two metal 
bars out of a garage. His French is as good as 
nonexistent, so he asks for his trial to be conducted 
in Jula. Antoine relaxes in his chair, leaning his head 
back into it and stretching out his legs. He does not 
take any notes – he never does, which is quite 
amazing and I ask myself again how he manages to 
remember everything the judge wants him to 
translate. Every once in a while, he consults his cell 
phone, types something in it, and continues to 
translate without looking at the defendant. Later he 
will tell me that as far as he is concerned it is 
unprofessional to take notes while interpreting; not like his colleagues who always have a 
notebook at the ready. When he consults his phone, he says, it is to look up words. 
Musa’s trial ends. He is acquitted. The next trial involves a young man, who chooses to 
defend himself in French. Antoine gets up and leaves the room, slowly, he is in no hurry. His 
interpreter colleague working at the tribunal d’instance, situated in the same building, has a 
desk in the court clerks’ office, right next to the courtroom. So, on his way out, Antoine goes 
to visit his colleague, Paul by name, greets everybody, goes on his way. Antoine was not given 
any office space or a desk in the huge office the clerks of the TGI share. So now, Antoine goes 
knocking on doors, greeting court members and checking if there are any errands to run, any 
work that he could do for them. In fact, this is what he is hired as, a so-called agent de liaison, 
a liaison officer who does precisely this – run errands for the various members of the TGI, at 






3.1. Qualitative inquiry and fieldwork – living and working in Bobo Dioulasso 
Ethnographic fieldwork has usually consisted of an immersion in the local environment under 
study, of long periods of time spent there. Once in the “there”, anthropologists engage in a 
methodology termed participant observation, in which they supposedly go about doing that 
what they study. This can be watching a cockfight like Clifford Geertz and his wife did in Bali 
in 1958 (Geertz 1973) or working in the vineyards in southwestern France, like my advisor in 
college, Robert Ulin, did in the 1980s (Ulin 1996). It is doing ethnographic work. The graphic 
part of ethnographic work of course implies something is written. Interestingly, ethnography 
can refer both to that which anthropologists do while they work, namely the keeping of a field 
journal/process of writing down their experiences, and it can also designate the end product 
of this work and its analysis – the book, article, or paper. The work itself, we have seen, is 
referred to as ethnographic fieldwork – or just fieldwork or ethnography (see for example 
Nyamnjoh 2012 on fieldwork). 
In this chapter I would like to, in a first section, describe details of where and how I 
went about collecting information, later to become data (see Dey 1993: 16). This includes 
reflecting on the drawings I had commissioned from my friend, graphic artist Caro van 
Leeuwen, and on how they came about and why they are in this book in the first place. Caro 
will herself recount her experience in being asked to do this work. I will also discuss some of 
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the terminology we anthropologists seem to have always applied to the work we engage in, 
often unquestioningly, I contend. In a second section of this chapter, flowing from the first, I 
will talk about experiences made while researching among the elite. Goffman will once again 
assist us in understanding how and to what ends the civil servants I engaged with presented 
their selves in the way they did. This presentation of themselves and their work at the court 
was pertinent to the question of access to the domain and the terrain I carried my research 
out in, the trials at the penal court. It can explain their reluctance to say anything of substance 
when talking to me.  
When I started writing the part of my PhD thesis concerned with analyzing 
communication during trials, I felt that I needed too much description to invoke the 
atmosphere of the courtroom. Too many words to paint the picture. My ruminations about 
how to solve this dissatisfaction led me to ask Caro to contribute drawings of how a day of 
trials in Bobo looked like. Caro is an experienced social science researcher who has done 
fieldwork in West Africa, mainly in Ghana. Since she is also a graphic artist having worked for 
different humanitarian and development agencies, I asked her if she would be interested in 
translating my descriptions into a graphic novel.  
 
In Caro’s words: 
There is the saying: a picture says more than 1000 words. Media (especially social media) and 
increasingly academic research know this, but it is not always easy to access or produce 
pictures for research. In delicate fields like the courtroom this is especially true.  
In an early phase of Natalie’s PhD thesis, we discussed her problems with the 
production of pictures for a presentation, an article, a poster, and eventually her thesis itself. 
Being a researcher in a courtroom is sensitive in itself. Natalie is white and European, she is a 
critical scientist, both not easy preconditions in a courtroom in Burkina Faso. From her stories 
I knew already that it was sometimes a challenge to get an interview with a judge or translator 
not to mention taking a picture. Taking a picture secretly would not only be ethically wrong 
but also qualitatively insufficient. It was during one of these conversations that I came up with 
the idea to illustrate a court situation for her.  
My passion for drawing was reawakened when I did an internship at a development 
agency. I have always loved to draw and paint but during my studies (where I met Natalie) it 
was nothing that I paid much attention to nor did I develop it any further. Only for my side 
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job as a German teacher this talent always came in handy when oral language could not 
explain something anymore. During this internship I started to illustrate topics on public 
health for an internal shareweb as well as flipcharts or posters for presentations. I kept this 
going after the internship, too, and was able to do a few assignments as a graphic recorder 
for some events. 
In numerous discussions and more sketches and notes Natalie and I drew out how the 
courtroom in Burkina Faso would look like. I am a lay when it comes to court situations, so I 
had to fully rely on Natalie’s vivid explanations and corrections. I have been in some countries 
in West Africa so I could imagine some sceneries and styles but for the arrangements inside I 
had to rely on imagination.  
As I had made a few drawings for presentations and articles and the reception had 
been positive, Natalie and I developed a plan for the illustration of her thesis. First it was 
supposed to be a full chapter drawn as a comic with the title “a day in the life of a translator”. 
It would be accompanied by a prosaic text by Natalie that she would use as introductory 
sections to her chapters. After I had drawn the introduction of the translator and his 
background as well as a view of the prisoners/defendants, the drawing of the court situation 
and trial turned out rather dull: there is not much action or change of situations, it is a ping-
pong between the judge, the defendant, and the translator. I could pick out some pointy 
situations, but everything would be accompanied by quite a lot of text – which I had not 
written yet. I had struggled with speech bubbles: how much text was necessary? Should it be 
English or French? I wanted to finalise this together with Natalie.  
In the course of this challenge – the language issue as well as the trials – Natalie 
decided that it would be better to have the pictures without text and that the comic pages or 
single outtakes of them would be inserted in the chapters. Ergo no single chapter on the 
graphic story of the translator. I was certainly fine with that as it is Natalie’s thesis and she 
knows her research best. Instead of a proper ending to the graphic story I did pick out single 
situations like the bored illustrations of the translator or the judges insulting a young 
defendant when he was acquitted of his charges. The closing of the court has come short in 
my opinion in contrast to the opening. However, the day ends with the translator having some 
drinks with his colleagues in a small bar.  
I see the illustrations as a means to help readers come to an understanding of the 
court room and trial situations in Burkina Faso. It should emphasise the sparse arrangements, 
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the overcrowded court room, and the sheer discrepancy of power between the judges and 
the defendants. Although the translator is not part of the elite himself, he sees himself on the 
ranks of the judges, using his own power in translating what he decides is necessary. From 
my point of view, the illustration is not meant to be a comic that can stand for itself (although 
I would love to make one in the future). It is simply supporting the reader’s imagination of a 
court room in Burkina Faso.  
In total, I see this collaboration with Natalie as an innovative approach to picturing 
research in social science and of course I value it as a great way to be part of my friend’s 
research. It has been equally inspiring to both of us I think, so we can call it a win-win 
situation! 
 
OF course, these kind of drawings – commissioned, carried out following a verbal description 
or explanation – are an interpretation of courtroom happenings. Moreover, they are an 
interpretation both by the artist and by the anthropologist who has asked for the illustrations 
to be made according to her ideas. So, they need to be seen as just that: a reflection or an 
interpretation of a day of penal trials in Bobo. In spite of this, the drawings contribute to 
making the text come alive, they interact with the written word, complementing it. 
This study is based on social anthropological qualitative research at the two courts in 
Bobo Dioulasso, where penal trials take place: at the Regional High Court, le Tribunal de 
grande instance or TGI, and at the Appeals Court, la cour d’appel. The largest part of data for 
this research comes from the TGI: sitting in on correctionnel trials, talking to and with 
members of the court, reading official court documents, and photocopying these for keeps. 
Four audio recordings of trials, recorded interviews, and most talks informal and formal come 
from members of the TGI. The semi undercover aspect of recordings has been at the root of 
many a debate and headache on the part of this researcher. The ethical aspect of collecting 
and then using material gathered half-clandestinely is described, explained, and discussed 
below.  
The language the empirical or data collecting part of this research was conducted in 
should be briefly mentioned, particularly since the project pertains to a language related 
topic. Language plays a prominent role in the production and dissemination of knowledge in 
academia, where English has become the (imposed) language for all those who want to be 
read and taken seriously. This debate is ongoing and very ideological (see for example Ammon 
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2012 on linguistic inequality in scientific discourse; Canagarajah 2007 on multilingual 
communities and language acquisition; Dedieu 2007 on translation into French in African 
Studies; House 2003 on English as a potential threat to multilingualism; Van Parijs 2007 on 
the inherent advantages of being an English native speaker). It is pertinent here insofar as this 
thesis is written in English on a topic researched in French in a French speaking environment. 
It is also pertinent because this research has been carried out in French in a country 
where French is an imposed language inaccessible to most citizens. Thoughts as to what 
language should and can be used in interviews, talks, in terms of fluency, for example (Gibb 
& Iglesias 2017), and how working with an interpreter can and does influence the collection 
and analysis of data (Borchgrevink 2003) were, for the present study, thought about and 
deemed dispensable. 
Here, all talk, all communication, in writing or orally, indeed all documentation at the 
two courts is in standard French (as opposed to the everyday Burkinabe variety of French), 
the language of the law in Burkina Faso and everyday language of court members at work, 
both among each other and with the outside – and sometimes even with their families. I thus 
saw no inconvenience or imposition in conducting my research in French. The language of the 
educational elite. And the language court members used when conversing with me.  
The fact that this thesis on the translation of an imported system which comes with a 
prescribed language, French, and which looks at interpretation and language use is written in 
English deserves attention as well. The installation of English as the lingua franca of academia 
is not too recent. It continues to be debated. The French and the académie française have 
reluctantly realized that it will no longer be their language that will serve as language of larger 
expansion, allowing people across the globe to communicate, but that this language is now 
English (Miller 2010). This does not mean it has been accepted, as we have seen in the 
example given by Kohl above, in which he mentions that in France, international conferences 
are only funded by the government if the official conference language is French (Kohl 2001: 
8). Often, the use of English as academic language is boiled down to being a US American 
imposition. It can be seen as this, too, for a variety of reasons – one being the dearly held 
cliché that US Americans speak nothing but English – but it is also more than that (Ammon 
2012). 
English is certainly easier to learn than French – or Japanese, for that matter. Ammon 
points out that for Japanese, leaning English is very difficult, which excludes them from much 
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of social scientific discourse (Ammon 2012). No institution such as France’s académie 
française protects and shields English from taking on new, non-English vocabulary or to evolve 
or mutate in any way. There is a vibrant research community studying what is known as Global 
English, the language non-native speakers have in common and use to communicate. And 
there are so many varieties used today, enumeration takes up quite some space: British 
English and American English are just the better-known varieties, formerly standards, but 
there is Australian English and there is also Aboriginal Australian English, as we have seen 
with linguist Diana Eades’ work. Nigerians and Ghanaians do not speak the same variety, and 
people from Kenya use a different English than Gambians. And so on. Speakers of English as 
lingua franca might not conform to the norms of standard English – whatever “standard 
English” might now be – or the usage of native speakers, which in general are taken as 
benchmarks of competence in the language. But communication is assured, also if it makes 
certain purists’ toenails curl.  
The reasons why I choose to write this thesis in English are soundly pragmatic. My 
writing virtuosity in the French standard is limited. In spite of a buzzing research interest and 
output studying and publishing on the varieties of the French language across the planet, 
academic works going to press need to continue to fulfill rigorously defined linguistic 
standards. The French language continues to be defined in an armchair in Paris – the 
académie française is very much alive and kicking – it is highly normative and does not allow 
for creative deviations even if these correspond to oral usage and are understood. 
First, I believed it would be suitable to have the finished thesis translated into French 
so as to be able to give a copy to the Ministry of Justice in Ouagadougou. Court personnel 
might be able to profit in one way or another from insights gained and data presented, from 
experiences recounted with the outsider’s eye. This is, of course, every social scientist’s secret 
hope (and wish). Or at least, the Ministry and the two courts in Bobo can receive a copy for 
the court’s library or archives – a purely symbolic gesture since both courts in Bobo have 
neither. On the other hand, it is an academic piece of writing, written for peers and for 
interested individuals in the academy and there, we have discussed it above, English is the 
lingua franca.  
As we know, this study focuses on how the foreign, imported institution or system 
which is the justice system is appropriated on the ground by, mainly, the experts who come 
with the system. Like this I hope to throw some light on the processes a bureaucratically 
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organized foreign system goes through on the way to being installed locally. This 
appropriation process is depicted through an analysis of the court interpreter’s work, 
specifically, and by looking at how civil servants carry out their jobs as judges, prosecutors, 
court scribes. In the previous chapter, I have introduced the theoretical and historical 
background and the concepts that accompany these ruminations and against which we will 
look at the bureaucrat-experts and the interpreter at work. I am still excluding the interpreter 
from being part either of the bureaucrat and the expert category. As far as I understand it 
until now the court interpreter is still hovering outside any of the slots so far established for 
the civil servants working in the justice system in Burkina Faso. 
The act of interpreting and the person of the court interpreter are looked at as both a 
continuation of historical and colonial interpreting practices, but and also as a spin-off or by-
product of the “appropriation work” local civil servants engage in to make the justice system 
local. He and his work come, more broadly speaking, with the bureaucratization of 
government work in the former French colonies in West Africa. And more narrowly, the 
interpreter and his work translating trials are essential to the way the justice system is made 
to work locally by the experts. Without the interpreter interpreting, the entire system could 
not function.  
Designating this study as “field”work is stretching it a bit, since all data collected, all 
talks with law and language experts stem from, mainly, the city of Bobo Dioulasso and some 
from the capital city of Ouagadougou. In fact, both the research site and this researcher are 
firmly anchored in the urban – in terms of work, living, upbringing, researching, and studying. 
“Fieldwork” or “the field” are terms we anthropologists continue to use since their beginnings 
in the hazy colonial past of anthropological endeavors. 
These terms need to be rethought, I believe, both for the rural-urban dichotomy they 
imply and for the definition of “being in the field” as opposed to being at home? Or at work? 
Sitting at a computer? “The field” implies being removed – emotionally, geographically, 
intellectually – from there, where we usually live, work, and play. This, too, needs to be 
rethought, also in view of thinking about “outsiderness” (Vigouroux 2005), which is no 
guarantee for better or more insightful research (Nyamnjoh 2012). And since we are re-
thinking – why do we anthropologists insist on the continued use of a methodology most 
anthropologists cannot engage in, namely participant observation?  
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Anthropology’s core methodology. What was I supposed to participate in during my 
research of civil servants working in the justice sector and on the court interpreter’s work? 
The judiciary is, at best, a delicate terrain to enter for an outsider. Participation was out of 
the question quite simply because I cannot translate penal trials from French into Jula and 
vice versa. I am neither an interpreter nor trained in law. Here it is worth citing Wolf Bleek at 
length – also for its anecdotal nature on his research looking at the equally delicate topics of 
suspicions of witchcraft, sexual relationships, and birth control practices in rural Ghana some 
decades ago: 
My doubts about the word “participant” arise from an impression that most 
fieldworkers who use this word to describe their research method hardly participate 
in the subject of their research, if at all. I am no exception. My participation in sexual 
relationships was slight, in birth control insignificant, and in witchcraft nonexistent. 
Ironically, anthropologists tend to be most interested in those transactions and affairs 
least accessible to them, those in which they cannot participate. This irony, I suspect, 
also applies to other research traditions. The inaccessible arouses curiosity; what is 
open to the public soon may lead to boredom (Bleek 1987: 315)  
 
Second guessing the concept – not necessarily the methodology – of participant observation 
is, of course, not a new thought. Ever since Bronislaw Malinowski set up his tent on the 
outskirts of a community in the Trobriand Islands, “liv[ing] as a native among the natives” 
(preface to Argonauts of the Western Pacific by James G. Frazer, 1961 [1922]: vii), 
anthropologists enthusiastically engage in participant observation. This enthusiasm often also 
extends to throwing ourselves into what we term “the field” with nonchalance.  
 On the other hand, we can argue that by carrying out empirical research, by being 
there and present, we researchers are sort of participating. My visible presence in the 
courthouse and during trials certainly influenced the setting to a certain degree. Here, I want 
to use the adjective “participant” in its purely active sense. The researcher participates in a 
trial when she interprets trials or speaks justice as a judge or writes the minutes of the trial in 
the court logbook, for example. For obvious reasons, I could not partake in any of these 
activities and I feel that by not being able to do at least some of what I research and write 
about, I cannot say that I am a participant observer.  
Even though well prepared in terms of being academically à jour, updated in our 
reading, background information, and so on, questions of gaining access, permissions to 
conduct research, engaging with our colleagues working in the country we carry our research 
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out in – what Francis Nyamnjoh calls for and terms convivial scholarship (Nyamnjoh 2012, 
201923) – of how we communicate and collaborate with each other, of how we share our 
results, also with the community we study, are not new thoughts. But they still do not seem 
to be standard working fare. 
The term observation, in its turn, was historically a practice of the police of absolutist 
18th century France to prove someone guilty of a crime – and it continues to be practiced in 
this sense by the police the world over today. In legal procedure, the expression “observation” 
is standard terminology, a vocabulary used, for example, during trials when the judge hands 
over the word to the prosecutor, asking him for his observations in relation to the case at 
hand. The Duden dictionary on foreign words explains the verb observieren as being 1. 
scientific watching (wissenschaftlich beobachten) and 2. police surveillance (polizeilich 
überwachen) (Duden Fremdwörterbuch 2001: 687), cementing the connection of 
anthropological research to police work.  
In spite of the Duden definition, the act of observing fits more with the practices of 
the judiciary in Bobo, where the overwhelming amount of penal cases are classified as 
flagrante delicto cases, than with the researcher’s applied methodology. Flagrante delicto 
designates being caught red handed – and thus seen, i.e. observed – in the act of committing 
a crime. We will get to this and the presence of flagrante delicto cases in Bobo and West 
Africa in general in our discussion in chapter four on the French language or Amtssprache at 
court. To conclude, let me say with Till Förster that observation as a legacy of positivist 
anthropology is a very special and narrowly framed way of seeing (Förster 2019).24  
So, I did not participate, and I prefer the term “watching” or seeing, along with Förster 
(Förster 2001), to “observing” when describing the empirical research process of what I did 
at the courts in Bobo. Of course, substituting the term observing with watching and seeing 
does not alter the fact that I was there, very visibly present during trials and around the 
courthouse. That the physical presence of a foreign researcher has an impact on the carryings-
on being watched, is a fact we have to live with, and which has been noted and discussed in 
anthropology for quite some time, in textbooks (see i.a. Dey 1993: 16; Yin 2011) and beyond. 
 
23 “Decolonising the Academy: A Case for Convivial Scholarship”, keynote address presented at the conference 
“Africa and the Academy in the 21st Century” in Basel, Switzerland, 1-2 November 2019. 
24 Seminar conducted at the University of Basel by Till Förster, fall semester 2019. See 
https://vorlesungsverzeichnis.unibas.ch/de/home?id=237705, accessed 7 January 2020. 
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That a penal trial allows for an audience to be present may have somewhat counteracted the 
fact of me being present, albeit more visible than the rest of the audience.  
As mentioned, there are two penal courts in Bobo, the TGI and the appeals court, 
where the two categories of penal trials recognized in the French legal system as practiced in 
Burkina Faso are held. Despite not being welcome to conduct research in any form at the 
appeals court in Bobo – we will discuss this topic in detail in the next chapter – I sat in on its 
criminel trials, watching the court interpreter Salomon at work. Trials are, we have just read 
it, open to the public. Trial-watching makes up a large part of this study, in which a 
combination of ethnographic methods was employed. 
In addition to watching trials, some few formal, recorded, and many informal talks and 
interviews took place with civil servants working at the two courts. At the local prison, the 
maison d’arrêt et de correction popularly referred to as MACO, I could do two group talks with 
convicted men and women, former defendants, whose trials had been conducted in Jula. The 
informative aspect of chatting, gossiping, hanging out with different interlocutors – not lastly 
members of the Bobolese family who accepted me in their midst and friends – and other 
informal talk should never be underestimated. And as Förster had so poetically remarked, we 
need to pay more attention to what we see also when we are not watching or observing; the 
everyday “normalized” seeing allows us more and more in-depth insights if we only pay 
attention to our surroundings (Förster 2001: 481). 
Selecting participants for formal and informal interviews and talks was done according 
to availability. Out of a total of five men, employees at the penal courts, who were asked to 
translate during trials, only two were actually working as interpreters in practice, Antoine and 
Salomon. Paul was the designated interpreter of the tribunal d’instance or TI, the district court 
located in the same building as the TGI and where civil cases are dealt with. Also Jean was 
part of my pool of interpreters in Bobo. He used to translate at the commercial court, but has 
moved on, nobody knows where to. 
Another selection criterion for interview partners was the many actors present at 
penal trials and the different professional orientations reflecting the range of people working 
at the court: members of the audience, witnesses, victims, and interpreters, judges, 
prosecutors, scribes, and various clerks. Differences between interlocutors at the court are of 
degree only in what concerns their professional education. With the exception of 
interpreters, all the civil servants, employees of the court and thus the Ministry of Justice, 
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have some education in law. They have all gone to the École nationale de l’administration et 
de la magistrature, ENAM, the in-house training institution for civil servants in law and 
administration – where bureaucrats are made. In terms of sex, all judges, prosecutors, and 
court scribes working at the two courts during the majority of the time of my research in Bobo 
were men; there was one female court scribe and some few female secretaries. Only at the 
very end of my stay in 2017 two women took up work at the courts, one as prosecutor at the 
appeals court, the other one as a judge at the TGI. All court interpreters in Bobo are men.  
The four interpreters employed at the different courts in Bobo during the time of my 
research (2016-2018), have only these things in common: they are Christian and they are 
men. All four belong to the same evangelical church, where sermons are interpreted every 
Sunday. And these church services can run on for hours. Both Salomon and Jean started their 
work as interpreters at the church before being hired as volunteers or clerks at the court 
where they subsequently were asked to interpret trials. But beyond religious affiliation, the 
four men have little in common. In age, they might belong to the same age class or generation 
except for Antoine, who is considerably older.  
I watched Antoine at work in over 30 days of correctionel and Salomon in some few 
criminel trials. Antoine has barely finished primary school, has started his own business selling 
animal feed, expanded to include cassettes and was quite content. He eventually came to 
work as driver at the court through the intervention of a parent. Salomon, on the other hand, 
has completed his high school studies with the BAC and then ran his own business as well. He 
ran a photo studio and was regularly asked to eternalize important events in peoples’ lives 
such as weddings or baptisms. Digitalization made it increasingly difficult for him to live off of 
his photo studio, so he responded to a government campaign offering young citizens jobs at 
state run institutions. He came to work at the court and is now interpreter at the court of 
appeals. 
The French justice system in vigor in Burkina Faso divides penal law into the two sub-
categories criminel and correctionnel according to type or gravity of offense and subsequent 
sentence (see table). The 30 days of trials I witnessed at the TGI, where Antoine works, 
amount to about 400 individual cases. This means that during the two days a week that 
correctionnel trials take place at the courthouse, one case after another gets treated. In one 
day up to 10 or even 15 individual cases can get decided on. Personally, I was present at about 
200 cases, of which at least three quarters needed interpretation. Since access to the appeals 
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court was difficult at best, most data stems from the TGI and from the correctionnel type of 
trials, as mentioned above.  
 
Table 1: Cases tried at TGI and appeals court in Bobo: 
 
 Penal Courts in Bobo Dioulasso 
Regional high court – 
tribunal de grande 
instance TGI 
Appeals court – Cour d’appel 
Type of trial acc. to penal law 
and procedure 
Correctionnel cases: 
petty theft, abuse of 
confidence 
Criminel cases: armed robbery, 
murder, rape,  
Assizes court 2x / year 
Sentences acc. to penal law max. 5 yrs prison max. 20 yrs prison 
Number of days / week trials 
are held in Bobo 
2 x week Unpredictable 
Number of days researcher 
attended 
25 6 
Number of cases researcher 
witnessed 
200 ~10 
Court-appointed lawyer acc. to 
penal law 
no yes 
Number of cases interpreted 
into national languages (mostly 






Total cases (UNICEF statistics) / 







Number and % of flagrant délit 





Convicted / year1+2 2015: 325 / 369 
2016: 388 / 485 
2017: 525 /655 
Not available 
Acquitted / year1+2 2015: 36 / 369 
2016: 57 / 485 
2017: 75 / 655 
Not available 
1 50 cases were selected randomly for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 
2 See http://www.justice.gov.bf/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ANNUAIRE-STATISTIQUE-2017-DE-LA-
JUSTICE-V4.pdf, last accessed 15 January 2020. UNICEF does not state how numbers were obtained for this 
report. 
1+2 UNICEF statistics do not show numbers of acquitted versus total number of cases. These were calculated 
from the TGI’s own statistics and UNICEF statistics combined. Acquitted numbers here include acquitted 
defendants and proceedings that were dropped due to a time limit reached (action publique éteinte), which 
explains difference in total numbers: convicted + acquitted = total – dropped cases à total listed here 
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Shadowing implies going along with a person throughout their (working) day to see things 
from their perspective. This was, again, delicate terrain to pursue. I was invited to accompany 
one judge to his house twice for talks, the courthouse not really being adequate for in depth 
discussion, he believed, after we had talked through various interruptions in his office there. 
In addition, he said he wanted to avoid making it too obvious to his colleagues that he was 
talking with and to me. One never knows, he said, what his colleagues might think he was 
telling me if they saw us together. Why he felt he needed to be cautious in being seen with 
the researcher everybody at court knew was there, looking at the interpreter’s work, 
demands the question of trust be brought up.  
Ideas of trusting or not trusting were constant companions before, during, and after 
work in Bobo. The president of the appeals court had refused me access to his terrain. He was 
reluctant to let me into his court because he thought I was a spy. Not wanting to be seen with 
me or believing researchers are spies is not a novel experience for an ethnographer. But why 
should the terrain of the judiciary be more delicate, sensitive, complicated than other places 
and topics of research? Over the entire course of data collection, I was confronted with the 
almost unanimous, agreed upon attitude from members of the court that I was not to be told 
anything relevant, anything of importance – and certainly not in a recorded interview. Only 
three men granted me a formal and recorded interview: the judge mentioned above, one 
prosecutor, and one interpreter. The judge positively inclined towards recordings, who is the 
one who insisted upon talking to me outside his office and the courthouse, granted me a 
recorded interview – which took place in his office.  
Going to his house allowed insights into him switching roles between his courthouse 
self, the front performed during trials as the presiding judge, and his backstage performance 
both at the courthouse after trials and particularly his relaxed self in his own home. Also 
Salomon, the appeals court interpreter, made appointments with me outside the courthouse 
off limits to me. Salomon pursues different translating jobs around town in addition to his job 
as interpreter at the appeals court. How else could he feed his family, he once rhetorically 
asked? We met a couple of times at a buvette, a small drinkery, in the center of Bobo or at a 
garage where he had taken his car to be fixed. Salomon had chosen this pseudonym for 
himself during one of our talks at the buvette. Also Antoine had met me outside the court. In 
fact, he had invited me to his house on several occasions, introducing his family and explaining 
his business of raising chickens and guinea fowl to me. He, too, needs the extra cash because, 
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like Salomon had remarked, the salary he earns at the TGI is barely enough to feed his family. 
But designating this as shadowing is stretching the definition of the endeavor beyond its 
natural limits.  
Coding and anonymizing notes and trial transcripts was done by hand; I did not use a 
software program. This, I believe, allows for a more palpable, thorough, physical – quite 
haptic – interaction with the data necessary to get in touch, recall sensually and in detail what 
every day brought with it. Repeatedly reading notes, transcripts, and listening again and again 
to recordings that come with this “mechanical” methodology allows for a more thorough 
engagement with the data. 
Data collection itself was conducted during three separate trips over the period of two 
years and for a total of six months. This allowed me to, first, organize access and explore the 
hitherto unknown field of the court and trials, and to be introduced to court personnel – the 
administrative-bureaucratic trip. During this first trip I made myself visible at the two 
courthouses, hanging out during the day, wandering the hallways, getting to know the who is 
who. I knocked on doors, chatted with interpreters, judges, prosecutors, and clerks. This trip 
also gave birth to the impression that indeed this was delicate terrain I was embarking on, a 
terrain and research topic I had chosen to engage with and where, it seemed, important 




During the second, longer trip, formal interviews and many more informal talks with 
my different interlocutors were conducted, I sat in on trials and thus spent hours at court 
almost every day – the data gathering trip. I stayed in Burkina Faso for a total of four months 
this time but took a three-week vacation with my family who came to visit for Christmas and 
New Year. In fact, during the entire four months my daughters were with me, first the younger 
one, then, after our vacation through Burkina Faso, the older one stayed on with me. My 
status as a married woman and a mother, the fact that my children were in Bobo with me, 
certainly influenced the perception, classification, and subsequent interaction my 
interlocutors engaged in with me. 
As importantly, my age – atypical for a PhD student in a European or African context 
– allowed me an amount of nonchalance in dealing with realities at a penal court and with 
the educational elite I would have had to struggle for had I been younger. For example 
listening to reports of victims and alleged perpetrators in rape cases, to men accused of 
murder, and to uncountable varieties of deceit all day long certainly took its toll on my mood 
momentarily. So actual research in Bobo during this second trip was conducted for three 
months. The final trip to Bobo I embarked on exactly one year later, at the beginning of 2018 
– the follow-up cum wrap-up trip. More talks, more hanging out at the courthouse, but this 
trip was mainly dedicated to talks and to gathering written, official documents – 
complementary or additional data.  
In Bobo, I was invited to live in the family compound of a man I had interviewed for 
my MA thesis in 2013. He gave me the second room in his so-called deux chambres-salon and 
his family and I share the communal spaces – outdoor shower, toilet, and the large courtyard, 
where dishes, clothes, and small children are washed and family members gather to sit 
together, work, play, and chat. Our individual three-room building is one of five similar ones 
constructed around the courtyard. There, a huge mango tree that has just the right age to 
produce wonderful mangoes twice a year is the source of shade for all of us. Being able to live 
with a Bobolaise family, children, chickens, rabbits and all, allows me to connect with and be 
part of the daily lives of an averagely comfortable family. It is especially relaxing and an 
antidote to the many hours spent at the courthouse; flips flops instead of heels.  
Watching and listening to judges, prosecutors, interpreters, court clerks, gives the 
impression of people who, at times, are far removed from those they judge every week. And 
even though probably most of the civil servants at court were also born into and grew up in 
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an average Burkinabe family such as the one I was living with, the concerns and struggles of 
people such as those of my Bobolaise family often seemed beyond their grasp. Because why 
would a judge threaten a young mother with her baby on her lap, waiting in line outside his 
office for her appointment for hours, to kick her out of the courthouse if she did not make 
sure her baby stopped – immediately! – to wail? In French, of course. We will look at what I 
will refer to as “courthouse speak” in the chapter on thick description below.  
Permission to audio record trials was granted by only one judge for the trials he 
personally presided. Again, it was the same judge who had consented to do a recorded 
interview. Is he, then, a so-called key informant? He did the recording of the trials for me 
himself. They were done “undercover” or clandestinely for fear of not obtaining permission 
to record from the presiding judge’s two colleagues. He recorded the trials with my cell phone 
sitting on the desk in front of him. In Burkina Faso it is not unusual for people who want to 
come across as wealthy or “important” to perform this importance by possessing two or three 
different types of cell phones and by handling them all at the same time. Cell phones – 
preferably a brand or type not obtainable in Burkina Faso – are a much appreciated accessoire 
to underline their bargaining power and status in society (see for example Banégas & Warnier 
2001: 9f). Never was a judge or lawyer seen with just one phone. Or some interpreters, for 
that matter.  
It was thus not further conspicuous for the presiding judge to have one more phone 
sitting on the desk in front of him. Unfortunately, my phone being of the type not obtainable 
in Burkina and thus not well known in its handling, the presiding judge first recorded with the 
microphone facing towards him instead of into the room and towards the defendant and 
interpreter. The recording quality consequently suffered quite a bit. The fact that the 
presiding judge recorded trials for me while not letting his colleagues in on it feeds, again, 
into my ongoing preoccupation with trust.  
The fact that recordings were obtained in this semi-secretive way demands thinking 
about ethics in research. It is an unanimously agreed upon fact that material should never be 
obtained secretly; this is highly unethical. At the least, the data collected in this way cannot 
be used for analysis and publication. Since the data obtained through the recordings was 
gathered with the explicit permission of the presiding judge – the one in charge of trials, the 
boss – who then even did these recordings for me, we could conclude that it is permissible to 
 81 
go ahead and use the data. The judge had decided that it was ok for me to have this material 
and so we should not worry about him. This is one way of looking at the matter. 
Other voices do not agree with this way of seeing things, however, insisting that the 
recordings were still done secretly and can thus not be used in any kind of way. The judge 
might get into trouble, I might get into trouble. This debate, or these different opinions are in 
line with the issue of trust in research that has accompanied this project from the very start. 
It is also in line with the silence researchers often keep in regard to how they got access to 
their topic, terrain, and data, specifically how they got permission to record, in this case. 
The texts on court interpretation I have read are all based on research working with 
audio recordings (Angermeyer 2008, 2009, 2014 looks at interpretation in small claims courts 
in New York; Eades 2000, 2003, 2008 has done extensive sociolinguistic research on 
Aboriginal English speakers at court in Australia; Hale 1997, 2014 and Hale et al. 1999, 2011 
have investigated translated trials in the UK, to name just these among a large pool of 
research on court interpretation). How easy or how difficult it was for these researchers to 
obtain permission to record – how they got permission in the first place – is not mentioned, 
however. This leaves the reader with the impression that it is easy, that it is, in fact, the 
standard working fare. Which immediately makes me ask myself what it is I have missed, not 
understood, done wrong?  
So, I had to make a decision about my data and if and how I could use the audio 
recordings and their transcriptions. Taking the two opposing views into account, I have 
answered this ethical dilemma for myself in the following way. I decided to use the recordings 
and transcripts for analysis insofar as I could combine this data with my own notes gathered 
while watching the trials and after (memory protocols). The combination of material gathered 
in full view of all and the data collected in a half secretive way allows me to use the material, 
I believe. 
In terms of data collection and methodology, my interlocutors immediately felt they 
needed to talk slowly, thoughtfully editing what they were about to say, as soon as my phone 
took on the visible function of a recording device. This consoles me somewhat to the fact that 
nobody wanted to grant me recorded interviews in the first place. Salomon, for example, was 
willing to do a formal, recorded interview with me (the only interpreter who did so), but as 
soon as my phone was turned on, he talked as if lecturing on interpreting techniques 101, 
textbook style. That interview partners react reluctantly, carefully weighing what they are 
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about to say when confronted with a recording machine has inspired anthropologists to 
become creative in how to go about remembering their talks and interviews (see e.g. Förster 
2002: 102f).  
The tedious work of transcribing poor-quality recordings was outsourced. First, the 
French passages in all four days of recordings were transcribed by four Master students in 
linguistics at UCAD in Dakar.25 They took turns transcribing for a fee. In Burkina, two different 
native speakers of Jula transcribed the Jula passages, inserting them into the already existing 
text with the French passages, completing the transcripts: my colleague Mamadou Lamine 
Sanogo, a sociolinguist researching the Bobo variety of Jula, researcher at the Institut des 
Sciences des Sociétés INSS in Ouagadougou, and a nameless native speaker with neither 
expert status nor Jula writing skills. Both were instructed to translate all Jula passages as 
spoken by defendants and the court interpreter back into French. All transcripts were 
discussed and checked, again and again. Because of the bad quality of the recordings, 
understanding the utterances is often a challenge. 
The question of trust became pertinent again during analysis when I realized that it 
was sometimes almost impossible to hear what people said but transcription was done 
anyway. For me, certain passages sounded different than the transcription I had 
commissioned. Maybe precisely because of the transactional aspect of their job the 
transcribers felt like they had to find a conclusive way to write down what they heard. Some 
passages could have been transcribed differently, I heard something else – or understood 
nothing at all due to the poor quality of the recording – when going over my material again 
during analysis. Some material was thus useless.  
The head of the correctionel court scribes, the greffier en chef at the TGI, needs to be 
mentioned separately, because he seemed to trust me with sensitive court documents. He 
copied court files for me, dossiers, of trials I had witnessed so as to have some quantitative 
data to compare with my own notes and observations. And more than that, he also gathered 
statistics for me of the last three years – by hand, painstakingly going over individual trials to 
check for the information upon my request. No court documents, be this files, trial protocols 
or logbooks, defendants’ dossiers, are digitalized in Bobo.  
 
25 In order to have an idea of how penal trails are handled in another, formerly French West African colony, 
comparative material was gathered at penal trials at the tribunal de Dakar, the courthouse housing all types of 
trials in the capital Dakar, during trips to attend conferences and workshops there (see Tarr & Sambou 2021). 
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So, the main challenge was getting access to the judiciary and then maintaining it 
through the periods of my absence and upon return. At the end of my second, long trip to 
Bobo, a prosecutor, seeing me waiting for a taxi outside the courthouse, greeted me and 
added “you are still here? – vous êtes encore là?”, giving voice to his feeling of 
incomprehension towards my seemingly long stay. Which I seemed to have overstayed.  
 
3.2. Gaining and maintaining access 
“You could be a spy, Madame, or a criminal, who knows for sure? We’ve had to deal with that 
before”. The president of the appeals court was adamant. He was not going to tolerate me 
doing research at “his” court. Here, all criminel trials take place, the appeals and the assizes 
court are held twice a year. The president of the TGI, where the correctionel trials are held, 
was, by contrast, open towards academic research, graciously giving of his time and 
supporting me in getting access to the court’s files or rooms. The president of the appeals 
court, however, was suspicious and stayed suspicious. I had been introduced to both 
presidents by my friend Mohamed Sanou, the president of the commercial court in Bobo and 
as such their colleague. This introduction seemed crucial and it helped in one case, it did not 
in the other. That access to conduct research is denied is an experience, researchers can make 
in many and quite different environments (see Massa 2016 on conducting research among 
Eritrean migrants in refugee camps in Ethiopia; Amadou & Tarr 2019 on ethnographic 
research as a local or a European in West Africa; Darmon 2005 and Derbez 2010 on refused 
access to conduct research in hospitals). Mistrust also seemed to be contagious, because I 
was consistently refused recorded interviews by interpreters, judges, or prosecutors, with 
three exceptions.  
Before starting to collect information in Bobo, I had contacted a former judge, now 
working at the Ministry of Justice in Ouagadougou, whom I knew from previous research in 
Bobo. A Bobo native, he had been transferred to the capital and was now responsible for a 
new department, which allocates state funds to pay for lawyers in criminel cases. He is the 
DG called “dégé”, the directeur general and highest-ranking official I know at the Ministry of 
Justice. It was important to get his blessing, so to speak, for my research. 
But not only that, we discussed strategy, ruminated upon the best way to go about my 
work, particularly the aspect of getting access to doing research at the courts in Bobo, 
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convincing the two presidents of my purely academic intentions. My friend, the former judge 
– lets call him Philippe Somé – decided to not involve the Minister of Justice because not 
doing so was more conducive to my research. The two presidents in Bobo should act and 
decide themselves and not upon the Minister’s orders what they were going to allow me to 
do or not at “their” respective court. That was fine with me; being able to rely on Philippe’s 
judgement, get advice, as to how to navigate the intricacies of researching the justice system 
was an opportunity I was not going to disregard. Our mutual friend Mohamed Sanou was to 
introduce me to the two presidents of the penal courts.  
This introduction, however, did neither smoothen the way to accessing court 
members, nor did it automatically encourage interpreters, judges, or prosecutors to be 
particularly open towards me. Even though friendly and selectively willing to talk to me for 
short periods of time (no recording!), judges and particularly prosecutors at the TGI were 
champions in talking without saying much, or, like Salomon, in talking as if reciting directly 
from a textbook.  
Not only the initial access was problematic, also keeping up a good communicative 
relationship over the period of two years and especially during my absences from Bobo 
proved to be difficult. My main informants have not yet installed an email address for 
themselves; some few use WhatsApp, mainly the younger people. So staying in touch was a 
challenge. And even those people initially open and talkative, such as the one presiding judge 
who recorded his trials for me, granted me a recorded interview, and invited me to his house 
for undisturbed talks, seemed taken aback with my continued presence. He did not have any 
time to meet me during the month I spent there wrapping-up and gathering last information 
and ideas. For a short five minutes I went to see him in his office to give him a copy of the 
transcribed trials he had recorded for me. I had promised to give him this copy also in the 
hope of discussing certain aspects of courtroom communication with him. To my surprise 
(and utter disappointment, I might add) he took the transcript, looked at the first page and 
remarked that he was not literate in Jula. And put the file away. 
Cunliff and Alcadipani (2016) lament the fact that even though gaining and 
maintaining access is crucial to the success of any research project, it is rarely described in 
detail in the literature (Cunliff & Alcadipani 2016: 536). And it is particularly scant in what 
concerns qualitative research in state institutions and organizations. This is indeed 
lamentable, because the process of obtaining permission to conduct research shows up 
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attitudes, hierarchies, and power relations within the institution and towards the researcher 
and project – and of the researcher towards the subject of his or her research as well. Like 
this, it can also show up how often logistical issues – obtaining research permits, collaborating 
with local colleagues, asking for permission to access whatever domain the research is going 
to be carried out at in the right hierarchical fashion, etc. – in conducting research abroad and 
the production of knowledge are silenced by us researchers. 
In practical terms, members of both courts in Bobo were reluctant to varying degrees 
to consent to interviews or even engaging in informal talks with me. Recording too was almost 
totally out of the question. The president of the appeals court flat out refused me any kind of 
permission to do research. His very vocal elaborations on why I was not to do any kind of 
research at “his” court were quite atypical in a society, where refusing a request is usually 
embedded in a friendly and polite dance avoiding the word “no”.  
It is, I am told, often difficult to gain access to research among the elite in any society. 
Researching elites – or studying up, as Nyamnjoh puts it (2012: 73) – and gaining and 
maintaining access to delicate environments such as the judiciary (Bergman Blix & Wettergren 
2015), to state institutions (Cunliff & Alcadipani 2016) or the fact of being an outsider (Bleek 
1979, 1987; Nyamnjoh 2012; Nyamnjoh & Page 2002), both in terms of background – being a 
westerner, a woman, a white, coming from Switzerland, “Le pays où on fabrique l’argent”26 – 
and education, like not having a background in law, might all have played a part in the attitude 
court members adopted towards them and their work being looked into and researched. Of 
course, being an insider doing social science research in your country or even city of origin is 
no guarantee for smooth access either (see Amadou & Tarr 2019; Siwale 2015). It is not even 
a guarantee for being taken seriously as a scientist having another perspective to offer on a 
specific topic, even within the community of researcher-colleagues (Nyamnjoh 2012). 
My working definition of the educational elite in Burkina Faso pertains to those 
citizens who have completed university studies and have a good job corresponding to these 
studies, as we have read above. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1992) uses the expression “educational 
elite”, which she defines as distinguishing itself from the majority of the population through 
 
26 “Wo Milch und Honig fliessen”, translatable as “Where milk and honey are abundant”, was commissioned by 
the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) as a play, developed by the late social anthropologist Noemi 
Steuer from the University of Basel and director Clemens Bechtel in Mali with local actors in 2010. A movie of 
its evolution was realized by Laszlo I. Kish. See https://vimeo.com/7282870, last accessed 14 January 2020. 
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three main criteria: education, their way of living, and the social prestige they enjoy (Coquery-
Vidrovitch 1992: 25). I like the designation educational elite because it captures two attributes 
at the same time: being educated and being part of the elite. Combined, they very well 
describe the upper echelon court members. The judiciary as a whole is thus elite terrain. Of 
course, many employees working there are not part of the educational elite according to 
these criteria, such as the court interpreters. They act within this terrain, they are civil 
servants, fonctionnaires, that is they are hired by and work for a state-run institution, the 
Ministry of Justice.  
Yet their job category as interpreters does not exist administrative-bureaucratically, 
but their job as interpreters exists in practice – they translate during trials, but as far as the 
Ministry of Justice is concerned, it does not. On an administrative level they thus do not figure 
as interpreters, their salary slips read “secretary to the president’s office” (Paul at the TI) or 
“liaison officer” (Antoine at the TGI), for example. As we have read above, only that what is 
written actually exists according to bureaucratic rationalization. Reality is organized through 
a specific kind of order and this order is maintained through the keeping of files (Rottenburg 
1996). As long as interpreters do not figure as interpreters in the court’s and the Ministry of 
Justice’s employee registry, they do not exist as such. As long as there is no officially 
recognized job category with all that entails in terms of job description, hiring conditions, and 
so on, they will continue to be seen and handled and paid as liaison officers and secretaries.  
So how do interpreters deal with this situation? They are part of the bureaucratic 
apparatus which is the Ministry of Justice. They move within a terrain which is the home turf 
of the educational elite, who present and carry themselves in ways corresponding to this 
terrain. We will look more closely at interpreters’ self-presentation in chapter 4.5. below. All 
four court interpreters in Bobo seem to strive to adapt their appearance, the way they carry 
themselves, how they talk, how they communicate, and what they say – the presentation of 
themselves – to their working environment. They model their behavior and appearance on 
the educational elite they work with daily, following or copying a model they perceive as being 
successful (Rottenburg 1996: 194). 
As anthropologists we need to be able to improvise and be prepared to work with 
situations as they present themselves – change tactics, come up with new strategies, use our 
imagination any time during our field research. Particularly in what gets termed elite research 
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or researching the elite in the literature, gaining access – and maintaining it – is described as 
complicated and difficult. Bergman Blix and Wettergren define the elite as  
people who have power, prestige and money, based on their positions in key 
institutions. Sharing similar social backgrounds, they belong to overlapping circles 
within the upper-class stratum of society. The elite differ from ordinary people in 
being ‘in command’ of things beyond the control of ordinary people, such as the … 
judicial power. … They enjoy high salaries and secure employment terms (Bergman 
Blix & Wettergren 2015: 692). 
 
These attributes can definitely be ascribed to the upper echelon of court members – judges, 
prosecutors, head scribes (greffier en chef), who have all had the same educational itinerary 
in terms of studying law and going to ENAM, the state institution where training for legal 
professionals takes place. 
Abbink and Salverda (2013) suggest that the elite consists of people who are defined 
as such by themselves or by others: “an elite is a relatively small group within the societal 
hierarchy that claims and/or is accorded power, prestige, or command over others on the 
basis of a number of publicly recognized criteria. ... Elites are dominant in some sectors of 
society on the basis of certain (im)material characteristics, skills, achievements, and this can 
be in any socially relevant field….” (Abbink & Salverda 2013: 1). This definition has the 
advantage of taking into account the social structure where elites act and power structures 
at work. Abbink and Salverda insists on the fact that “elites do not exist in a vacuum”, but that 
they “... only exist vis-à-vis other social groups – be they the marginalized, dependents, 
supporters, or the counter-elites” (Abbink & Salverda 2013: 16).  
The elite in Burkina Faso cannot, by virtue of their success alone, be described with 
the sociological notion of “style of life”. Rather, the success of the elite becomes visible 
through putting on a show of specific objects, mediated by money. Banégas and Warnier had 
identified the four Vs – Villa, Voiture, Video, Virement (villa, car, video, and money transfer) 
that accompany a certain performance of the self through clothes, a certain way of carrying 
yourself, consumption, choice of food (Banégas & Warnier 2001: 9f). A decade after Banégas 
and Warnier published their paper, the four Vs have shrunk to three Vs, Steuer tells us, now 
being updated and modernized into: Villa, Voiture, et Verger, that is a villa, a car and a piece 
of land are now the main accessories denoting success (Steuer 2012: 91). It is a materialist 
and mundane conception of success securely anchored in emic materialist imaginaries, 
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Banégas and Warnier contend (2001: 10; see also Newell 2012 on bluffing). If we take into 
account the number of cell phones judges and prosecutors handle, then they are definitely 
part of the elite even though cell phones do not strictly fall into the four V categorization of 
showy elite behavior.  
Bergman Blix and Wettergren discuss their difficult process of gaining access to the 
judiciary and the particular case of researching elites in Sweden as “outside” researchers 
(Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2015). With outsiders they refer to the fact that they, as 
anthropologists, do not come from the same professional-educational background as their 
interlocutors. Although their focus is on the emotion work in qualitative research, their 
observations on questions of access and the work required in ethnographic research in elite 
situations are pertinent to my own experience. Of course, researching among lawyers and 
judges – university graduates – could have also facilitated communication between 
anthropologist and interlocutors because of our similar educational background – we all went 
to university. In the end, gaining, securing, and maintaining access to the delicate terrain of 
the judiciary was, quite simply, unpredictable and was obtained only with limits. 
The educational elite I am looking at here is also perceived or designated as 
intellectuels by the population at large: judges, prosecutors, and all upper echelon court 
personnel. Which, again, seems to rub off on interpreters. Historically, interpreters were 
vested with a lot of prestige, power, and respect, even fear from both the local population 
and colonial administrators, we read. In contrast, interpreters today are equally needed, 
albeit for different reasons; they are hired and then largely ignored. Without them, the 
bureaucratic organization of the justice system and particularly the way it is run by the experts 
in charge, could not function. The French language can only be used during trials because of 
the mediation of the court interpreter. 
Their being both needed and ignored puts interpreters in an ambiguous or difficult to 
define position; they are, as individuals, interchangeable and replaceable in their work on the 
ground, having been hired on a “right place, right time” basis and mainly for bureaucratic 
reasons. They are also needed to legitimize the running of an organization modelled on an 
imported system, which includes a ratification of international Human Rights laws. How far 
interpreters can act for and by themselves is clearly defined and delimited both by the 
organizational rules and the bureaucracy their superiors subscribe to, and by the control their 
superiors exercise over their work interpreting. Where interpreters are free from in-house 
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protocol is in the way they choose to present themselves and their work to outsiders such as 
plaintiffs, defendants, or this researcher. 
When I returned for final, wrap-up research in early 2018, it was Salomon who 
backpedalled. “Some judges [of the court of appeals] are getting on my case, accusing me of 
taking money from you in exchange for information. The president says you are a spy. I don’t 
want to lose my job, Natalie, so I cannot continue our conversations”. During the entire two 
years of my research the president of the court of appeals had not changed his mind, I 
understood. On the contrary, he got the criminel court interpreter to abandon his talks with 
me after a while by threatening him that he might lose his job. Also the judges were informed 
to not, under any circumstances, talk to the foreign spy and imposter, as he labelled me. Or 
so Salomon, the appeals court interpreter, told me. 
 
3.3. Concluding: Self-reflections of an anthropologist in Bobo, subject of detouring 
and deferring strategies 
The unanimity of judges and prosecutors on the use of French in the courtroom baffled me 
at first, particularly their insistence upon it. They appealed to the higher order of the penal 
code and the constitution, deferring responsibility and making sure I, the uninitiated, knew, 
that they knew what they were talking about. Judges or prosecutors also made comments 
such as “you know, Madame, it is difficult for a lay person to understand”. Yes, indeed, why 
did I choose to do research in an area – “the law” – I have had no training in? This comment 
automatically puts the researcher in a position of ignorant outsider and the judge or 
prosecutor in a position, where they do not feel pressed to answer or to continue the 
conversation. 
Everybody who studies law knows this, I was assured. And anyway, how could they 
hold a trial in Jula? They had neither the vocabulary necessary nor the education to administer 
justice in a language other than French. They are not aware of the existence of dictionaries 
(for example the Bambara-French dictionary by Dumestre 2011) or the translation of the 
constitution into Jula (Sanogo 1991), or of the existence of glossaries that had been created 
for Jula legal language (for example Wedirawogo and Budo 2002). As my colleague and I have 
asked elsewhere (Tarr & Sambou 2021), it seems that even though efforts to create 
vocabularies and glossaries in African languages exist and for a number of different domains, 
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communication between those producing the literature and the professionals meant to use 
them is practically nonexistent. It also seems like the entire self-conception of judges and 
prosecutors is based on a conviction that the law does not need to explain itself and this law 
is to be administered in French.  
When asked where it is written and defined that French is mandatory in court, judges 
and prosecutors consistently state that, indeed, it is written, that this law or paragraph exists, 
and they will surely be able to find it for me. They are lying, as Bleek drily labelled the tactics 
of his informants (1987), because it is not written anywhere. Even if I would not voice it in 
Bleek’s terms, I never got a conclusive answer to my question. How could I? It is not written 
anywhere.  
But this question might not be the one to ask. The self-determination of judges and 
other high echelon court personnel is delimited by codified texts written in the official 
language French. These legal texts are not only written in French, but also discussed, taught 
in law school, implemented to real cases, validated, and so forth, in French. The link between 
the official language and the law as spoken in a court thus exists through writing. We have 
seen that only what is written down exists according to the rationalization of a 
bureaucratically run institution. Any decision taken by members of the court needs to be 
based on a written, legal text, which, again, is written in the official language. So, the official 
language is by default the language of the law even though this is not eternalized in writing 
anywhere. 
It is this and more. In the next chapter we will see how the French language has 
historically been positioned as the only language in Burkina Faso deemed capable of 
transporting knowledge. French has and is promoted as language of learning, of upward social 
mobility, and as an asset for a good social status in society. The expert-bureaucrats running 
the justice system adhere to rules and regulations they see as successful. These rules and 
regulations, codified laws, are an integral part of the system just as they, the experts, come 
with the system as well. Following rules is a rule in itself. 
As we have determined earlier, citizens today have internalized the idea that French 
is the language of government institutions, like judges and prosecutors have, to a certain 
extent, internalized certain ways of going about speaking justice. These practices, however, 
are not only embedded in internalized behavior such as habitus, but are an integral part of 
practices applied to create boundaries. In this sense, we should not see silence, reluctance to 
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say anything relevant, even lies, as strategies meant to hide something or as obstacles to be 
overcome by the researcher. From a methodological point of view, they are essential parts of 
the analysis. 
So, the question might rather be how something becomes generally accepted as 
mandatory – how something becomes a fact in social reality. “Bourdieu made us attend to 
the ways in which patterns of behavior … become internalized, automatic, unconscious 
manifestations of who we are”, Hacking declares (Hacking 2004: 288). The ingrained habits 
often make people mistake them for something natural, instead of seeing them as culturally 
developed and perpetuated by those with the most power. Who has the power, then, to 
institutionalize rules, construct them as facts, and make them part of the social imaginary? 
Since we are in a legal environment, this question becomes even more pertinent because it 
shows up moments of “law-making” and of who has the power to decide on the procedure 
to follow. 
The law-making comes with the system. The imported justice system that came to 
Burkina Faso came with the French language, it came with its own educative institution, and 
it came with law texts already written. Judges and other high ranking court personnel might 
support and perpetuate the exclusive use of French, they did not institutionalize it, however. 
As employees of the Ministry of Justice they agree to follow its rules, regulations, procedures, 
to adhere to a pre-determined way of going about doing things, of carrying out their jobs. Just 
like everybody else working alongside them as fonctionnaires; they are the victims of a 
machinery that is bigger than them, to put it dramatically. Or, as judge D.M, had expressed it: 
“Yes, in Banfora [where he used to work as investigating judge] we did everything in Jula, you 
understand each other better, the mother tongue is closer to the heart, there’s a certain 
familiarity, a trust that develops between speakers. This allowed me to advance quickly in 
Banfora contrary to here in Bobo where they force us all the time to speak French” (judge 
D.M, Bobo 9 February 2017).27 Here in Bobo at the TGI, the judge told me, it is too much work 
and too much prescription on how you have to go about doing things. As an investigating 
judge (juge d’instruction) you can schedule your day as you wish, but here in Bobo, trials can 
go on until 6pm. A long day. 
 
27 Oui, à Banfora j’ai fait tout en dioula, on se comprend mieux quoi, la langue maternelle, c’est sentimental, il y 
a une familiarité, une confiance qui naît entre vous. Cela m’a permis d’avancer très vite à Banfora par rapport à 
Bobo où on nous oblige à tout moment de parler français. 
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Court interpreters subscribe to certain ways of acting as well, conforming to the 
overall, unwritten rules. They imitate certain forms of behavior, the process Rottenburg refers 
to as modeling, that they perceive as successful in order to appear more modern and rational, 
as being an integral part of the legal environment. Antoine repeatedly told me how he has to 
deal with highly confidential material and he refused a recorded interview, imitating judges’ 
or prosecutor’ rationale.  
Deferring tactics extended to other situations as well. When I asked the chief of police 
if I could interview him, he was very forthcoming, obeying the unwritten rule of Burkinabe 
social conduct to never outright refuse a request. Of course, he will do an interview with me, 
he told me, in time. I should call him. The interview never happened, the chief of police being 
absent or too busy every time I called. I wanted to get more insight into the production of a 
police report, the document which precedes and justifies a subsequent accusation by the 
prosecutor. We talked for a short while in his office.  
I get to the commissariat a bit early and wait in the ante-room of the commissaire 
principal de police’s – the chief of police’s – office after getting my visitor’s badge with 
no delay. His assistant goes to tell the adjoint, the second in command, that I am here. 
I take a secret picture of the two piles of narrow-backed grey books and folders in pink, 
white, yellow, red on top of the assistant’s white metal desk and wait.  
When the adjoint knocks-enters, everybody shoots out of their seats and slaps 
their outer thigh. He is a rather short man, today in a suit with shirt, no tie, which is 
the first time I see him without uniform. The adjoint shakes hands with everyone and 
tells them to “Repos!”, to relax, they deflate but only sit down when he tells them to. 
He proceeds into the commissaire principal’s office and re-emerges a bit later, telling 
me to come in.  
Now an extended massaging-stroking begins, me flattering the principal, 
listening to his excursions on how much he enjoyed writing his thesis, which he did in 
2005, talking to people, writing it all down at night after a day’s work. The police school 
uses teachers from university and the state is now in the process of giving equivalency 
to diplomas not obtained from university. His thesis title was “Le contrôle de 
circulation des personnes au Burkina Faso”, a topic he chose because he is a believer 
of free movement, he tells me.  
In spite of my flattery and uncharacteristic patience, still I only get a “oui, on 
verra, plus tard” from him to do a recorded interview with me. He gets uncountable 
phone calls, I flatter him again by remarking on how much people need his advice, he 
likes it, but still does not grant me a definite ok. I insist, waiting again for him to get 
off the phone after he told me that we were done, to ask if I then can go ahead and do 
an interview with his adjoint while I wait for him to grant me one. 
 93 
Every time I talk the chief yawns and watches the TV which is high up on the 
wall behind me. Once he picks his nose while looking at me, both nostrils. He looks me 
in the eyes with his finger in his nose and it looks as if he is very far away. I think I did 
not flinch.  
While we talk, he not only gets constantly interrupted with phone calls, but 
people march in to have him sign various documents. He does not only sign, but also 
corrects them – orthography, general content – and he comments on how these people 
tire him out in a tone, which suggests he likes being informed of everything. C’est pas 
facile. One man giving him something to look at has a swollen lower face due to a 
tooth ache. The principal gives advice, acting as dentist – an important man with many 
talents. One lady had made a typo, writing the name of a place Zogona instead of 
Dogona, which both exist and which in this case could have entailed unwanted 
consequences.  
He finally says yes, go ahead. This very small victory is paid for dearly, even 
more so when I go say good-bye to the adjoint, wanting to fix an appointment at the 
same time. The adjoint cannot give me an interview before his boss has not given me 
one. I know that his boss is very busy, however, and will probably not have the time. In 
addition, it is him, the adjoint, who is closer to the basis of things and can tell me more 
about what happens daily on the ground. He agrees, smiling, but still tells me his 
hierarchy does not allow him to go before his boss. But if I see that the chief cannot 
make it, he will talk to me, no problem (Commissariat de police central, Bobo, 1 
February 2017). 
 
In the end, I could not do a formal interview with either the adjoint or the commissaire 
principal. My short visits allowed for short conversations. They also allowed for insights 
despite conversations refused. It seemed like the judiciary in Bobo, be this the penal courts, 
the prison, or the police headquarters, were delicate terrain – but why? What makes the civil 
servants in law and law enforcement protective of information as to how they carry out their 
jobs? Trust was indeed a recurring topic throughout research in Bobo. 
The reluctance to talk to me and the suspicion were not necessarily obstacles to be 
overcome or wasted time and material, however, but they constitute information in 
themselves. The reluctance, the silence, and the mistrust I encountered throughout my 
research were as important as the information that these attitudes or practices veiled. During 
the analyzing process and while writing, I came to understand that mistrust and silence are 
as important as gossip or informal talks. The mistrust can be seen as a protective strategy 
against outsiders. The court members use silence to overcome or to hide their conflict of 
constantly having to navigate or choose between local social expectations of them and the 
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demands of a highly structured institution. In addition, suspicion and mistrust, even lies, can 
also be analyzed as part of historically rooted strategies people have always employed in 
situations of unequal power relations such as colonialism – we remember Moussa Soumaré, 
Wangrin, and Omar Sy – or in postcolonial imported, appropriated institutions.  
In researching elites, Bergman Blix and Wettergren describe the strategic emotion 
work “researchers in the field” need to perform to build up trust and to gain and maintain 
access (Bergman Blix & Wettergren 2015: 692). Their findings are relevant to anthropological 
methodology generally. To my own research I deem the following two points they make 
particularly on target. One theme they discuss is “the power issue”, the constant 
renegotiation of status between researcher and interlocutor.  
Why did interlocutors, who were friendly and granted me of their time at first, become 
reluctant, even cold and would not talk to me again after a year? Judge D.M. had been 
interested in receiving a copy of the transcribed trials he had presided and recorded for me, 
but when I gave him the copy, he was not only disinterested, he was dismissive, putting it 
away after a short glance. Our meeting was signaled to have thus ended. I must have 
overlooked something. 
Every research project depends on fair and sustainable access, not only researching 
elites, I would say (see also Cunliff & Alcadipani 2016: 536). Impression management can 
indeed be strategic. It included presenting myself adapted to the circumstances at hand. My 
dress code became more formal, because the people I was around all day long at court 
showed up for work dressed sharply. We have seen that dressing nicely is not only a 
prerogative of the civil servants working at court, but is part of citizens’ everyday presentation 
of themselves as successful and important (Banégas & Warnier 2001: 9f). 
So, in the end, being strategic went both ways: for my interlocutors at court, 
presenting themselves as a part of the machinery that is the justice system, it was essential 
to come across as being in control, to being successful. For myself, presenting myself adapted 
to the environment I carried my research out in, it was strategic so as not to feel totally out 
of place. Of course, I also wanted to inspire trust and solicit a willingness to speak with me 
from court members. The idea of trust was a constant companion. 
We will now look at language use and language policies in Burkina Faso in retrospect, 
travelling back in time and then looking at how language is handled today. Bobo Dioulasso is 
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accorded much attention, a city, where the large, internationally used language Jula is the 





CHAPTER 4: INSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE USE – Amtssprache: the way 
it was and the way it is 
 
Prologue – A day in court cont., Part 4 
 
How on earth would Antoine translate the prosecutor’s speech that he just held, and the 
judge’s verdict, releasing Musa on the benefit of doubt? When I ask him this he tells me that 
it had taken him years to get all the phrases correct, the difficult standard French and even 
more so the legal expressions, “on benefit of the doubt” being among the easier ones; a 
straightforward translation. By now, he has developed a routine, he says. His former boss, the 
president of the appeals court, had encouraged him to consult law books he had lent him, to 
look at and memorize certain legal expressions. He had tried to read these books, it was 
difficult, so he preferred listening to what the president explained to him. He needs to stay 
attentive during the entire duration of a trial.  
Now, the judge had just corrected him quite vehemently. It looks like a tricky situation 
altogether. All the many legal expressions he masters now, repetition and routine making 
them manageable. Or so he says to me later. It is all repetition after a while. Antoine relaxes 
back into his chair, stretching out his legs in front of him, locking his fingers on his belly. 
Musa’s interrogation goes on. 
 
4.1. The languascape of Bobo Dioulasso 
Bobo is the second largest city in Burkina Faso in terms of both population and industrial 
production and it is the center of tourism in the country’s South West. Travelling overland 
from Ouagadougou to Bobo, the countryside becomes increasingly green. In the otherwise 
dry landscape Bobo seems particularly rich in vegetation and especially after the rainy season 
the cashew and mango trees that dot the landscape shimmer in various shades of green. The 
city is, compared to the capital Ouagadougou in the center of the country, very lush and 
green. 
Geographically-linguistically, the city of Bobo is situated towards the eastern border 
within the larger Mande language space. Across this vast region, reaching from Senegal to 
Guinea and from Mali over Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire, various inter-comprehensible 
varieties of the Mande language continuum are used. The Jula language in one of its forms is 
also a trade and vehicular language that can be used in a large part of western Africa. In Bobo 
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itself, an own, urban variety of Jula has evolved. This variety has become the main language 
spoken in the city, often as first or even only African language of its inhabitants (Sanogo 2013: 
266).  
The city of Sya (or Sia), as Bobo Dioulasso was first called, has its origins in the 11th 
century, when agriculturalists of the Bobo ethnic group lived in different settlements in the 
region of today’s Bobo Dioulasso (Sanou 2000: 386; Sanogo 2013: 262). Some researchers 
therefore designate the Bobo ethnic group as autochthonous or indigenous to this geographic 
area, while others have found that they are an immigrant Mande people (Roth 1994: 36). 
Roth describes the region as Boboland. Like Sanogo, she, too, dates their presence in the area 
at about the year 1000, while Sanou cites historians Sanou and Sanou, who set the date at 
between the 13th and 14th centuries (Sanou and Sanou 1994 quoted in Sanou 2000: 386). 
Whoever the original settlers or autochthonous inhabitants were, they were 
progressively joined by peoples coming from various parts of the Mande world. After the 
dissolution of the Mali empire in the 15th century, many peoples immigrated to Boboland 
from there. The Mali empire had encompassed a huge area covering territory from the 
Atlantic coast all the way to Gao along the river Niger. Many different ethnic and linguistic 
groups had lived in the Mali empire, inspiring Kouadio to the question of how or by which 
criteria could a citizen of Mali be identified (Kouadio 2004)? He answers his question by 
stating that 
the empire’s citizens were the Mandinka. This term designated both those who came 
from Manding lands (i.e. natives of the Manding ethnic group) as well as all those living 
in the empire (also non-native Manding). All citizens thus enjoyed a type of supra-
citizenship which transcended ethnic groups and was multilingual and multicultural. 
A kind of collective, federal citizenship. This plural identity was formed from a 
common language which linked these different populations to each other. The 
framework which the empire created reinforced points held in common and reduced 
divergences and internal fights with a naming system, cousin-relations and joking 
relationships…. (Kouadio 2004: 4).28  
 
28 “Les ressortissants de l’empire étaient des Mandenka. Ce terme désignait à la fois celui qui venait du pays 
mandingue (c’est-à-dire natif de l’ethnie mandingue) ainsi que tout ressortissant de l’empire (même non natif 
mandingue). Tous les ressortissants jouissaient alors d’une espèce de supracitoyenneté qui transcendait les 
ethnies et était multilingue et multiculturelle. Une citoyenneté collective et fédérale en quelque sorte. Cette 
identité plurale s’est forgée à partir d’une culture commune qui liait ces populations entre elles. Le cadre créé 
par l’empire renforça les points communs et atténua les divergences et les querelles intestines à partir du 
système de correspondance des noms, des liens de cousinages et de parentés à plaisanterie….”. 
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Another noteworthy immigrant group are the Zara, whose origin is not definitely clear, 
but they themselves designate themselves as venus du Mandé, having come from the Mande 
area, as Roth tells us (Roth 1994: 38). Today, the Zara are considered to be part of the most 
ancient or even autochthonous inhabitants of the city of Bobo, many of them living in Koko, 
one of the oldest parts of town. With the Jula of Kong (in today’s northern Côte d’Ivoire) 
another important Mande immigrant group came to Sya, moving northwards as conquerors 
and eventually settling in Boboland in the 18th century. 
There is considerable confusion over and there are many different ideas that have 
formed as to the designation of ethnic groups and languages, not only for the Mande region 
of West Africa. Jula, for example, is an expression used at the same time for an ethnic group, 
presumably originary of Kong, then for Muslim traders travelling and working all over West 
Africa, and finally for all those who have converted to Islam. For methodological, historic, 
political, and ideological reasons, many of the assignations in use today were codified during 
colonialism, ossifying momentary indigenous ideas of ethnicity and belonging that were much 
more fluid.  
One of the first and best-known scientists to describe languages in the AOF, colonial 
administrator and professor at the École des langues orientales Maurice Delafosse, classified 
Malinke, Bamana and Jula as dialects of Mande (Delafosse 1901).29 He lamented the fact that 
it was difficult to trace boundaries between these supposed dialects, categorizing the Mande 
languages according to linguistic criteria of his time (Canut 2008, particularly ch. 2). The idea 
that languages are identified with nation states or have borders is as much a result of a 
European way of thinking and ordering the world as the idea of linguistic or ethnic groups. 
They are European constructs and have much to do with colonial hygiene.30 It was also an 
instrument for social stratification in Europe “…to see how Europe came to be 
‘deprovincialized’, how ideologies and practices tied to a specific gender, race, class and time 
were reframed as universal, timeless knowledge of ‘man’” (Baumann and Briggs 2003: 68). 
Colonial administrators were under political pressure to identify languages that could 
serve as ethnic labels and by extension as territorial and political divisions needed to establish 
 
29 Delafosse’s publication can be found under http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5440988h/f11.image. 
Maurice Delafosse is well known to researchers studying Mande languages. 
30 Johannes Fabian (2000) talks about tropical hygiene, when discussing colonial administrators’ collecting, 
cataloguing, reducing to writing, etc. of languages and vocabularies. 
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colonial rule. Europeans only saw what they knew and in unknown, new surroundings they 
imposed their categories in order to understand the world around them. This need for 
categorization was also a sign of the times. In the late 1700s and early 1800s, European 
scientists were busy measuring the world, travelling far, collecting and creating data (Harries 
1987 on South East Africa; Fabian 1986, 2000 on East Africa; Irvine and Gal 2000 on 
francophone western Africa31). Through Jula it can be illustrated how French colonial 
administrators interpreted and molded the world around them.  
In fact, Jula as a vehicular language had been known and used in large parts of West 
Africa for centuries and long before French invasion (Djité 1990; Iliffe 1995; Lüpke and Storch 
2013). Used as a vehicular and trade language, Jula linked people across West Africa, allowing 
them to communicate across linguistic boundaries.  
Such [trade] networks extending across environmental borders were the main form 
of West African commercial organization. The earliest comprised the Soninke traders 
of Ghana…. [M]any Soninke formed the nucleus of a larger, multiethnic, Muslim, 
Mande-speaking trading class, known most commonly as Dyula, who chiefly traded 
gold, kola, and cloth [as early as in the thirteenth century]. While many Dyula were 
travelling merchants, others settled in foreign territory, established local ties, and 
created a diaspora through which trade could pass across political and ethnic borders 
from the forest to the desert and from the Atlantic to Hausaland…. (Iliffe 1995: 85). 
 
The term Jula literally means “salesperson” (commerçant, Kouadio 2006: 181), but over time, 
Jula became an ethnonym, designating an ethnic group as an extension of the language name: 
“… ethnologists, historians or linguists realize again and again that many ethnic groups known 
today have only been defined as such during colonial times” (Werthmann 2005: 223).32 
Delafosse, who was interested in making the Jula language accessible to his fellow colonial 
administrators, was crucial in creating and naming this ethnic group in his influential 
publication Haut-Sénégal-Niger of 1912 (cited in Werthmann 2005: 223; Canut 2008: chapter 
2; see also Delafosse 1901). 
 
31 The expression francophone western Africa is a very unsatisfying designation I only use for reasons of brevity. 
The former AOF might show pockets of an appropriated and localized variety of French like in Côte d’Ivoire (see 
i.a. Kouadio 2007), but as a whole, no part of Africa can be designated as francophone (or anglophone or 
lusophone, for that matter), as Guy Ossito Midiohouan has already stated over 30 years ago, but julaphone or 
moorephone or wolof-phone – in short, africanophone (Midiohouan 1988). 
32 “…Ethnologen, Historiker oder Sprachwissenschaftler [stellen] immer wieder fest, dass viele der heute als 
Ethnien bekannten Bevölkerungsgruppen erst in der Kolonialzeit als solche definiert wurden”. 
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This reification of linguistic and ethnic boundaries evokes an ethnicization of 
populations perfectly in line with occidental, colonial Africanist research. In other words, the 
“ethnic” components were constructed and imposed by colonial ethno-linguistic researchers 
such as Delafosse. Actually, Delafosse went even further, wanting to find the “pure”, the 
authentically African in the Mande languages, uncontaminated by occidental and Islamic 
influences. This he found in what he designated as South Mande languages, which were, 
contrary to the North Mande languages, less influenced by Arabic (Canut 2008: 77). Like this 
he did not only create an ethnic group and geographically bounded language varieties, but an 
ideal, pure, authentic Africa. But West African populations had been highly mobile long 
before, during and after colonization (Amselle and M’Bokolo 1999), so linguistic hybridization, 
language mixing, plurilingualism, and thus also interpreting have always been part of daily 
life. 
 Even though there are no clear-cut linguistic boundaries between the different Mande 
varieties, as Delafosse had already noted, Jula the language and Jula the ethnic group are 
today known as such in Côte d’Ivoire and in Burkina Faso, while in Guinea and Senegal they 
are known as Mandinka and in Mali as Bamana (see Amselle 1990: 79ff on the creation of the 
ethnic group Bambara or Bamana in Mali; Werthmann 2005: 223f). Werthmann shows how 
speakers apply the designation Jula differently over time and according to political sentiments 
and context. Using the recent history of violence in Côte d’Ivoire, she shows how, first, Jula 
was used to designate a socio-professional category, standing for Muslim trader. Then, the 
term Jula was used to point to those living in the North, the Northerners. And in the end, it 
became a nationalistic hate symbol, the Jula were the foreigners (Werthmann 2005).  
According to Sanogo, the name Bobo Dioulasso was given to the city of Sya in 1904 by 
French commander Caudrelier (Sanogo 2013: 263). Historians Sanou and Sanou, however, 
remark that the name had been used long before Caudrelier by explorers passing through the 
region and who used the name Bobo Dioulasso in their report (Sanou and Sanou 1994 quoted 
in Sanou 2000: 286). The name of the city, Bobo Dioulasso, is made up of Jula – transcribed 
in French as dioula – and Bobo, the names of the two most ancient ethnic groups and 
languages present in the city. The suffix -so stands for house in Jula. We are in the house of 
the Bobo and the Jula. In fact, when Thomas Sankara renamed the country from Haute Volta 
to Burkina Faso in 1984 in his quest for more self-determination and autonomy from France, 
he chose a name that allowed the two most prominent ethnic groups of the nation state of 
 102 
Burkina Faso, the Moore and the Jula, to become visible: burkina is Moore for honest, upright, 
and faso is made up of the Jula words fa for father and, again, so for house. Burkina Faso thus 
stands for The Fatherland, i.e. Home of the Upright or Honest People. 
Today, we find, next to Bobo and Jula, the two main languages spoken, many other 
languages, which do not become visible beyond family or personal interactions with the 
exception of Fulfulde – or peul as it is called in French – and Arabic. Bobo Dioulasso is situated 
at a crossroads, on the north-south axis of the trans-Saharan trade route and on the east-
west axis of sub-Saharan trade. Bobo has thus always been an important place, a hub of trade. 
What is noteworthy for us here, is that in Bobo everybody speaks Jula at least as a second 
language; it has become what sociolinguist Sanogo calls a pan-dialectal, urban language for 
the city’s inhabitants, a particular Jula that is designated as “the Jula of Bobo” or “the Jula as 
spoken in Bobo” by inhabitants/its speakers (Sanogo 2013).  
Jula, as a large lingua franca used all over West Africa, is of course also used in other 
parts of Burkina Faso, such as in Ouagadougou, eternal rival of Bobo Dioulasso for attention 
in what regards development of infrastructure or work opportunities. Even here, Jula has its 
place, particularly in commercial contexts. The Ouagalais are usually described and also 
describe themselves as solid speakers of Moore and French, Jula not really figuring within 
their immediate horizon. French is, if course, the other large or visible language spoken in 
West Africa and by many Burkinabe in different varieties. Officially, the French language does 
not know or allow for any varieties, there being, according to the keeper of the French 
language, the académie française, only one standard form. In the 60-odd years since the end 
of the colonial period, French has evolved into many regional forms in Africa, which has 
attracted a considerable amount of research. 
Calvet, for example, has looked at how the French colonial administration installed the 
French language and civilization through schools and with force, marginalizing African 
languages (Calvet 1974, 2010). According so some linguists and sociolinguists, French has long 
been made into an African language by its speakers (Calvet 2010; Dumont 1990; Mengara 
2000), a heatedly discussed topic and a discourse loaded with political and moral ideas. 
French linguist Gisèle Prignitz has investigated form and content of Burkinabe French in many 
publications since the mid-1990s (see e.g. Prignitz 1996) and has analyzed recordings of the 
revolutionary trials during the Sankara years in Burkina Faso, where Burkinabe French 
became standard (Prignitz 1998). Sociolinguist Kouadio, too, has looked at local varieties of 
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French, particularly in Côte d’Ivoire, and has published extensively on Ivorian French and 
nouchi, an Ivorian variety of French heavily impregnated with Jula syntax and vocabulary (see 
e.g. Kouadio 2006, 2007, 2008). 
In spite of French being an African language today, as some contend, it has not entered 
Burkina Faso’s state-run institutions in its Burkinabe variety. On the contrary, at both the TGI 
and the appeals court in Bobo, it is not the Burkinabe variety of French that is current for 
communication, neither between civil servant colleagues working at the courthouses, nor 
between judges or prosecutors and defendants during trials.  
Bobo is a buzzing city, second largest in Burkina Faso, and thanks to its industry and 
university there is always an influx of new, young people from all over the country and West 
Africa. The Bobolais are speakers of a variety of Jula that has been literally born and bred in 
Bobo, an urban Jula. Newcomers to the city need to learn to speak Jula in order to feel to be 
a part of the city. 
Throughout Burkina Faso, French has become the language associated with social 
mobility, bargaining power, and the marker of a certain standing in society. French is, today, 
the language of the elite in its standard variety, while “street French” is spoken by the barely 
or little educated. Not only to gain access to the elite social strata of society are French skills 
crucial, but French is a mandatory prerequisite to be able to get a job as a fonctionnaire, a 
public or civil servant. There, French defines the working day since all government jobs, all 
tubabubaaraw, be it in education, politics, or in the judiciary, rely on the oral and written 
French skills of their employees, the work of fonctionnaires being based on documentation 
written in French. 
This is the result of a concerted and continuous effort on the side of, first, the 
colonizing administrators, military forces, and politicians as well as of post-independence 
language politics and policies. The first presidents of many former French colonies were men, 
who had been educated in the French colonial schools and in France. They were, for the most 
part, positively inclined towards France and its African language politics and extended these 
into today so that we now find French installed as official language in Burkina Faso and 
mandatory language in court.  
Although French has only come to West Africa with colonialism, it is today the only 
language of instruction in the formal educative sector in Burkina Faso. And even though Jula 
has been used for centuries in both written (in both Latin and Arabic script, adjami) and 
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spoken forms and continues to be a lingua franca used all over West Africa, it has been kept 
out of formal education also in Bobo. There, we find only two bilingual schools teaching in 
both French and Jula today. 
 
4.2. Amtssprache French in the formal educative system 
Until this day, no formal educative institution or government run school in Burkina Faso 
teaches in any of the over 60 African languages spoken in Burkina Faso, but exclusively in the 
official language French. There are no up to date statistics showing the relationship of Burkina 
Faso’s inhabitants to the French language, so we need to content ourselves with the survey 
mentioned above and which was conducted in 2004 by linguist Issa Diallo working at the 
national center for scientific and technological research (CNRST, Centre national de la 
recherche scientifique et technologique). This study shows that 56% of the total hours of 
education during the six years of primary school are dedicated solely to the acquisition of the 
French language, neglecting all other needs of instruction (Diallo 2004: 14). And even though 
French has been the official language in Burkina Faso for over half a century, less than 0,01% 
of the population use French as a family language, according to Diallo (ibid.). 
Children in Bobo grow up speaking Jula – at home, with their friends, around town. 
When children start primary school, and according to World Bank statistics almost 80% of 
children in Burkina Faso were enrolled in primary education in 201733, the six-year olds are 
confronted with a wall of French. Teachers speak and teach exclusively in French. Some 
institutions support the acquisition of the French language through a rigorous policy of 
French-only on the school premises, a habit introduced during colonialism and which 
continues to be employed today (Mayrhofer-Deák 2009: 23).34 Some private primary schools 
hire a second teacher to facilitate teaching in the first grade of primary school by translating 
and explaining some things in Jula for a couple of hours every week. But most schools do not 
 
33 See http://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/country/burkina-faso, last accessed 24.09.2019. As with all 
statistics enumerated by organizations who do not state how, exactly, they gather their data, also these results 
need to be taken with a grain of salt. The Annuaire statistique national (2019) states that the total enrollment 
in primary education for Burkina Faso was 90,7% in 2017/2018. These numbers have been collected by state run 
institutions 
(www.insd.bf/n/contenu/pub_periodiques/annuaires_stat/Annuaires_stat_nationaux_BF/Annuaire_Statistiqu
e_National_2018.pdf) and thus need to be viewed critically as well. 
34 The rigorous policy and accompanying punishment was carried into Africa by the French, who themselves had 
inherited it from the Jesuits. They, ironically, had used it to enforce Latin on their French-speaking pupils (see 
Weber 1976). 
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offer this service – no government run primary school does. The fact that a person is hired to 
help pupils along in Jula does not mean schools have recognized a need for bilingual 
instruction or instruction in the mother tongue. Jula is supposed to facilitate the learning in 
and of the French language. 
At the end of my fieldwork in December 2018, there were two private bilingual schools 
in Bobo teaching in Jula and French. The bilingual curriculum prescribes Jula-only instruction 
for the first of six primary school years, with gradual introduction of French in the second and 
third in order to conclude primary school with French-only instruction in the last year. So Jula 
in fact again mainly functions as a facilitator for the acquisition of French. At secondary and 
tertiary level all teaching is in French only. To my knowledge there is only one (unpublished) 
study which has looked at questions pertaining to the language of instruction at tertiary, i.e. 
university school level in the former French colonies of western Africa (Slezak 2016). 
Also in France, laws had been passed in the late 1880s, which made elementary 
schooling mandatory, free of charge, secular, and francophone. Even though nobody seems 
to have deemed it important to codify this officially, the republican school was from the very 
beginning pursuing a linguistically centralized agenda. Regional languages such as Breton, 
Basque, Corse or Provençal were at the time still vividly in use, but they found no place in 
national education curricula (see Weber 1976, especially chapters 6 and 18). This, of course, 
did not concern metropolitan France alone, but was carried over into their colonial project as 
well (Calvet 2010: 57).  
In order to understand why French is the main and often only language of instruction 
in the formal educative system in Burkina Faso, we thus need to go back in time. With the 
advent of the French colonizers installing themselves permanently in western Africa, came 
their mission civilisatrice, a civilizing mission closely connected to and implemented through 
the French language. Being able to communicate with the colonized was one of the 
preconditions for the imposition of colonial power. “This went beyond the (trivial) fact of 
verbal exchanges, because in the long run such exchanges depended on a shared 
communicative praxis providing the common ground on which unilateral claims could be 
imposed” (Fabian 1986: 3). The French settlers in West Africa soon realized that in order to 
further their colonial project, they had to be able to reach the local population. For this 
purpose, they needed local, autochthonous intermediaries who were able to speak, write and 
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read French (Calvet 2010: 18). What happened, was the creation of an African elite through 
education (Jézéquel 2003; Kamara 2005; Mayrhofer-Deák 2014).  
The first French school was opened in Senegal, the first class was held in 1817 in Saint 
Louis du Senegal (Bamgbose 2000: 75) by the teacher Jean Dard. He used a methodology then 
that continues to be at the center of debates about teaching in plurilingual settings and the 
space given to national languages in school curricula in Africa today. Dard studied and 
published a number of books on Wolof (Hair 1959: 585).35 Most notably, his students learned 
to read and write in their mother tongues before continuing their schooling in French. Jean 
Dard did not get any support from the colonial government. On the contrary, “… introducing 
Wolof in school meant establishing it as a language, on equal footing with French, which was 
not part of the general mentality of the time; according to colonial discourse, Africans spoke 
dialects, not languages….” (Calvet 2010: 24).36  
The first schools in Burkina Faso were opened by soldiers, who later, at the beginning 
of the 20th century, handed them over to private persons, civil servants working for and in 
state institutions, and missionaries (Mayrhofer-Deák 2009: 22-23). It was after the Brazzaville 
conference of 1944 that the French-only politics were rigorously implemented in schools 
throughout the French West African territory. 
[D]uring the 1930s an array of high-ranking colonial officials evinced a new openness 
to the use of African languages for certain kinds of practical education. Striking a 
different posture, officials at the Brazzaville Conference sought to dispel any 
ambiguities surrounding language policies, by declaring that “EDUCATION MUST BE IN 
FRENCH, given that the use of local spoken dialects is absolutely prohibited, in private 
schools as well as in public schools” (La Conférence africaine française: Brazzaville, 
cited in Gamble 2017: 191, capitals in original). 
 
Formal education in the colonies had thus tolerated African languages up to a certain point 
in time.37  
 
35 Hair here mentions Jean Dard’s publications of 1826, one of which is a dictionary French-Wolof and the other 
a Wolof grammar.  
36 „…introduire le wolof à l’école revenait à lui reconnaître la qualité de langue, à parité avec le français, ce qui 
n’était pas dans l’air du temps, le discours colonial considérant plutôt que l’on parlait en Afrique des dialectes, 
voire des patois….“ 
37 Mayrhofer-Deák's research shows that during the entire colonial period African languages were officially 
prohibited in all schools throughout the French West African territory through various written decrees (2014: 
207). This, of course, does not mean that African languages did not get used in practice by teachers. 
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Colonial governor Louis Faidherbe opened the École des otages38 – later more tellingly 
renamed École des fils de chefs et des interprètes – in Saint Louis in Senegal in 1855 (or 1856, 
see Mbaye 2006: 291) with the objective of teaching the sons of chiefs. The founding of the 
federal school system in 1903 then saw another colonial school opening its doors, also in Saint 
Louis: the École Normale. It was later rebaptized École Normale William Ponty after colonial 
Governor General of French West Africa William Ponty died in 1915 (Forster 2007: 211), the 
name it is best known as. The William Ponty school produced most West African 
schoolteachers, doctors, and clerks prior to independence. It was the elite training center par 
excellence and recruited its pupils directly from the upper primary school classes (EPS écoles 
primaires supérieures, Jézéquel 2003: 410) from all colonies in the AOF, a recruiting policy 
employed by the École des otages as well.  
The main goals both schools pursued were to educate future African professionals to 
secure teaching in the increasingly numerous rural schools, as well as to produce allies for the 
colonial endeavor – interpreters and clerks, for example, who entered the colonial 
administrative service as intermediaries upon graduation (Bouche 1968: 119; see also Gamble 
2017). Education was clearly geared to train locals to assist the colonial project. “Since this 
time, the larger direction teaching took was to give Africans an applied education…. Teaching 
in the colonies was developed in the interests of colonization” (Kouadio 2008: 2).39 Interpreter 
training was oriented towards learning the French language and civilization and not towards 
techniques of interpretation (Lawrance et al. 2006: 12). 
For Africans, “[t]he teaching profession constituted one of the major avenues of social 
promotion open to French-educated Africans. Colonial officials hoped that schoolteachers 
would serve as loyal foot soldiers, as they spread out to staff increasingly far-flung schools” 
(Gamble 2017: 99; see also Kouadio 2008; Jézéquel 2005). Later, graduates of the William 
Ponty school were at the forefront of the struggle for independence and many became the 
first leaders of the newly founded, independent states. Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte 
d’Ivoire, Hamani Diori in Niger, Modibo Keita from Mali, Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade had all 
gone to the École Normale William Ponty. They were highly educated men who, for political-
 
38 According to Kamara (2005: 106), Faidherbe himself gave the school this name. 
39 „[D]ès cette époque, les grandes orientations données à l’enseignement visaient à donner aux Africains un 
enseignement à but utilitaire…. L’enseignement sera développé aux colonies dans la mesure où il servira les 
intérêts coloniaux“ 
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strategic reasons, took over French language policies and the bureaucratic-administrative 
system, which includes the justice system, of the former colonizers after independence (see 
Canut 2010: 146; Midiohouan 1988). In addition, they institutionalized the former colonizers’ 
language as the official language – all former French colonies in West Africa have chosen 
French as their official language. 
So, in the entire French territory, including the colonies, speaking other languages 
than French such as African languages or non-standard French (or local French varieties such 
as Breton or Basque in the case of France) was strictly prohibited in school. The French also 
kept referring to non-French languages in metropolitan France as well as to African languages 
as dialecte, as patois, jargon, un parler de sauvages or barbares and never as langue, further 
denigrating these languages (see among others Calvet 1974, ch. II, Weber 1976 for France).  
Burkina Faso, at the time of its independence in 1960 still known as Haute Volta, 
established French as its official language as well. The Senegalese constitution, for example, 
enumerates six specific languages as national languages, adding that any local language that 
has been codified is a national language. Burkina Faso’s constitution does not name any 
specific language(s), but by default designates all languages as national languages and thus 
worthy of support. We can see how nebulous the concept of national language is, just as 
nebulous as the concept of official language and its apparent exclusive use in the justice 
system.  
It seems like a paradox that linguistic policies and language politics, which had 
excluded African languages from school during colonialism, were adopted unchanged after 
independence (Kouadio 2008) – and by those, who had fought for independence. The 
explanation put forward for this decision is to promote national unity and national identity. 
Ironically, "[i]n some instances these European languages were seen as having a capacity to 
unite African peoples against divisive tendencies inherent in the multiplicity of African 
languages within the same geographic state. … English and French have become the common 
language with which to present a nationalist front against white oppressors…" (wa Thiong’o 
1994: 6-7; see also Dirven 1993; Naguschewski 2003: 25; Kouadio 2008). Another argument 
stated in favor of the continued use of French in all official situations, is its capacity for 
international communication, an opening up to the world which is not possible with African 
languages. In light of the fact that English and not French is the language of international and 
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particularly academic communication, this line of argumentation needs to be rethought for 
the so-called francophone African states – and for France as well, of course (Miller 2010).  
Hence all formal education in Burkina Faso, from primary school to university, from 
the many different concours candidates take to obtain the coveted government jobs to the 
various continued education opportunities for civil servants employed in state institutions, 
continues to be taught in French. In order to become judge or prosecutor at one of the courts 
in the country, you need to, first, study law. Mohamed Sanou, for example, today’s president 
of the commercial court in Bobo, wanted to do just that. Let us look at his educational 
itinerary, which is like a blueprint typical of anyone wanting to set out on a career as judge, 
lawyer, or prosecutor in Burkina Faso today. 
 
Mohamed’s story 1: 
Mohamed Sanou was born and raised in a secondary town to the south east of Ouagadougou, 
Tenkodogo, in 1976. After having obtained his high school diploma, the baccalauréat or 
simply le bac (A-levels, Matura, Abitur), he went to university in Ouagadougou and studied 
law, obtaining the maîtrise diploma (the equivalent of a MA in law in terms of duration of 
education) in 2003, at age 27. He then decided that he wanted to enter the public service, 
become a fonctionnaire, in one or the other of the many posts open to law graduates, he was 
not picky. He embarked on an odyssey of concours – taking and failing quite a number of 
these entry exams. But he persevered and being a deeply religious man, he did not lose faith. 
The concours are tough, standardized, multiple choice, and mandatory examinations, a hurdle 
to be taken for anyone interested in a job in public service. Mohamed was rewarded for his 
perseverance, passing the concours to start training at the national ENAM school, the École 
nationale de l’administration et de la magistrature, for the profession of judge or prosecutor, 
the education being the same for both. ENAM is run and administered by the Ministry of 
Justice. Structural conditions of the education were not quite as tough then as they are now. 
In 2010, the Burkinabe state had decided to “bring justice closer to the people” by 
opening regional high courts or courts of first instance, TGI, in each of the 45 administrative 
provinces.40 In order to staff these new courts, the Burkinabe state takes on 100 new students 
 
40 “La Politique nationale de justice … insistait sur la nécessité d’une promotion de la « justice de proximité [qui] 
est un moyen essentiel de rapprochement de la justice des justiciables qu’il faut préserver et améliorer »” (Plan 
National de Justice 2010-2019, quoted in Fofana 2018: 394). By the end of 2018, there were 27 TGI in Burkina 
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per year at ENAM to train for magistrate jobs – judges, prosecutors, clerks of different ranks 
such as court scribes – and for the next five years, beginning in 2017. In that same year, 3200 
candidates took the concours exam for these 100 job openings. So, Mohamed was lucky by 
being a good ten years ahead of these more difficult times. He trained at ENAM for two years 
– or rather, for one year because then, the first year consisted of theoretical schooling, where 
you attend classes at ENAM in Ouagadougou. In the second year of training, the aspiring 
judges or prosecutors, legal secretaries, or court scribes, go get practical experience as interns 
at one of the courthouses in the country, participating in the everyday work realities of those 
employed at the court the student gets sent to.41 
After successfully completing his two years of training, the Ministry of Justice assigned 
Mohamed to go work as judge at a court in Ouagadougou; he could also have been sent 
someplace else and as prosecutor, the Ministry of Justice reserving for itself the right to 
decide the where and in what position for you. The administration of public service jobs is 
based on a system of rotation meaning that, theoretically, all judges and prosecutors can be 
assigned to a new court after two years of service in one place. Now, in 2021, Mohamed has 
been the president of the commercial court in Bobo for some years, he has built a comfortable 
home for his family (one wife, four kids as of 2020 and his mother lives with them as well). He 
also runs a turkey farm adjacent to their home, breeding and selling the animals to make 
some extra cash. They are quite comfortable. Mohamed hopes that the Ministry of Justice 
will not assign him to a court somewhere else in the country, sending him and his family away 
from all they have built for themselves in Bobo.  
 
DESCRIBING the educative itinerary of Mohamed, who was keen on obtaining a job as a civil 
servant in a state-run institution, allows for an excursion on the position the fonctionnaire 
 
Faso, 2 of which were not yet in use at that time (Direction du développement et de la cooperation DDC 2018: 5; 
see also Annuaire statistique 2017 de la justice, UNICEF 2018, 
http://cns.bf/IMG/pdf/annuaire_statistique_2017_de_la_justice_vf.pdf, p. 24, where 25 TGI are mentioned for 
2017). 
41 After the revolution in October 2014 and ensuing political reforms, the transitory government had signed a 
pact to renew the justice system, see Pacte national pour le renouveau de la justice, adopted on 28 March 2015 
(pdf file online at www.justice.gov.bf/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Pacte-version-finale.pdf). Article 24 states 
that the minimum age for magistrates to start work is 25 years and article 25 states that training for any 
magistrate’s position is extended to three years. The explanation given by one aspiring young judge-in-training 
at the TGI in Bobo is that judges and prosecutors have so far been too young when they started working, but it 
is difficult to see how being one year older will considerably alter the situation (and what, exactly, is meant to 
be improved remains unclear in the Pacte de renouveau). 
 111 
enjoys in Burkinabe society as well as of the status and definition of the intellectual in Burkina 
Faso today. Two aspects are pertinent: the standing public servants – the tubabubaarakelaw 
– continue to enjoy in the eyes of citizens and the continued, fervent wish to attain work in 
the public service sector in spite of increasingly difficult access to increasingly scarce 
government jobs. 
A person working as a public servant is perceived as being what Banégas and Warnier 
(2001) designate as une figure de la réussite et du pouvoir, a type of person in charge, who 
has made it and who is invested with a certain amount of power. This is also one among 
various definitions of elite, as we have already read. In fact, the change in the everyday social 
realities that Burkina Faso particularly and African societies in general have known over the 
past thirty years, brought about by structural changes (demographic growth, climate change, 
desertification, urbanization), has not only fundamentally influenced the political, social, and 
economic sectors of society, but also individuals’ practices, the “moral codes” as much as 
their “social imaginings” (les imaginaires sociaux, Banégas and Warnier 2001: 5).  
Yet also moral attitudes, social roles as well as representations of power have 
undergone considerable changes. Over the past couple of years, these figures de la réussite 
et du pouvoir, who have so far occupied a central space in the popular imagination of what it 
means to be successful, suddenly saw their image losing the attractiveness and shine it had 
so far enjoyed. Instead, new figures, with different upwardly mobile itineraries have entered 
the scene (Banégas and Warnier 2001: 7). 
 Nevertheless, public servants continue to enjoy considerable prestige among citizens. 
As intellectuals or évolués, to say it in everyday Burkinabe French, judges and prosecutors are 
part of an “educational elite”, as I have called it here. While not all individuals that enjoy elite 
status are intellectuals, intellectuals by definition are part of the elite. Here, I thus bring 
together the two figures of the intellectual and the elite in the person of judges and 
prosecutors and will dedicate a short discussion to teasing out their historical itinerary and 
how today’s intellectuals go about presenting their selves. 
During colonialism, access to jobs in the public sector was a given and a privilege the 
young “Pontins”, graduates of the École normale William Ponty, enjoyed by definition, as we 
have read above (Jézéquel 2003, 2005). This “white person’s school” (Jézéquel 2003: 409), 
first perceived as a constraint, quickly became the privileged place for upward social mobility 
for Africans (Jézéquel 2003: 410). “The popular label intellectual identified both the new 
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national bourgeoisie of politicians, bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and wealthy traders and also 
the second echelon of clerks, teachers, policemen, and soldiers “ (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1970, 
quoted in Oldenburg 2016: 5). After independence, many intellectuals – mainly of Nzongola-
Ntalaja’s implied first echelon – occupied strategic and important roles in the construction of 
the new states.  
In fact, economic crises and sociopolitical transformations as well as the structural 
reforms implemented since the mid-1980s have had a huge impact on the lives of young 
university graduates, the intellectuals. Today, a university diploma does not guarantee a 
career or class mobility any longer (Steuer et al. 2017) and university graduates’ status is at 
best described as precarious in comparison to the elitist prestige their predecessors had 
enjoyed, complete with financial security and an exclusive social status (Banégas and Warnier 
2001; Oldenburg 2016; Steuer et al. 2017). Despite these constraints to their comfort and 
everyday lives, university graduates are nevertheless seen as and respected as intellectuels.  
The situation university graduates find themselves in today has thus changed 
considerably. But even though getting a university degree comes with many and increasing 
uncertainties, it still is a rare resource and represents hope for good (job) perspectives. Many 
young people continue to sign up for university studies and an increasing number of 
graduates or diplomés look for increasingly rare job opportunities corresponding to their 
education. Until today, defining yourself as an intellectual is still accompanied by a certain 
elitist rhetoric making a distinction between yourself and others, between an urban, 
cultivated, progressive university identity and a poor, rural, backward identity bound to life 
in the fields (Oldenburg 2016). It is within this tension, oscillating between under- and over 
evaluation, that today’s intellectual (elite) operates.  
And it is the action arena of interpreters, who fit neither into the hierarchical space 
reserved for the elite, nor are they part of the social strata of intellectuals or évolués. Having 
neither pursued any kind of university education nor having sat for the concours exam, court 
interpreters’ rank, prestige, and standing at the courthouse is very low. As employees at a 
state-run institution, they automatically are civil servants, however. And, as we have read 
above, as civil servants they enjoy a certain prestige among citizens, even if not among court 
personnel at the courthouse. They got the position of fonctionnaire by way of a short cut, so 
to speak – they occupy a kind of third space. 
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Bintou, for example, had worked as court interpreter in Ouagadougou in the 1990s, 
having no formal training in interpretation or a university degree of any kind at the time. And 
even though she had successfully passed the BAC, the final high school exams, and had later 
taken (and passed) different concours exams and subsequent training and is now a diplomée 
employed as head of court scribes at the commercial court in Ouagadougou, she does not 
enjoy the respect she feels her hard work and position entitle her to because she has not 
studied law. In the eyes of her colleagues at the courthouse, university graduates in law, this 
makes her eternally inferior to them. They bicker that she has gotten around university 
studies and is now in the same position as them, a fact they can hardly tolerate, she told me. 
And on top of it she is a woman. But let us listen to Bintou telling her story herself: 
 
Bintou’s story: 
Bintou was actually not very interested in working as an interpreter at the penal court in 
Ouagadougou. On the contrary, the idea of sitting in a courtroom all day long, translating one 
case after another did not figure very high on her list of priorities work wise. And days can 
run very long at penal courts in Burkina Faso, forcing court personnel to stay put for up to 
eight hours with no or only very short breaks. In 1998, Bintou was in her last year of high 
school, about to sit for the baccalauréat or BAC exams, she had a baby to take care of and 
she was pregnant with her second child. All she wanted was to successfully finish her high 
school studies, have her baby, and start looking for a decent job. “Decent” meaning a job 
corresponding to her qualifications: Bintou already had a diploma in accounting and very soon 
she was going to pass the BAC exams. In fact, accounting was what she loved doing and was 
good at. Consequently, the interpreting job at the court did not qualify as decent, in her view. 
The pay was miserable and the required hiring criteria ridiculous – all the Ministry of Justice 
asked a court interpreter to bring to the job was a primary school diploma. Why suffer 
through the BAC exams if, in the end, she took a job that hired according to criteria well below 
her qualifications? 
But her older brother insisted. He was the head of the department of administration 
and finances at the Ministry of Justice and told Bintou that the penal court was desperately 
looking for interpreters. Burkina Faso had only just ratified the Covenant of Political and Civil 
Rights, which states that all defendants in penal cases have a right to be tried in a language 
of their choice if they do not understand the language of the court. Since Ouagadougou is the 
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capital of Burkina Faso, it was imperative the penal court there found and hired an interpreter 
as quickly as possible – as an example for the rest of the country, she told me.  
On the other hand, working for the Ministry – for any Ministry – means being hired as 
a public servant, a fonctionnaire and being employed as a fonctionnaire conveys upon a 
person not only a certain status society regards as worthy of respect, but also comes with a 
reliably paid salary even if this salary is ridiculously small. In Burkina Faso, many high school 
students dream of the security a job as fonctionnaire represents. So, in the end, Bintou took 
the job as court interpreter in spite of her reservations. Once hired as a government 
employee, there are opportunities to advance and rise within the system after a certain 
number of years of service, she figured. And this is what Bintou did.  
During her work as court interpreter, Bintou had to learn to be tough. Not only were 
the days long, the salary ridiculous, and recognition and respect from other employees of the 
court near zero, the toughest of all was you had to translate cases that were hard to bear. 
Once, Bintou had to translate in a rape case, the victim was a four-year old girl. “You are a 
human being, a mother, so I could not just turn off my feelings … listening to this small girl 
and having to translate her words was almost unbearable for me”, she told me. Indeed, 
observing penal trials for months on end did not make certain facts any more bearable, but 
at least I, the Swiss researcher, did not have to repeat and translate what victims and 
defendants said. “I was crying, tears streaming down my cheeks, all the while I continued to 
translate the little girl’s words for the judge just as my job demanded I do”, Bintou continued. 
Today, Bintou is not working as court interpreter anymore, having taken advantage of 
the system that allows fonctionnaires to climb the career ladder from the inside. Her children 
are both at university, studying medicine. Bintou is now head of court scribes at the 
commercial court in Ouagadougou – and does not miss interpreting one second.42 
 
 
42 This is the shortened version of: Tarr, Natalie 2021. Bintou and Alain. In: B.A.S.S. Meier-Lorente-Muth-





CONSIDERING Bintou’s struggle for acceptance among her colleagues in spite of her 
education, training, and professional work, it is not surprising that today’s penal court 
interpreters Antoine and Salomon in Bobo do not enjoy a high standing in the eyes of the civil 
servants working at the court. Let us remember that occupational hierarchies at court, like in 
all state-run jobs, are prescribed by the government, who clearly defines access to and the 
precise career itineraries for individual positions. All civil servants working at the two courts 
with the exception of the interpreters had to sit for some concours exam or the other, they 
had all studied at ENAM (and some also at university) for varying numbers of years depending 
on the job they were training for. The only thing Bintou, Salomon, and Antoine (and Paul and 
Jean as well) have in common is that they are fonctionnaires working for the Ministry of 
Justice. Later, the interpreters will describe their work and present themselves; we will also 
get to see more of what their superiors and other civil servants say about them and their 
work. For now, we will dedicate some more pages to how French has become and still 
functions as the Amtssprache it is today. 
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4.3. Amtssprache French in the justice system and in court 
The public space in Africa has always been that place, where justice was spoken through an 
institution Bidima terms la palabre (Bidima 1997, 2014).43 This public space can be the chief’s 
house, the home of the eldest person in the highest age class, or under a tree, depending on 
the political-social organization of the society at hand. The choice of the space is extremely 
important because it becomes the place where relationships between the subject, law, and 
the forbidden, between nature and culture, are expressed (Bidima 1997: 12). According to 
Bidima, la palabre is not only an exchange of words, but also a social drama, human 
procedure, and interactions. La palabre is thus staged, it is ordered, and it is put into words 
(Bidima 1997: 11). In many societies this institution of la palabre was responsible for the 
solving of conflicts. Here, citizens were judged publicly by varying constellations of 
participants and speakers, often involving an entire community. The goal was not to punish, 
but to seek a consensus and reparations for the damage caused. Reconciliation was sought in 
an ongoing palabre, which continued after the public trial, where a sentence had been 
spoken, so as to repair relationships, re-establish peace and social harmony in the community 
as a whole.  
Consensus, however, should be viewed critically, Bidima continues. Simply because 
conflicts were resolved publicly did not automatically mean that nothing could be hidden. On 
the contrary, words and speech are “opaque and can – in certain cases – form a screen 
between the subject and reality” (Bidima 2014: 31). In certain cases – Bidima cites as example 
the njobi secret society in Gabon – consensus becomes repressive. The basis of the traditional 
power of la palabre is metaphysical; authority can function without force because of myths, 
symbols, and customs. Collective adherence is thus founded upon a mythical threat – those 
that provoke the authority of njobi are secretly assassinated so that everybody can continue 
believing in the power of the gods (ibid: 47ff.).44  
Societies who traditionally practiced la palabre are the most adamant in pursuing 
justice through institutions copied from western societies, Bidima remarks at the very outset 
 
43 There is an English translation of La Palabre entitled Law and the Public Sphere in Africa, edited and translated 
by Laura Hengehold (Bidima 2014). It includes other writings of Bidima as well. If not noted otherwise, all 
translations of the original French Bidima text of 1997 are my own. The English version by Hengehold is cited as 
(Bidima 2014). 
44 This balance between adherence to tradition and living it in a newly constituted world is vividly recounted in 
a work of fiction, Ceux qui sortent dans la nuit, by Mutt-Lon (2013).  
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of his book (Bidima 1997: 9; see also Le Roy 1997: 321). Le Roy describes this as being the 
professional ideology of legal personnel, who believe in – and utilize – imported codified texts 
regardless of the abyss between this legal discourse and the everyday behavior of ordinary 
citizens (Le Roy 1997: 313). African political and intellectual elites despise la palabre, as 
Bidima stated it, preferring a superficial legalism directly copied from the West. Today, 
informal mediation is introduced more and more in societies which did not know this way of 
resolving conflict, while those societies that used to apply it spontaneously in their tradition 
want to codify everything according to an imported, rigid justice.  
Certain strictly structural similarities between a French court trial and a palabre as 
Bidima analyzes it exist. In the performance of both, the hierarchy of courtroom/palabre 
participants is visible, for example in who decides when who may speak. This follows a 
prescribed procedure, with one big difference. During a palabre, the crowd – la foule (Bidima 
1997: 24) – gets the word as well; being present at a palabre means there are no passive 
spectators. In a courtroom trial, on the contrary, the audience is ordered to keep silent. 
Another purely formal similarity is that in flagrante delicto cases, no pre-palabre takes place, 
just like in codified law, where no preliminary hearing/interrogation of defendants happens 
at the court. In cases classified as flagrant délit, defendants are brought directly to the 
prosecutor and to trial. 
Bidima criticizes occidental penal trials in that they concentrate more on procedure 
than on the actual case at hand (Bidima 1997: 28). In her sociolinguistic analyses of trials and 
of codified texts in Australia, Eades, too found that particularly judges obsessively follow 
courtroom procedure (Eades 2003: 125; see also Halaoui 2002; Le Roy 1997; Fofana 2018: 
407). In addition, Bidima continues, “in Africa today, users [of the justice system] often do not 
understand the language in which justice is rendered. … To linguistic and legal difficulties we 
might add other obstacles: high costs or the slow legal procedures. A trial can take many 
months while an informal resolution of conflict does not take more than half a day” (Bidima 
1997: 27ff). 
As importantly, going to court constitutes a moral socio-cultural obstacle, it shames 
not only the defendant, but his entire family. In order to preserve the family’s honor, Bidima 
remarks, conflicts should be dealt with within the family. Nothing is more important to 
traditional Africans than honor, he states (Bidima 1997: 16). Informal conflict resolution 
procedures do not leave defendants to their own devices but would restore defendants’ 
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dignity because they operate within their cultural imagination. They can thus understand 
what they are being reprimanded for (Bidima 1997: 31). So, how the concept of justice is 
handled needs a political philosophy which can operate as a frame of reference for meting 
out justice (Bidima 1997: 33).  
According to Bidima, penal justice today progresses also due to Islamic and Christian 
conceptions of fault. Colonial repression, where the police or gendarmerie took on the role 
of judge, also supported this penal vision within society. The goal of the penal justice system 
then and now is to find a culprit and to punish according to codified, written laws. Punish in 
French, that is, the standard variety of which has become the language of power in all state-
run institutions, in all matters bureaucratic, administrative, educative, and thus also in the 
system of justice, while national languages or “street variety” French are relegated to 
subaltern positions (Kouadio 2008: 6). 
Until 1903, a system of French style courts existed only along the West African coast, 
installed to serve Europeans and Africans with French citizenship. Until then, there was no 
French legal system inland (Ginio 2006: 116). After 1903, this system of justice was subdivided 
into two separate jurisdictions, making a distinction between citizens and subjects: now there 
were French citizens, Africans and Europeans alike, and there were African subjects and they 
each had their own, separate jurisdiction or justice system. 
This “branding” (Mamdani 1999: 864) of the vast majority of inhabitants into subjects 
was a strategy employed by the colonial power to exclude them from the rights of citizens 
(see also Conklin 1998: 433f). Together with their local allies, the French used this indigenous 
system of justice to better control local populations (Rodet 2011: 174). At the same time, 
these local allies of the French colonial power were crucial in deciding what, exactly, was to 
be defined as customary law which could then be used as a basis to decide cases on (Mamdani 
1999: 865). So now, there were two parallelly existing systems of justice. African subjects, as 
opposed to African citizens, could bring their cases before an African magistrate, who was 
supposed to judge according to local customs “as long as these did not contradict the 
principles of French civilization” (Ginio 2006: 117). The citizens were subject to French 
law/codes and procedure. 
The problem of speaking justice was more complex, however. French administrators 
could neither speak the languages in use nor did they know local customs in the territories 
under their control. This gave rise to the urge to codify customary law, but since customs 
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differed even between neighboring villages, this turned out to be a real challenge (see 
Jézéquel 2008 below). It was a challenge also to the magistrates who, unless they came from 
the village where a case was being judged, could not speak justice according to this custom 
simply because they did not know the local customs either (Ginio 2006: 118). 
Until 1911 and adding another complicating layer, Arabic was allowed as language of 
indigenous courts in the AOF; African secretaries could write protocols and verdicts in Arabic 
(Ginio 2006: 122; Mbaye 2006: 292). But after that, Governor General William Ponty 
prohibited the use of Arabic in all legal correspondence and for the records of the indigenous 
courts (Rodet 2011: 179), making French “the official language of all communication within 
the colony and the French West Africa Federation” (Mbaye 2006: 292). Record-keeping was 
continuously intensified and after 1912, religious status was officially recognized, adding 
another attribute to registered individuals’ files. Together with a defendant’s ethnic status, it 
needed to be fixed in writing and taken into account by the indigenous courts during trials 
(Rodet 2011: 174). The population took advantage of this legal pluralism by choosing which 
court to go to in order to win their case. Women particularly tried to take advantage of the 
rivalry between traditions and court systems to detour traditional power (Rodet 2011: 175). 
In the early 20th century, Governor General William Ponty started drawing a picture of 
Islam that saw people like El Hadj Omar, who resisted French conquest for a long time, as 
destroyers of traditional society and of imposing tyrannical Muslim chiefs on the population 
(Rodet 2011: 178; see also Dramé 2016 on the “criminalization” of Muslims, particularly 
marabouts, in colonial Senegal). Arabic was banned from all legal documentation. 
Today, the application of codified, written laws needs to be accompanied by 
interpretation, like during colonial times. But neither Antoine nor Salomon have the freedom 
to pour their personal interests or opinions into the way they translate because, contrary to 
colonial interpreters Wangrin, Moussa Soumaré, and Omar Sy, their translational work is 
controlled by Jula speaking judges. 
The way judges and prosecutors see it, the linguistic situation at court demands that 
the civil servants communicate in French. Major challenges result from this language practice, 
which allows Jula, the language of the public space, into the courtroom only in tandem with 
interpretation. At the same time, this practice of allowing only French as language of 
communication into the courtroom is not challenged by citizens, as we have seen. 
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 Not only can defendants not communicate directly in Jula with judges during their 
trials, but French in its Burkinabe variety has no place in the courtroom either. Or rather, 
judges and prosecutors continue to utilize a variety of French – standard French or academic 
French, as Halaoui calls it (Halaoui 2002: 348) – barely understandable to the average citizen, 
much less to defendants who, for the most part, have only little or no schooling. The 
overwhelming majority of defendants in penal trials are day laborers, shepherds, peasants, 
people carrying out various jobs in the informal sector, or unemployed youth who speak no 
or only rudimentary French (see also Fofana 2018: 400). 
In addition, court personnel use legalese during trials, which is incomprehensible even 
to fluent speakers of standard French, we might add. Both standard French and legalese do 
not figure in the everyday life world of defendants and so, in spite of the fact that some 
researchers deem French to be an African language today, as discussed earlier, it has not 
entered official or government run Burkina Faso in its Burkinabe variety. On the contrary, at 
both the TGI and the appeals court in Bobo, it is not the Burkinabe variety of French that is 
current for communication, neither during trials nor between colleagues. The educational 
elite, the intellectuels in Burkina Faso use standard French. 
Yet during a short period in Burkina Faso’s history, Burkinabe French was introduced 
as the standard during trials. The revolutionary period under captain Thomas Sankara only 
lasted from 1983 to 1987, but the justice system was radically renewed. Sankara became 
president of Haute Volta through a military coup d’état – nothing new in Haute Volta, where 
power changed hands through more or less violent methods a number of times since 
independence in 1960.45 
After taking power, Sankara proceeded to install a form of socialism meant to 
strengthen Burkinabe industry and production and the formation of an own, Burkinabe 
identity, starting by renaming the country Burkina Faso in 1984 (Selhami in Jeune Afrique 
1232-1233, 15-22 August 1984: 34). Sankara’s reforms, his revolution, focused – among other 
things – on national market development, the integration of women into the public eye, and 
the eradication of corruption, particularly in limiting the excessive expenses and lifestyle of 
 
45 According to Yonaba (1997), Haute Volta / Burkina Faso knew four what he terms constitutional periods, 
corresponding to the first, second, third, and fourth Republics. These were interrupted at least five times by 
mostly peaceful coup d’états by the military (Yonaba 1997: 8ff). This does not include the most recent coup, 
during which citizens (not the military this time) again more or less peacefully, ousted long-term president Blaise 
Compaoré from power in late October 2014 (see i.a. Hagberg et al. 2015; Tarr 2015). 
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all government employees, particularly high-ranking ones. Sankara was known for coming to 
work in a Renault 5, sometimes even by bicycle, repeatedly stating that nobody needs a huge 
car, also not the head of state.46  
In order to purge Haute Volta of its former corrupt leaders and their acts, Sankara 
installed what he termed popular justice, a judicial apparatus with institutions conforming to 
a new, revolutionary philosophy. This was to do away with the justice system in place, which 
was perceived as being a neo-colonial and anachronistic instrument allowing a small, 
privileged elite to stay in power. A system of courts was established, replacing but still along 
the lines of the “old” justice system. 
Known as tribunaux populaires de la revolution, TPR, these revolutionary popular trials 
were created by decree in 1983.47 The TPR were specifically meant to try political crimes and 
offenses of former government employees, of fonctionnaires. Former leaders had to accuse 
and defend themselves, starting with the preceding government’s members under colonel 
Saye Zerbo and before Sankara’s putshing his way to power in 1983. The TPR differed 
considerably from a classical, French-style court system in use so far in the composition of its 
members, in form, in procedure, and in its sanctions. It also differed from any other 
exceptional or new court system, some of which had been installed in Burkina Faso in the past 
(Carrefour africain 842, 4 August 1984: 17). All TPR were aired on national radio in real time 
and summarized orally in national languages before being printed in the press 
(Benabdessadok in Afrique-Asie 398, 20 April – 3 May 1987: 26). 
The TPR courts consisted of eleven members, of whom only one was a person 
educated in law, one member came from the military or the gendarmerie, and five members 
were normal citizens, members of one of the numerous local cells of the Committee to 
Defend the Revolution, the CDR (Comité de Défense de la Révolution) (Carrefour africain 842, 
4 August 1984: 17). No lawyers were allowed, the accused had to defend themselves. Equally, 
no prosecutor was present. Sankara believed that in this way citizens could be involved in 
 
46 Uncountable movies and documentaries, books and newspaper articles exist on Thomas Sankara, for example 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=wF-otRbvvUc or the 2015 movie by Swiss filmmaker Christophe Cupelin Capitaine 
Thomas Sankara (www.capitainethomassankara.net/pages_deu/boutique.html).  
47 See Ordonnance n° 83-18 /CNR/PRES du 19 octobre 1983 portant création des Tribunaux  
populaires de la Révolution (Yonaba 1997: 34). The TPR were the penal arm of revolutionary justice and were 
followed by the creation, in 1985, of the tribunaux populaires de conciliation TPC, operating on village or urban 
sector level, the tribunaux populaires départementaux TPD, responsible for meting out justice on departmental 
level, and finally the TPA, the tribunaux populaires d’appel, of which there were 30 alongside the 30 TPR – one 
for each departmental capital of the time (Yonaba 1997: 24ff).  
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sanctioning those who had embezzled or “eaten” the funds meant to be used for them, the 
people.48 
The French language, however, did not get banned from trials. Sankara firmly believed 
in the utilization of a popular French, or petit-nègre as he called it, the everyday French 
spoken by the Burkinabe. He illustrated this by stating in an interview that he would 
appreciate African literature more if authors did not keep insisting on writing in a language 
not their own, but instead used that language in writing they and other people spoke in their 
everyday lives. And anyway, he did not like fiction, least of all African novels, which have 
disappointed him just like African films have disappointed him. In these novels and films, it 
was not Africans who spoke, Sankara felt, but “…Blacks, who, under all circumstances, want 
to speak French. This saddens me. The authors should write the way we speak today” (Meuer 
1986: 3).49 
French linguist and sociolinguist Gisèle Prignitz, who has published various studies on 
oral and written forms of Burkinabe French in the 1990s (i.a. Prignitz 1996, 1998), analyzed 
the form and use of French in vigor for the TPR trials held between 1984 and 1987. Her corpus 
consists of audio recordings of TPR trials and the written transcriptions thereof (Prignitz). It 
might seem strange, upon first sight, that the revolutionary Sankara continued to use French. 
He explained this with his wish to erase differences between the various ethnic and linguistic 
groups in Burkina Faso, thus making use of the same rhetoric as his colonial and post-colonial 
predecessors – a line of argument that continues to suffuse justifications for the use of French 
today, as we have read. But a closer look at this decision of his is warranted, making sense 
when looked at in historical context.  
In 1984, a bit over 20 years after independence, Sankara wanted to use a language in 
court that made sure all citizens were equal regardless of ethnic or linguistic affiliations. 
Ethnic groups and languages in Africa were more often than not a colonial construction, as 
we have seen. The colonizers were not interested in a united AOF, which would constitute a 
threat to their small numbers and thin presence on the huge territory that they were claiming 
as theirs. So, creating, labeling, naming and thus dividing the African population was in the 
 
48 Here I want to thank Lilo Roost Vischer for allowing me access to her very rich archive of contemporary African 
and European publications (newspaper and magazine articles, among others) from the Sankara period.  
49 “Man hat den Eindruck, es handele sich um Schwarze, die mit aller Gewalt französisch reden wollen. Das macht 
mich betroffen. Die Autoren sollten so schreiben wie man heute spricht“. 
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French colonials’ best interests. Certain African languages, their designation and even their 
very creation, were a French construction, geared towards this specific end. 
In order to counteract this inheritance from colonialism, Sankara institutionalized the 
use of Burkinabe French for the TPR trials, that variety of French the people used (and use 
today) in everyday interactions when they do not have an African language in common. He 
thus wanted to “totally erase ethnic differences and used French to make all citizens equal…. 
In addition, the accused are politicians, adversaries of judges, who were often educated in 
the same university departments, or [they are] high civil servants. They do not share the same 
values, but they have a social status in common, whose prerogative it is to use French” 
(Prignitz).50 Above, we have read that TPR trials were diffused on radio, including translated 
summaries in national languages. By forcing high ranking politicians to use Burkinabe French, 
Sankara wanted to de-ideologize the language used by elitist speakers, forcing them to resort 
to the popular French variety understood and spoken by the masses.  
Interestingly, this increased and promoted use of Burkinabe French, which had the 
objective to overcome neo-colonial ideologies and the reactionary former government, as 
Sankara saw it, increased the popularity of using French in everyday interactions. The 
institutionalization of Burkinabe French during trials, which allowed “the people without a 
voice” to participate in legal disputes, for those to exercise their rights as citizens who were 
so far faced with the subtleties of a “foreign, Napoleonic” (Sakara quoted in Prignitz) law 
expressed in an incomprehensible language – privilege of the well-educated – gave the French 
language an enormous upwind. 
Today, Burkina Faso is back to holding trials the way they had been held before 
Sankara tried to bring them closer to the daily reality of citizens. Defendants in present day 
penal trials are not well-educated, high-ranking government officials like during the TPR trials, 
but ordinary citizens, those “without a voice”. Rapprocher la justice des justiciables (Fofana 
2018) – to bring justice closer to defendants – or justice de proximité (Yonaba 1997: 28) – a 
closer justice – continues to be on scientists’ and on the government’s agenda, even though 
with a totally different objective than in Sankara’s understanding. Now, the government 
 
50 “La révolution a voulu gommer au maximum les différences ethniques et s’est servi du français pour mettre 
à égalité les citoyens…. C’est aussi que les accusés sont des responsables politiques, adversaires des juges, 
souvent issus des mêmes formations universitaires, ou de hauts fonctionnaires. Ils ne partagent pas les même 
valeurs, mais ont en commun un status social dont le maniement du français et l’apanage” see 
www.thomassankara.net/la-rhetorique-de-la-revolution-burkinabe-une-mediation-sociale-de-gisele-prignitz/ 
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wants to bring justice closer to the people both in terms of physical closeness by creating 
more court houses all over Burkina Faso, as well as in terms of adapting legal procedure more 
to daily lived realities (i.a. Degni-Segui 1995; Fofana 2018; Yonaba 1997), for example by 
decluttering spectacularly long and complicated legal paths through different institutions to 
attain a land title (Korbeogo 2015 discussed below). We will get back to this idea or attempt 
to adapt the justice system to local sensibilities by “domesticating” it, particularly the legal 
procedure. The limits or shortcomings of these politics of rapprochement, of bringing justice 
closer to citizens, were felt during the revolutionary period as much as they are felt today. 
Most immediately, out of the 30 TPR established all over Burkina Faso, only seven were 
operable, for example (Degni-Segui 1995: 452). 
After Sankara’s assassination in 1987 there followed a political period designated as 
rectification (Korbeogo 2015: 45; see also i.a. Hilgers and Loada 2013) or rectification of the 
revolution (Boudon 1997), which, by its very designation, implies that the new regime under 
Blaise Compaoré wanted not only to change, but to correct things and to set them right. In 
fact, Compaoré wanted this rectification to be explicitly understood as a kind of glasnost. He 
had to tread carefully, satisfying both the Mossi elders, whom Sankara had shunned, by 
rehabilitating customary chiefs (Hilgers and Loada 2013: 194), while also keeping Sankarist 
rhetoric alive for those who still favored it (Boudon 1997: 132). Renaming Sankara’s CDRs – 
Comités pour la Défense de la Révolution – into Comités Révolutionnaires or CR, Compaoré 
appeased those that continued to appreciate ideas associated with the revolution. He thus 
used the power structure established with the CDRs (which had been set up in all towns and 
villages in Burkina Faso) when going about installing a constitutional democracy, the Fourth 
Republic. 
The rectification included doing entirely away with Sankarist popular justice in all its 
forms; the justice system was once again controlled by the Ministry of Justice. The new 
constitution adopted in 1991 expressly mentions that all texts which describe and define the 
TPR are revoked and classic jurisdictions are re-established (Yonaba 1997: 27; Fofana 2018: 
401). And even though no text or decree states that the official language French in its 
standard form is the language of justice, trials as of 1991 were once again held in standard 
French. The pre-revolutionary French legal procedure and code are again the standard.  
Like this, the justice system is, once again, far removed from everyday citizens’ lives. 
This does not mean that no attempts were made by the government to bring justice closer to 
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the people. Let me illustrate this through an example described by Korbeogo (2015) in his 
study of land acquisition, which allows insights into how the Burkinabe government tries to 
adapt legal procedure to citizens’ world view – he calls it la domestication cadastrale 
(Korbeogo 2015: 48) – and to how, in the end, it failed to attain this goal, namely to make 
legal, institutional, government procedure accessible to its users. 
Korbeogo and his team carried out empirical research also in and around Bobo. The 
land to the south and west of the city is extremely coveted for its natural water ways and 
excellent land quality. Nowadays to own land and to prove that you do so you need a number 
of different documents, obtainable from a chain of various government offices located all 
over the city of Bobo. The procedure is long and costly. It demands Sisyphean patience. And 
it remains, to the everyday citizen, totally incomprehensible. 
Land had traditionally not been owned, neither by individuals nor by a group, but 
according to customary laws was used and tended to by a community as a whole.51 The idea 
of having to suddenly prove ownership of land, legitimating working it, using its products, and 
so on, is at best a harassment. In the worst case, it poses an existential dilemma for 
agricultural users. 
The Burkinabe government sees all land as belonging to the state by definition 
(Korbeogo 2015). In practical terms, this does not mean or change anything for the traditional 
peasants or land users as long as nobody claims land for him or herself and kick-starts legal 
processes peasants are not aware of. And even if they were made aware of the bureaucratic 
relay race, they do not have the financial means to pursue it. As long as nobody proceeds to 
acquire large parts of land – Korbeogo mentions urban fonctionnaires, retirees who have 
discovered their passion for farming, or one “grande dame” from Bobo, all of whom were 
unavailable for interviews or meetings, I might add – the traditional land users are left in 
peace. Because in the end, money always wins out, “[c]’est l’argent qui fait tout”, as Korbeogo 
laconically states (Korbeogo 1997: 55). Just like at court. 
Certain individuals’ wish to acquire large pieces of land starting at 200 hectares, poses 
a serious dilemma for traditional land-user peasants, some of whom have worked a certain 
 
51 Traditionally, land was used by the community or village or lineage as a whole. Not only in what is now Burkina 
Faso, but in many different parts of Africa (and the world, for that matter) customary usage of land was regulated 
in this way. This is a richly researched and discussed topic and even though extremely intriguing as subject, goes 
beyond the topic of this study.  
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piece of land for generations. Like in many instances of “occidentalization”, where the 
exogeneity (Le Roy’s words 1997: 312) of the system itself shows up the clash between local 
social sensibilities and imported values, the land – we have read above – was traditionally not 
owned by an individual or a group, but by a community as a whole. Now, suddenly, the “right 
to land” needs to be proven in the form of specific documents, obtainable through 
interminable, incomprehensible, and expensive walks through the state-run bureaucracy. 
When the bureaucrats in charge of land questions realized that practically nobody was 
in possession of this documentation – of the 13 people interviewed in one area of Burkina by 
Korbeogo and his team, none had all the documentation necessary – they wanted to facilitate 
the procedure for peasants to attain these papers. The state did not question the rules per 
se: the number and nature of papers necessary or the many different institutions involved in 
providing this documentation was not up for debate. But the state – or rather those that run 
the state, the fonctionnaires – realized that measures were needed in order to assist the 
population in actually getting all of these papers. Procedures were needed that allowed 
citizens to obtain all of the required papers. Adapted, modified procedures that allowed the 
system to continue running as it was. 
Korbeogo found that out of the 13 peasants he and his team talked to in the qualitative 
part of their study, only one actually owned a permit to exploit – and only exploit, not own – 
the land, which took him one year to get (Korbeogo 2015: 52). This constitutes the first of 
many more legal documents needed to fully own the land. The government reacted to this 
paucity of legal documentation in the hands of users. “Procedures were somewhat simplified 
in order to be accessible (at least according to official view) [and] the rural land plans, [which] 
already [were] a hybrid (between administrative and customary procedures) and a transitory 
form of recognition of rural ground law … were not successful” (Korbeogo 2015: 50). 
According to Korbeogo, legal pluralism and various land programs meant to encourage users 
to attain legal documentation, only contributed to the proliferation of the uncountable, 
necessary documents.  
This is one example which shows that the state might show willingness to domesticate 
the justice system by adapting legal procedure more to daily reality. But it does this not by 
adopting laws – making new laws – closer to local world views, but by facilitating procedure 
while continuing to adhere to the existing rules, laws, regulations. Legal professionals and 
bureaucrats adhere to what Le Roy calls a professional ideology, they follow codified texts 
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and procedures to the word (see Le Roy 1997: 312ff). The normative assumptions of the legal 
system are not translated into local norms nor are they questioned. 
In the Fourth Republic, which was the result of the “rectification period” (1987-1991), 
the justice system did also not integrate experiences gained in the TPR trials during Sankara’s 
era by, for example, involving citizens/the audience in the trials “palabre style” or by keeping 
Burkinabe French as the language of the courts. Quite contrarily, the justice system was 
transformed back to its “normal constitutional” (Yonaba 1997: 12), pre-revolutionary form. 
Today, most defendants being judged in a penal court need to be translated – they need to 
be made to fit (into) the courtroom space, like Elijah Anderson found black Americans need 
to adapt to a mostly white middle-class life in the USA (Anderson 2015). 
Anderson calls the middle-class space in the USA the white space, shaped and largely 
occupied by white US Americans. African Americans only fit into this space by adapting to it 
in terms of how they dress and carry themselves and by how they talk. Here, I am applying 
Anderson’s concept of the white space to what we can call the French space, i.e. the 
courtroom, in Burkina Faso: a place to which some people belong and many do not by virtue 
of certain characteristics. It is a concept of exclusive belonging. In the French space of the 
courtroom, the vast majority of defendants do not belong, because of their social class, 
education, and especially their non- or little command of standard French. To make them 
“belong”, defendants need the intermediation of an interpreter. 
But the interpreter too does not belong to this French space, or rather, he has attained 
a certain precarious status within it by short cutting standard procedure, we saw. He moves 
within the justice system as a necessary working part of trials. He also conforms or adapts to 
his environment, terrain of the educational elite, by adopting what can be termed standard 
courthouse procedure: sharp dress, slow, dignified walk, and a certain amount of downtalking 
to defendants and the audience. How can we assess the interpreter’s position at court, how 
he carries himself, and his role during trials?  
Defendants never receive a script, to return to Goffman, meaning they are the only 
ones on stage during a trial, who have no or only little idea of what to expect, on how to 
behave and carry themselves. At the same time, they, too, are an integral part of the play 
staged. So, one particular feature of courtroom interaction – the use of standard French – is 
that it transforms the courtroom and hence the justice system in its representation of state 
authority into an inaccessible space for a remarkable part of society. This is especially visible 
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through as well as reinforced by the language regime at court, making citizens dependent on 
interpretation. 
Defendants are made to fit the French space of the courtroom through interpretation 
– the court interpreter intervenes. In Bobo, more than three quarters of all correctionel trials 
need interpretation. Out of a randomly selected 50 correctionel trials held at the TGI in Bobo 
in 2015, 11 trials were conducted in French while 39 needed interpretation, mostly into Jula, 
rarely into another African language (in 2016, 8 trials were in French, 42 were interpreted and 
in 2017, 12 were in French and 38 needed interpretation). To illustrate communication during 
penal trials in more detail, let us look at some specific and often repeated phrases. 
 
Examples from court cases at the TGI: 
Courthouse, 24 January 2017, 10:45am, third case: “Vous vous exprimez en quelle langue?” 
Today the presiding judge has remembered to ask the defendant which language he wants to 
use during his trial. Considering that often he forgets to ask all together, this is a good start 
for the defendant. He opts for Jula. Later, in the middle of being questioned by one of the 
judges, this same defendant responds with a French oui; the presiding judge tells him 
immediately to stick to Jula: “C’est ça le jula? Is this Jula? Make up your mind!”. The judge 
also tells him to speak clearly, which the defendant seems to have difficulties doing to the 
judge’s ears. 
In other cases, the judge asks if the defendant can express himself in French: “Vous 
vous exprimez en français?”. Wording the question in these terms puts French in the position 
of default language, the defendant having to justify using any other language. And, indeed, in 
half of the cases analyzed, the judge had asked the defendant in which language the 
defendant expressed himself in. In the other half, the judge either asked if the defendant 
spoke French or did not ask at all. Often, the presiding judge deems the defendant’s French 
good enough so as to proceed in French. Like in Joseph’s trial over ten years ago. As Eades 
had already remarked, ultimately it is the judge who decides which language will be spoken 
in a trial (Eades 2003: 115-116).  
Ideally, the presiding judge asks defendants this most important question at the 
beginning of each new case. Once defendants have designated which language they feel most 
comfortable defending themselves in, they have to stick to it to the end of their trial. Yet 
judges say that defendants can switch language anytime during their trial, if they wish. In 
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judge D.M.’s words: “It is always better to let the defendant use the language he understands 
best, so there is no problem at all to let them switch languages [in the middle of a trial]. There 
are those who do it on purpose to make the trial take longer, it’s a watering down strategy 
by lawyers or defendants, they create situations to push things back” (Bobo 7 February 
2017).52 
In practice, this is never granted, however. In fact, this same judge told a defendant 
during her trial to stick to Jula; she had chosen Jula for her trial at the beginning, now she 
should continue in it (6 December 2016). The same holds for the other way around; here a 
woman defendant in a case in which I knew one of the plaintiffs, started out in French, as we 
can read in my fieldnotes: 
 
In case 6 (16:08pm), Abou’s wife-as-plaintiff finally gets her turn [she had been waiting 
since 8am]. The woman defendant is accused of having “eaten” all of the money from 
their tontine. The case starts in French, so Antoine leaves the room, but the defendant, 
stating her case, soon realizes she’d prefer Jula. Presiding judge A.P. sends somebody 
to go look for Antoine, who comes back, but then decides to not let the woman 
continue in Jula after all. This is the second time that it seems once a trial starts, there 
is no language switch (she can state all the numbers in Jula though). 
(TGI, 2 December 2016) 
 
So here, the defendant was forced to continue using French, which she had reluctantly agreed 
to use at the beginning of her trial upon the presiding judge’s insistence. As usual, after the 
identity check, the trial began with the defendant getting to state her side of the case. Here, 
she searched for words, but spoke quickly and breathlessly in rudimentary French. In the 
middle of her trial, she asked to be able to continue in Jula, which was not granted. In fact, 
the presiding judge made fun of his colleague, who seemed incapable, in his eyes, to adapt 
his French to the defendant’s when interrogating her. This constitutes the one rare case the 
Burkinabe French variety was mentioned – not used – during a trial. She was not allowed to 
 
52 “C’est toujours mieux de laisser le prévenu s’exprimer dans la langue qu’il comprend le plus, donc il n’y a 
aucun problème de changer de langue. Il y a ceux qui le font pour faire durer le procès, c’est dilatoire (soit les 
avocats, soit les prévenus), créer des situations pour reporter.” 
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switch. As we have seen, judges believe defendants are using a switch in language 
strategically to confuse them and the prosecutor.  
In practice, it is the presiding judge who decides in which language a trial is to be held 
– or rather, he decides if a defendant’s French suffices. “I was forced to use French during my 
trial in 2005”, says Joseph, who is imprisoned for life at the jail in Bobo, “judge P.N. decided 
my French was good enough – but I only went to school for three years! I asked for Jula in my 
trial, but the judge did not let me defend myself in Jula. It was very difficult, I did not 
understand much.” (MACO Bobo, 27.02.2018). The judge, who is neither a linguist nor a 
language teacher or researcher and thus has no competence to evaluate defendants’ French 
skills, nevertheless has the power to force defendants to use French. 
Another problem arises if the defendant’s native tongue is not Jula but Moore or Bisa, 
or any other African language. Interpreter Antoine then gets up and leaves the room, like he 
does when a trial is to be held in French. He interprets from and to French, Jula, and Bobo 
only. Bobo was never asked for during my research. If Moore is asked for by a defendant, the 
presiding judge quickly confers with his two colleagues. Then he calls into the audience, asking 
if there is somebody fluent in both Moore and French and has the courage to come translate. 
If somebody indeed considers him- or herself courageous enough, they step forward. If the 
person is over 21 years of age, s/he quickly gets sworn in and the trial can start. In the contrary 
case, when nobody is available to come forward and translate, the case gets adjourned, and 
the judge and prosecutor immediately select a new date. The defendant has to wait until the 
next time his case can be heard and, hopefully, translated.  
Judges and prosecutors are unanimous in their belief that French is the only 
acceptable language to be used in court and particularly during trials, which are open to the 
public. Neither the penal code (le code penal, most recent edition of 1996) nor the code of 
penal procedure (code de procedure pénale 1968) mention that French needs to be used in 
court. No amendment exists to date demanding the use of French in court. Halaoui designates 
this situation – the choice of using a foreign language in court, a decision citizens have had no 
say in – as “une situation de deviance” (Halaoui 2002: 346), which I will designate with the 
term aberrance. 
When judges, by themselves or with the support of an interpreter, use the official 
language French, a situation of aberrance installs itself. Working with an interpreter does not 
necessarily improve the quality of communication, Halaoui contends, on the contrary. Since 
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interpreters are “simple citizens” and not professionals, they, too, contribute to the situation 
of aberrance (Halaoui 2002: 351f). In addition, it is judges alone who decide when and what 
an interpreter is supposed to translate for defendants. We will look at courtroom 
communication in detail in the next chapter. 
Most cases treated at the TGI in Bobo are flagrante delicto cases – being caught red-
handed – which means no preliminary hearing takes place, defendants are brought before 
the prosecutor and go directly to trial. Usually, they stand trial after having spent several 
weeks or even months in prison53, a prison notoriously overfilled, with precarious living 
conditions.54 As we have read, during assizes trials in Bobo, crimes committed as far back as 
in 1989 are now handled at the appeals court in Bobo. This means some defendants have 
been waiting for their trial to take place for almost 30 years (cour d’appel, assizes trials, Bobo 
16.06.2016). 
In Burkinabe society, like in many African societies, age hierarchies and rules of 
politeness forbid the direct questioning of an older person by a younger one; this kind of 
behavior is deemed highly inappropriate and rude. The institution of the “right of age” or le 
droit d’aînesse can only be questioned by royal authority, such as the Naaba in Mossi society, 
for example, where the king (Naaba), even if young, can have authority over an older person 
(see also Bidima 1997: 51).  
The shape such a clash of institutions looks like in the courtroom, can be illustrated by 
the following anecdote, which took place during a civil trial I attended at the tribunal 
d’instance (TI), the twin court of the TGI: 
 
Today, watching civil trials, Paul [the interpreter] at work. A man is accused of having 
refused to pay his workers. The judge asks him to take off his hat once the defendant 
 
53 According to Bidima, in Niger this “preventive detention” can take as long as seven years (Bidima 1997: 29). 
See also https://lefaso.net/spip.php?page=web-tv-video&id_article=79290&rubrique4, last accessed 7 
February 2020.  
54 On 27 February 2018, for example, one of the days I spoke with Joseph and other inmates at MACO, there 
were a total of 685 prisoners, counting men, women, and minors in a building originally constructed for 180 
inmates. Two documentaries illustrate the living conditions in Bobo’s detention center, one produced by rtb, 
the Burkinabe broadcasting company: “52 Minutes sur la RTB, 21 Mai 2017 ‘Conditions des détenus de Bobo’”, 
(www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAsB8p7__Ik) and Dignité en détention (https://jura-films.ch/production/trois-
gouttes-pour-le-futur/). During my research a new, more modern and larger prison complex was under 
construction on the MACO grounds. Prisoners were used as construction workers, “giving them something to 
do”, as the prison director Monsieur M.D. worded it. It has been inaugurated in the meanwhile, see 
http://www.justice.gov.bf/index.php/2020/09/18/, last accessed 25 January 2021.  
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is standing at the bar. Paul translates this into Moore. The man refuses, telling Paul to 
tell the judge that he is too young (“trop petit”) to order him, an older man, around. 
The only person he will take his hat off for is his king, the Mooro Naaba.  
(TI, 6 February 2017) 
 
The defendant was behaving according to the codes of conduct of Burkinabe society, codes 
of conduct also the judge had been socialized in. The institution of the justice system, 
however, does not allow laws or codes beyond its codified rules to take precedent. The judge 
needs to adhere to these codified rules that he had been initiated into during his training in 
law school and at ENAM. A conflict he lives with daily at work. Being on the home turf of the 
justice system, the judge needs to follow its rules, not the rules of larger society. This 
particular case was adjourned, the judge was visibly upset.  
The main prosecutor at the TGI, upon my question as to how a young judge feels 
deciding the fate of an older defendant, expressed it such, saying that age is not the problem, 
just look at the military or royalty. There, too, younger officers or a young king are venerated 
by their elders. As soon as you enter the courtroom for a trial the rules are such that the black 
clad judges are in charge. Judge D.M. is more elaborate, saying that the judges’ and 
prosecutors’ black robe assists them in becoming a neutral instance during a trial: 
The color black of the judge’s robe (la toge) stands for darkness, for night, symbolizing 
that between the judge and the defendant there is nothing. They do not know each 
other and the judge is impartial. Even if the judge is very young, he can pronounce a 
verdict over a much older person. This is unthinkable in larger society, the color black 
of the judge’s robe puts him in a position to treat all defendants equally regardless of 
age etc. (judge D.M., Bobo 13 February 2017). 
 
This recourse to equal treatment for all puts judges in a dilemma. Social sensibilities and 
Burkinabe values, which dictate that people be treated according to their status in society, 
their age, and/or the connection and familiarity they have to the judge, cannot be ignored. 
As members of the state-run justice system, however, judges are obliged to give precedent 
to codified rules. How deal with this dilemma or conflict? The trial becomes a performance of 
legal correctness and adherence. The way the court presents itself, consists of judges and 
prosecutors wearing the costume of their trade, the black robe, which not only gives them 
authority in the courtroom, but also protects them from social backfire. This garment and its 
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black color signal the unquestionable position of the civil servant above and beyond 
traditional ideas of age hierarchy and behavior towards elders. Because of this piece of 
clothing also very young judges and prosecutors cannot be doubted on how they act and 
certainly not on how they speak justice. 
Judges cannot be the neutral instance unless they protect themselves. By definition, 
they should be impartial. At the same time, they are in charge during trials. They show their 
superior bargaining power from the outset of trials, telling defendants to stand straight, to 
not put their hands on the railing, to come closer, speak louder and clearer before they can 
start or else their trial will be postponed, forcing the defendant to wait again for a next trial 
date. A threat made true we have just seen with the older man refusing to take off his hat for 
the judge at his trial.  
This kind of courtroom speak of judges and prosecutors towards outsiders – 
defendants, plaintiffs, the audience – is a sign of the trade and it is strategic. In one case, the 
judge tells the defendant what he, the judge, thinks of his intentions: 
 
“Mister Diallo, this is too easy (Monsieur Diallo, c’est trop facile). What were you doing 
outside at three o’clock in the morning? You went out with the intention of stealing! 
(Qu’est-ce que vous faites dehors à trois heures du matin? Vous êtes sorti avec 
l’intention de voler!)”, the judge continues, answering his own question. Later, in case 
5, the same judge tells another defendant to move backwards some steps to force him 
to speak louder. If he does not speak louder, his case will be pushed back to a later 
date. The prosecutor calls this same defendant a delinquent with bad intentions (un 
délinquant avec mauvaise foi) (TGI, 29 November 2016).  
 
An atmosphere of insecurity or even fear installs itself when judges whisper with the 
penitentiary guards, all equipped with machine guns. During interrogation, judges address 
defendants with the following statements: 
 
“You are a guardian, no? The role of a guardian is what?” The man was hired to watch 
a house during nights. He went to the neighbors’, broke in, and stole computers and 
cell phones there. The presiding judge continues his interrogation: “Are you a guardian 
or are you a thief? It’s ok…“ 
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Third case 10:06am – Jula  
The judge doing the questioning says that they, the judges, have a minimum of 
information at their disposition by the start of a trial.  
Questioning judge: “Why are you pulling our leg?” (“Pourquoi vous voulez nous 
envoyer balader?”) 
At 10:38am the presiding judge calls the machine gun clad penitentiary guard sitting 
by the left door to him, whispers something to him, the guard nods and goes to his 
colleague sitting by the door on the right side, also with a machine gun on his thighs, 
and they leave the room together. 
At 10:45am, the prosecutor says to the defendant: “What, in broad daylight, you 
behave like that? Are you Jango, a Mexican, running around the neighborhood?“ 
(“Comment, en pleine journée, vous vous comportez de cette façon là? Vous êtes 
Django, un mexicain… dans le quartier?”) 
(TGI, 25 November 2016)  
 
Judges also let the audience know who has the say so in the courtroom: 
 
One young judge tells a man in the audience to sit correctly, then addresses the entire 
audience, telling them that it shows a lack of respect, not sitting correctly. Later, the 
audience gets reprimanded again after some people make loud comments on a 
sentence spoken that they seem to not approve of. They are told to hold their horses 
(“retenez vos ardeurs”) or else they’ll end up on the same bench as the defendant-
prisoners if they cannot keep their opinion to themselves. 
(TGI, 2 December 2016) 
 
When a cell phone goes off in the audience, presiding judge A.P. has a military man go 
get it “saissisez ce portable – go get this phone” and then, when it’s not found, asks 
into the audience “qui a fait crier son portable? Il n’a qu’à se dénoncer! Who has let 
his phone squeal? He should come forward and show himself!”, but nobody comes 
forward. Somehow the man is found after all and called to the bar, where he is told off 
about his loud phone and because he did not come forward by himself.  
(TGI, 2 December 2016) 
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The public gets impatient, shuffling, muttering, making exclamations, when an alleged 
child rapist does not agree with the accusation. The presiding judge tells the audience 
to stay calm or he’ll kick them all out. This is a tedious trial, straining everybody’s 
nerves. Later, a man in the audience gets up and shouts something unintelligible. One 
judge almost yells at him “He! Monsieur, sit down!” 
(TGI, 9 December 2016). 
 
“If you want to chat, leave the room!” (TGI, 10 January 2017). 
 
Towards the interpreter too judges adopt a tone that makes clear who is in charge. Antoine 
gets sent on errands during trials, and his translations are corrected, even though not 
consistently: 
 
Judge D.M. is interrogating the defendant. He addresses Antoine forcefully, 
interrupting him: “Translate faithfully!”. Later, he will again talk to the interpreter, 
telling him that this is not what he, the judge, had said: “Repeat!” 
(TGI, 29 November 2016) 
 
The presiding judge reprimands Antoine for not asking the questions in the way that 
he had put them. Antoine offers to ask again, but judge A.P. says no, it’s too late now. 
(TGI, 16 January 2017) 
 
The court interpreter, too, adopts a specific kind of speak when addressing defendants or the 
audience, which consists to a large part of communicating with hand gestures and finger 
snapping: 
 
Antoine is in finger-snapping mode. First, he snaps his fingers and waves with arm 
outstretched in the downward, one-handed gesture at a defendant to come forward, 
then he snaps at the audience to sit down, waving his right hand up and down. Finally, 
he snaps his fingers at the plaintiff-victim to come forward with required documents 
 136 
for the judge. He does not utter one word. Today, power-cut. The air-con is out and it 
gets stuffy and hot very fast in the courtroom. 
(TGI, 2 December 2016). 
 
Antoine calls the defendant loudly to come forward “Na! (Come!)”, which he does, 
walking right up to the judges’ desk. “Aaaah, are you ok? You march up on us like 
this?”, the presiding judge A.P. says to the defendant in French, who clearly has no clue 
as to what is going on. He gets directed to his designated standing place behind the 
bar-railing by a snap! of Antoine’s fingers and a hand wave. This young defendant 
(born 1997) clearly does not understand the judge’s questions, translated into Jula by 
Antoine. Was he ever decorated? He does not know, does not seem to understand. The 
interpreter and the judges look at each other, grin. Judge W.S., at some point during 
the interrogation, remarks: Is the only solution to every financial problem to go steal? 
(“Est-ce que c’est la seule solution à chaque problem financier d’aller voler?”). No 
answer. The young man stands accused of having stolen two sheep. Later, in his 
questioning, the prosecutor switches to the familiar tu-form, asking the defendant if 
he knew that he could be sentenced to prison? (“Tu savais que tu pouvais aller en 
prison?”) Yes. “Was it the money that interested you? (C’était l’argent qui 
t’intéressait?)” Yes. (TGI, 6 December 2016) 
 
Addressing a grown-up person with the imperative Na! (come!) in Jula is very rude, impolite. 
This is how small children are called, not adults. Antoine might be emulating the judges’ tone, 
down-talking to this young defendant. 
A certain way of sending a defendant who has been acquitted on his way, is equally 
typical of judges’ and prosecutors’ courtroom speak. Judges and prosecutors often call after 
them that they, judges and prosecutors, know they will be back before them in a next trial 
because being a delinquent is their business. Also those defendants who are found guilty 
sometimes are sent on their way with threats of future worse punishment, as seen, for 
example, in these two instances at the TGI: 
 
The prosecutor gives his plaidoyer, which Antoine does not translate. To conclude, the 
prosecutor asks for six months in prison because the defendant is a first-time offender 
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on his way to becoming a delinquent. Before the defendant goes back to his seat 
among the other defendant-prisoners, one judge tells him that when he gets out in six 
months and continues on this track, he will see the real sentences raining down on him 
here (“quand vous sortez et vous continuez dans cette voie, vous allez voir les vrais 
peines tomber ici”)  
The same day, another defendant, who had just gotten sentenced to five years in 
prison, gets told that all he needs to do is come back here [into the courtroom to his 
trial] after the five years and they’d triple his sentence. 
(TGI, 6 December 2016) 
 
Later, two defendants stand accused of robbery in another case. One is acquitted, the other 
one sentenced to twelve months in prison and to the payment of all costs. Before they went 
back to their seats, one judge called after the one who was acquitted: “Monsieur Sawadogo, 
you just continue like this and you’ll come back here and the next time you will not escape!” 
(“Monsieur Sawadogo il faut continuer … et vous allez revenir ici, la prochaine fois-là vous 
n’allez pas échapper!”) (TGI, 17 January 2017). 
The court considers defendants to be guilty by definition. This can be seen not only in 
the way judges and prosecutors address defendants, but also the fact that the vast majority 
of cases are closed with a guilty verdict. There are no official statistics available, the Burkinabe 
jurisdictions not having digitalized their documents (yet). International organizations such as 
Unicef collect very detailed data pertaining to trials worldwide; also the Burkinabe state 
collects statistics pertaining to all government institutions country-wide (see Unicef and 
Annuaire statistique de la justice). The Unicef statistics pertaining to the justice sector are 
broken down by country, city, and courthouse and published annually. They do not, however, 
state how data is collected nor by whom. Neither can the reader get information as to the 
relation between the total number of defendants who appear in court and how many get 
sentenced as guilty, are acquitted, or get probation. 
With the support of the chief court scribe at the TGI, I collected statistics to answer 
this question. Of all correctionel cases tried in the year 2015 at the TGI in Bobo, only one in 
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nine defendants got acquitted.55 In 2017 out of a total of 655 trials, 525 were found guilty, 
while 75 were acquitted; 55 cases ended either with the verdict probation or had become 
time-barred and thus do not figure in the guilty-released numbers. Also in 2016, there were 
considerably more cases that ended with the verdict guilty than not: out of a total of 485 
defendants tried, 388 were found guilty and 57 were acquitted; 40 ended as probation or had 
already fallen out of the statistics because they had become time-barred.  
Court members communicate in a specific kind of language in the courtroom, what I 
have referred to as courtroom speak. It consists of three layers: the Amtssprache demands a 
form – bureaucratic, functional, prescribed script, strictly adhered to procedure – and a 
variety – legalese, standard – of French to be used by court personnel. And lastly, the court 
members deliver their utterances in a very top-down manner, signaling that it is they who are 
in charge in the courtroom. This courtroom speak, coupled with aberrant translation, 
constructs guilty defendants who can be condemned. 
Bidima states that the ritual of a trial – the black robes, keeping defendants in prison 
prior to trial, the high costs and lengthy procedures – constructs this object called the accused 
(Garapon cited in Bidima 1997: 29f). Adding courtoom speak, an accused is being constructed, 
who is ultimately found guilty. And, we remember, it is not the well-connected or wealthy 
perpetrators that end up in court. It is those with little or no bargaining power, the young, 
uneducated, poor, the not well-connected. How can this situation be assessed? In the next 
section we will look at the legal landscape from another angle, providing more explanations 
to how the justice system functions and how its members make it work.  
 
4.4. Administering justice in court under legal pluralism 
Legal pluralism and new institutionalism both argue that external contexts shape the value of 
a legal context. They also shape the action arena and affect the bargaining power of actors 
therein, particularly the way they strategically select – how they shop – among the multiplicity 
of rules, values, constraints. How actors justify their choices verbally and non-verbally is part 
of the shopping package and consists in a combination of (former) colonial and local legal 
 
55 Out of 369 verdicts spoken in 2015, 325 were guilty, 36 were acquitted verdicts, and 8 cases were either 
sentenced as probation or were time-barred. See also Annuaire Statistique 2017 de la Justice, V4 
www.justice.gov.bf/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ANNUAIRE-STATISTIQUE-2017-DE-LA-JUSTICE-V4.pdf,  
which gives the total number of defendants appearing in court, organized by their accusation (Unicef March 
2018). 
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fragments. That these are not always clearly separable has been illustrated in detail by 
Mamdani (1999), who shows how the colonial powers have unraveled local customary laws 
to utilize those strands of them that served their colonizing interests best, designating these 
as customary laws. We will see that the issue is not so much of having invented customary 
law, but strategically selecting among that what was already in existence.  
But which segments of society are affected by legal pluralism, which topics impact the 
use and choice of language and of interpretation? We have seen that Bidima as well as Le Roy 
had both remarked that particularly the elite stratum of African societies or intellectuals is 
the most adamant in adhering to western legal institutions and ideas (Bidima 1997: 9; Le Roy 
1997: 317). It is more complex than that, however, which we can illustrate again by asking the 
president of the commercial court, judge Mohamed Sanou, to act as an example of one 
intellectuel, a man who, by virtue of his education and job position, is clearly part of the elite 
of Burkinabe society. And who is at the same time navigating among and between different 
social views, rules, and laws of justice. 
 
Mohamed’s story 2: 
My friend Mohamed Sanou, the president of the commercial court in Bobo, is a devout 
Muslim. He has no problem going to work as judge during Burkinabe working hours, which 
nowadays run from 8am to 3pm, journée continue with no break, and to then go preach at 
his local mosque as imam in the evening. On weekends, he is often called to a baptism or a 
funeral, he is well known and respected in his neighborhood, and often, people come by his 
house for his spiritual and religious advice and guidance. He zooms in and out of traffic on his 
moto in order to get to the office in time, and zooms in and out of roles, going from judge to 
imam to head of household and father. His colleagues at the commercial court amicably call 
him Elhadji – not Mohamed and not because he had gone on the pilgrimage to Mecca, but 
because he is known to be deeply religious.  
At home after a strenuous day’s work at court and after the last prayer at the mosque, 
Mohamed is the family father. He sits at the table, waiting to be served dinner. His wife and 
children often have already eaten. Once he has finished eating and if he has enough energy 
left, he starts telling fairytales – in Jula, in Moore, in French. These traditional fairytales often 
have a moral lesson to go with the story; they are part of traditional Burkinabe education. He 
is a good storyteller.  
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Moving with ease and seeming nonchalance between different systems of justice and 
thought – western inspired justice, Islamic law, and traditional morality – does not constitute 
a challenge for Mohamed. On the contrary, he does not see a contradiction or a problem in 
integrating these different systems of thought into his everyday life.56 The nonchalance with 
which he switches from being an imam and counselor to his religious community, to working 
as a western educated judge, presiding court trials in French, communicating with the 
defendant through an interpreter, whose Jula renderings he needs to correct every once in a 
while, seems to be mundane. 
 
IS this legal pluralism? And who decides if and that legal pluralism exists? Do we speak about 
legal pluralism if there are several conflict-resolution institutions coexisting or existing 
parallelly in one space or geographical area, in one nation state? And do they indeed function 
parallelly, is each responsible for its own designated domain or do they overlap? How does 
who decide which institution to use to solve which kind of conflict? These are of course largely 
empirical questions. Before we can look at how justice is administered in the courts run by 
the state under conditions of legal pluralism, as this chapter suggests, we need an answer to 
the question “How does legal pluralism manifest itself in Burkina Faso?”. Or to put it more 
dryly: we need a working definition of what legal pluralism means and stands for. 
The question has been discussed for quite some time, across and in various disciplines. 
In fact, there are several journals dedicated to the topic from different disciplinary 
perspectives, such as the anthropologically oriented The Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law, published by Routledge, or the German Journal for Law and Society (Zeitschrift 
für Rechtssoziologie), in which Gerd Spittler had published an article on legal pluralism as early 
as 1980. There he investigated citizens’ use of different conflict resolving institutions 
(Institutionen der Streitregelung) in the literature as well as empirically. He found that 
anthropologists commonly oppose “law” and “custom”, court and non-court institutions of 
conflict resolving. But the success of all institutions, he found, is bound up with the existence 
of state-run courts (Spittler 1980: 6). 
 
56 See also an article in German, published in NZZ, written by David Signer, a Swiss anthropologist turned 
journalist: www.nzz.ch/international/geisterpriester-und-zahnchirurg-ld.1369482, accessed 21 August 2019. 
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Franz and Keebet57 von Benda-Beckmann have considerably marked the field in their 
anthropological investigations of legal issues. Particularly pertinent for my description and 
analysis is Keebet’s coining and application of the term forum shopping, the term forum 
coming from private international law (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981). Together with Spittler, 
the Benda-Beckmans have contributed to making the subject field not only visible, but have 
found ground breaking ways of defining and seeing legal pluralism in non-western societies. 
We will here look at reflections around legal pluralism in connection with Africa.  
Both Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann had started their careers as legal 
scholars, they both studied and practiced law, but then turned to anthropology and became 
anthropologists researching “law”. Here, I would like to concentrate on Franz von Benda-
Beckmann’s detailed discussion of legal pluralism in his publication tellingly entitled “Who’s 
afraid of legal pluralism?” (F. von Benda-Beckmann 2002). In this article he often refers to a 
publication by Tamanaha – actually engages the author in a dispute – which is equally tellingly 
called “The folly of the social scientific concept of ‘legal pluralism’” (Tamanaha 1993). This 
article we will look at as well shortly. 
We first need an answer to specific conceptual issues before we can decide if legal 
pluralism is relevant and in what way to our understanding of the bureaucratization of the 
state institution of justice and particularly to how the court interpreter acts and is made to 
act. The term “pluralism” points to some kind of complexity, but what type of complexity do 
we call “legal pluralism”? And with which categories and concepts can we make sense of the 
complexity? And what definition do we give “law”? Geertz had remarked that “the 
problematic relationship between rubrics emerging from one culture and practices met in 
another has been recognized neither as avoidable nor fatal in connection with ‘religion’, 
‘family’, ‘government’, ‘art’, and even ‘science’, it remains oddly obstructive in the case of 
‘law’” (Geertz 1983 quoted in F. von Benda-Beckmann 2002: 44). Why is that so?  
While in the legal sciences – academic lawyers and judges, for example – predictably 
assure us that legal pluralism is a myth, anthropologists and historians prefer to define legal 
pluralism according to cultural criteria (K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981, 1984; F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1994, 2002; Kaufmann 2016; Rodet 2011; Spittler 1980; Tamanaha 1993). In other 
 
57 In her 1984 doctoral dissertation for her law degree, which she wrote on village justice and state courts in an 
Indonesian village, she calls herself Cornelia Elisabeth. 
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words, we are searching to define a concept that can be applied cross-culturally. Not only 
state institutions decide what “law” is, but all socially accepted, functioning, conflict-
resolution instances can apply law. Who and what are those institutions? 
Tamanaha criticizes this viewpoint of legal pluralists, saying that by defining all types 
of normative ordering – be they attached to the state or not – as law, we are left with the 
idea that the legal includes the non-legal; legal pluralists say that the state’s definition of law 
is ideological. This also means, Tamanaha further argues, that with this statement legal 
pluralists say that their version of law is the right one, the objective one (Tamanaha 1993: 
196). What is ideological or not thus depends upon the perspective from which one argues. 
So it is entirely understandable that the state deems legal pluralism an ideological construct 
of legal pluralists who want their version of law, i.e. non-state law, to gain as much prestige 
as state law. So far, so theoretical. Let us put some empirical flesh on this unresolved debate. 
After the political upheavals in 2014, during which long-term president Blaise 
Compaoré was chased from power, and subsequent changes in Burkina Faso’s government 
institutions, the Burkinabe state has noted an increase in certain forms of self-organized 
defense groups.58 In rural areas various auto-defense groups, among them the koglweogo 
(Moore for “the keepers of the forest”) have organized, working complementarily or 
contrarily to, often substituting, state sanctioned policing efforts.59 Travelling overland one 
crosses paths with these groups of men, all armed and mobile. We could also call them 
militias, which immediately gives what they do a more unsavory taste reminiscent of war, 
arbitrariness, and uncontrolled violence. They constitute a dilemma for the state. On the one 
hand state security personnel is understaffed, forcing the state to favorably accept certain 
forms of local self-regulatory defense, certain non-state forms of the law. On the other hand, 
these locally organized groups destabilize the state monopoly on violence through arbitrary 
sanctioning practices, ranging from (monetary) fines to torture (see summary of research 
project, footnote below).  
Law student Sow expresses it in these words: “With the appearance of the koglweogo 
in Burkina, …, the notion of informal justice is being rediscussed with an eye to the methods 
 
58 On the Burkinabe state’s take on or attitude towards auto-defense groups, see 
https://lefaso.net/spip.php?article92487, accessed 18 October 2019. 
59 An ongoing research project at the university of Leipzig under the direction of anthropologist Katja 
Werthmann looks at different forms these self-organized defense groups take in Burkina Faso, see 
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/418144975. 
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employed by these self-defense groups” (p.c. 20 May 2019).60 Of course, “guardians and 
operators of a single normative universe”, as Franz von Benda-Beckmann calls academic or 
practical lawyers, and judges, like Sow, (F. von Benda-Beckmann 2002: 40), from the internal 
perspective of state law (Tamanaha 1993: 196), the notion of legal pluralism is inacceptable, 
because it is the job of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, for example, to teach or to apply “the 
law” as defined in the normative logic of their own law discourses. Judges, or future judges 
like Sow, have to make choices through which the complexity of legal pluralism is reduced to 
“the” law for producing the rationalization and justification of a court decision. 
Or they explain that the state system of justice sanctions and accepts these conflict-
resolving institutions, thus making them legitimate “partners” in their eyes, helping an 
overloaded state to carry out its job. In fact, in his PhD thesis in 1970, then still as a lawyer, 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann quotes himself as having asked: Can we speak of “legal pluralism” 
if state law, via legislation or court decisions, recognizes non-state law, or can we also talk 
about legal pluralism independently of such recognition? Later, as an anthropologist, he 
decided that it is more interesting to disassociate the concept of law from the state (F. von 
Benda-Beckmann 2002: 40, footnote 2).  
Tamanaha (1993) finds that we need to look at definitions of “state law”, “customary 
law”, or “normative order” from a different angle altogether. By studying post-colonial 
situations of transplanted law61, we need to look at how norms are lived in the everyday and 
at what state law norms say. These neither exclude one another, nor do they necessarily 
overlap. In addition, what people say they do and what they do in practice need not overlap 
either. Both Tamanaha and F. von Benda-Beckmann emphasize the importance of an 
empirical view, but whereas Tamanaha finds that the concept of legal pluralism is misleading, 
because, according to him, it is constructed upon an unstable analytical foundation, which 
 
60 “Je tiens à préciser qu’avec l’apparition des koglweogo dont tu as sûrement entendue parler au Burkina, la 
notion de justice informelle est en train d’être remis sur la table de discussion avec au regard des méthodes 
employées par ces groupes d’auto-défense.”  
61 Also Etienne Le Roy uses the designation “transplanted” to point to institutions conceptualized in one place 
and brought to another by quoting the subtitle of Mamadou Dia’s book: “Reconciling Indigenous and 
Transplanted Institutions”. Dia was a consultant to the World Bank in the 1990s and favored the idea of 
accepting the habits of the majority in the renegotiation of transforming institutions in Africa (see Dia 1996 in 
Le Roy 1997: 318). The idea of transplanting does not really capture, in my view, the introduction, imposition, 
and institutionalization of the French justice system and law in western Africa. A transplant implies digging up, 
removing from one place and putting it back in the earth in another place. This is clearly not the case with the 
French justice system, which continues to exist and to evolve in France. 
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will ultimately contribute to its crumbling (Tamanaha 1993: 192), F. von Benda-Beckmann 
shows that a concept of legal pluralism can be upheld. 
In Burkina Faso, we find a system of arbitrage, in which outstanding personalities such 
as a successful businessman – un grand commerçant – are called on to mediate between 
parties involved in a dispute over commercial matters in his neighborhood. This system of 
arbitrage works exclusively outside the formal court system, it is actively supported by the 
state justice system and officially recognized by state law. In the eyes of state law, it can only 
be applied in civil cases and never in penal law, I am informed by Philippe Somé, the high-
ranking fonctionnaire at the Ministry of Justice and a former judge (p.c. 18 January 2018). Like 
this, the chronically understaffed and overloaded state justice system can delegate certain 
conflicts to outside systems of justice (see also Bierschenk 2008 on the administering of 
justice outside the courts in Benin; Spittler 1980 on the successful functioning of legal 
institutions as bound up with the state justice system). Also the chefs de quartier 
(neighborhood chiefs) are consulted to solve certain conflicts. Other institutions citizens can 
choose to turn to include high ranking religious personalities such as imams, who intervene 
according to Islamic law. Fields of jurisdiction thus overlap and are combined in one person, 
as we have seen with Mohamed Sanou, the judge and imam (see also K. von Benda-Beckmann 
1981: 117). Usages by citizens are not always clear cut, one system need not exclude another. 
People go there where they find their conflict solved to their satisfaction (see Rodet 2011).  
The question then is not so much if legal pluralism exists, which it quite clearly seems 
to do, but how it gets utilized by citizens. We have, on the one hand, people who use conflict-
solving institutions: plaintiffs or victims. On the other hand, we have the institutions who 
“speak justice”: the koglweogo and other self-organized militias, the “big men” in the 
quartiers, the imams and other religious leaders or advisors, the traditional or neighborhood 
chiefs, and we have the courts, institutions run by the state. For my research on court 
interpreting legal pluralism becomes pertinent for two specific reasons. For one, we might 
ask ourselves why plaintiffs involve a state institution to resolve their problem if it could also 
be dealt with through customary, local, or traditional law – whatever label one wants to stick 
on dispute resolving instances that speak justice outside a courthouse. These institutions – 
the imam as well as the traditional chief, the chef de quartier and the local businessman – all 
speak justice in Jula. Plaintiffs do not need to go through an interpreter as they have to do in 
a state-run court trial. In addition, court justice is costly and time consuming for plaintiffs, 
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which leaves us with the question of why plaintiffs would resort to the state at all? And how 
do people cope in daily life with this legal complexity, with so many choices?  
Mohamed as judge, imam, and family father chooses that institution to arrive at a 
decision which promises the most satisfactory outcome for him and for his clients. It is not 
always so clear-cut, of course, because how must it feel for judges, who have to apply a law, 
which runs contrary to their faith? Or a law, which has nothing to do with everyday reality as 
lived by citizens, but that runs counter to their upbringing, convictions, or cultural 
sensitivities? As an example, lawyer C.O. points to a new law on “harassment”, how it is 
defined and treated by the law and how certain ways of behaving seen as normal can fit this 
definition:  
 
Talking about imposed values, lawyer C.O. says that indeed, you give up your own 
values for ones that are imposed (“tu abandonnes tes propres valeurs pour les valeurs 
imposées”). As an example he names a new law passed in 2015 on harcèlement, 
stalking. The definition of stalking has been taken from a European context. Here in 
Burkina, if a woman responds to a man’s advances upon his first try, she is considered 
a loose woman, a prostitute even. As a man, you need to work harder to get into her 
pants, so to speak, but if that then is considered to be stalking, we have a problem 
(Bobo 16 February 2016).62 
 
Prosecutor F.D., the only female prosecutor working at either one of the two penal courts in 
Bobo during my research, shows that the situation becomes even more complex, because 
different ethnic groups have different views on, for example, the definition (and thus 
punishment) of rape: 
 
One major challenge is the interpretation of rape, which is handled completely 
differently by the various ethnic groups – or rather the interpretation should be 
adapted to custom, F.D. remarks. In Bobo, for example, before you marry a woman 
you have to kidnap her and have sex with her – basically rape – but the Mossi do not 
 
62 In 2015, a new amendment was added to the penal code: LOI N° 061-2015/CNT, defining harassment, see 
https://lavoixdujuristebf.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/loi_061.pdf, last accessed 25 February 2020. 
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do that. So, when she first came to Bobo, she had to figure out how to handle this as a 
prosecutor – mitigating circumstances, circonstances atténuantes. Custom needs to 
be taken into account when deciding on a case, she finds (Bobo 5 March 2018). 
 
One answer we might find in how Mohamed Sanou moves between different justice systems 
and systems of thought with apparent ease, not seeing any inconvenience in marrying Islamic 
law to western concepts of right and wrong, and teaching his children moral codes through 
African fairytales. Those with more bargaining power had always been in the position to 
decide what law to apply – or what constitutes a law that needs to be followed. So, in the 
state-run system of justice, it is in the power of prosecutors and judges to take into account 
or not traditional ideas concerning rape or harassment, for example, when deciding on a 
verdict. And it is mostly citizens who decide which conflict-resolving instance they want to 
refer to. 
We have seen how a new system of justice was installed in the AOF by the French 
colonial powers in 1903. It was separated into French justice and indigenous justice (Rodet 
2011). The French colonial administrators collected customary law (Jézéquel 2006; Snyder 
1981), codifying that part of African legal concepts which served their interests best 
(Mamdani 1999). These concepts were searched for, collected, and made into customary law 
by colonial administrators and by their African allies alike. African chiefs were selected by the 
colonial administration strategically according to the degree of their political compliance to 
the colonial endeavor (Snyder 1981: 61) and they participated in the codification and 
manipulation of traditions to serve their own and their ethnic group’s interests (Jézéquel 
2006).  
In the 1930s, the collection and codification of customary law were at their most 
fervent; colonial Governor General Brevié believed that understanding it was of practical 
interest (Jézéquel 2006: 140). The native chief of the Fouta Tooro, Abdou Salam Kane, for 
example, “invented” the Foutanké feudal system in order to support his own position and to 
stay in control of land (Jézéquel 2006: 142ff). The colonial stereotype considered African land 
holding in terms of the European notions of sovereignty and ultimate rights to land, a view 
consistent with the dominant colonial ideology of African land tenure (Snyder 1981: 69). 
According to Mamdani (1999), there was, both during colonial times and after independence, 
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a political divide between rural and urban areas which also affected the institution of the 
system of justice. 
In some instances, a constellation of ethnically defined customary laws was done away 
with as a single customary law transcending ethnic boundaries was codified. But even 
if the result was to develop a single country-wide “customary” law, applicable to all 
peasants regardless of ethnic affiliation, it still functioned alongside a “modern” law 
for urban dwellers … In spite of the overwhelming accent on change, there was an 
important continuity with colonial practices: in as much as these “radical” regimes 
shared with colonial powers the conviction to effect a “revolution from above”, they 
ended up intensifying the administratively-driven nature of justice (Mamdani 1999: 
879). 
 
In many post-independence African states, the single party came to be the alternative to 
“customary” power; “even if imposed from above, [the militants of the single party] 
considered the single party preferable to giving the colonial corruption [of the ethnically 
based system of privilege] a fresh lease on life” (Mamdani 1999: 879f). These were the politics 
also pursued by the Sankara regime in the 1980s, where the use of a local, Burkinabe variety 
of French in the new justice system was preferred to giving “a fresh lease on life” to colonially 
constructed ethnic groups and languages.  
Is it at all relevant to the everyday practices of citizens to know that “customary law” 
is to a large extent a recent, colonial and thus French creation? It is relevant insofar as that 
plaintiffs, like everybody, act pragmatically, they go there, where they hope to be successful 
with their claims, resorting to customary law, regardless if it is indeed customary-traditional 
or a colonial creation (or they knowing about this), or they go to the state, hoping to win their 
case.  
So, what does this mean for our analysis of legal pluralism? Obviously, conflict 
resolution instances existed before colonization and before the invention of tradition, or 
creation of codified laws. Today, we find customary laws that may or may not be categorizable 
as African or colonial in origin. Is it important to sieve out the original African laws from the 
constructed ones to be able to label them as customary? In our present discussion I believe it 
is not important. What is pertinent is how people act, to understand what criteria they follow 
in their decision to go or not go solve their problems outside the state sanctioned system and 
how, according to which criteria, they choose where to go. 
 148 
An imam might believe that there is a solution to all conflicts in sharia, Quranic law or 
in the Quran. Yet, a Muslim judge working at a penal court in Burkina Faso will judge cases 
according to the French penal code in vigor in Burkina Faso, following the “administratively-
driven nature of justice” (Mamdani above) he was educated in. And an illiterate peasant, who 
has been accused of stealing two sheep by a plaintiff and consequently brought before a 
court, has had no say so in the matter, he had no choice in who was going to decide in his 
case. The plaintiff, on the other hand, had decided where he will have his problem resolved, 
opting for the court and a judge. This time he believed that at court he had better chances of 
winning his case than with the neighborhood chief, so he goes to court to file charges against 
the illiterate peasant.  
Judge-in-training Sow says that “in the case of two stolen sheep, the law defines this 
type of crime as a case punishable by the correctionel penal code. So, stealing is an infraction 
exclusively dealt with by the correctionel chamber at the TGI” (p.c. 20 May 2019).63 The state-
run justice system reserves for itself the monopoly on solving penal offenses and the 
definition is quite wide. The cases that get tried at the penal courts in Bobo range from petty 
offences such as the theft of two sheep to felonies including rape, armed robbery, and 
murder. The French penal code classifies penal offences into two sub-categories according to 
severity of crime and subsequent sanction: correctionnels and criminels (see table 1 above). 
Correctionnel trials are held twice a week in Bobo. There, cases that date back two 
years can be treated along with more recent ones. With no or only very short breaks, the 
court personnel work uninterruptedly all day long, also the interpreter. The criminel trials take 
place only irregularly due to a number of strategic, functional, political reasons, not lastly 
because of financial underfunding, I am told. Paradoxically, it seems that one reason why 
criminel trials hardly take place is because a new department has been created within the 
Ministry of Justice in 2016, the fonds d’assistance judiciaire. Among other tasks, it is 
mandated to find and allocate funds to pay for lawyers in criminel trials.64 Since the state has 
 
63 “Pour le cas de 2 moutons volés, c'est la loi qui prévoit que ce type d’affaire relève du correctionnel et par 
voie de conséquence est punie par le code pénal. Bref le vol est une infraction donc relevant exclusivement de 
la chambre correctionnelle du TGI.”  
64 I am told that the state pays a lawyer the lump sum of 300’000 franc CFA (Ministry of Justice Ouagadougou, 
p.c. 18 January 2018), approximately 500 CHF, for one case, see www.umrechnung.org/waehrungen-
umrechnen/waehrungs-kurs-umrechner.htm, 6 January 2020.  
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no money, it cannot afford to pay for lawyers to accompany defendants in criminel trials, 
which then do not take place. 
In that same year, 2016, the appeals court in Bobo was dealing with criminel cases 
committed in the early 1990s. During assizes, which take place once or twice a year for a 
week, the goal is to eliminate as many pending criminel cases as possible. In 2018, for 
example, the assizes court was held in October and set itself the goal of trying 30 cases.65 At 
the same time, the jury, mandatory in assizes courts, does now not consist of members of the 
public anymore, but of professional law personnel. Also this change in procedure is due to 
financial constraints, it seems.  
As we can see, the state legal system in Burkina Faso is excruciatingly slow. On top of 
it being slow, it is expensive, tedious – even hazardous, to say it with K. von Benda-Beckmann 
(K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 142) – and incomprehensible to most citizens, not only in 
terms of impenetrable laws and procedures, but because it functions exclusively in French 
(see also Bierschenk 2008 and Alou 2006 for other French West African states). So, going to 
the state institution as plaintiff presupposes and requires you have time, money, and good 
nerves, and that you bring enough bargaining power along. 
To avoid the hassle accompanying an involvement with the state institution – time, 
money, nerves – an accused person needs to know the presiding judge or, even better, the 
prosecutor dealing with his case (see Alou 2006 on prosecutors’ power). Those with enough 
bargaining power, wealth, and social standing do not appear in court. Best-case scenario. But 
maybe your funds are just enough to pay for a lawyer, which is second best to not having to 
go to trial at all. Cases involving lawyers get treated preferentially by judges.  
Before the trials start on any given day – be they correctionel or criminel trials – the 
presiding judge asks the lawyers present to step forward and to look through the pile of files 
on their desk. The lawyers then sift through the files and place the cases they are here to 
represent at the top of the pile. The presiding judge works through the pile from top to 
bottom – cases with lawyers get treated first and they (and the plaintiff) are free to leave. 
Defendants must remain in the courtroom during the entire duration of a day of trials, when 
all of them are brought back to prison together.  
 
65 See www.facebook.com/Justice.BurkinaFaso/posts/1714727741964980, last accessed 11 November 2019. 
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In the penal justice system in Burkina Faso, there is a very high incidence of flagrante 
delicto cases (and in West Africa in general, see Alou 2006; Bierschenk 2008), which means 
individuals are caught red-handed, in the act of committing a crime, they are supposedly seen 
while they commit the crime. In fact, the vast majority of cases tried in Bobo are cases of 
flagrant délit, easily distinguishable from cases of citation direct or direct summons by the 
red jacket color of their file folders. The heap of files on the judges’ desk during trials is almost 
exclusively red.66 According to Alou, the system of flagrante delicto gets abused for a number 
of reasons, he states, but foremost to short-circuit preliminary investigations with a judge, 
putting the case into the hands of the prosecutor directly (Alou 2006: 152-153). And the 
prosecutor is the accusing instance in any trial, we know.  
Cases that are classed as direct summons, by contrast, demand a lot of time and 
particularly resources from court personnel, which are simply not available. This “material 
and technical under resourcing” (Bierschenk 2008: 111), i.e. the lack of tools or the material 
of modern criminal technology needed to perform investigations, is not unique to Burkina 
Faso. By classifying cases as flagrante delicto, the court makes these cases and the people 
standing trial for these cases manageable; they domesticate them to their possibilities. This 
way of going about criminal investigations also puts a lot of power into the hands of 
prosecutors, who are now the only accusing instance, not having to rely on any evidence, only 
on their oratory skills – in French, of course. Defendants are, together with their case, made 
to fit the procedural possibilities of the court. 
So, the case and the defendant are made to fit the working order of the system by the 
experts within the constraints the Ministry of Justice defines and delimits for the expert-
bureaucrats. They claim to strictly adhere to codified law and procedure. At the same time, 
they have a certain amount of professionally induced leeway in how, exactly, laws and 
procedures get read and ultimately implemented. Or, to put it differently, the experts running 
the system of justice interpret legal procedure to fit their possibilities and also their own 
interests within the imposed limits. We have seen this with procedure – mostly flagrant délit 
cases or how access to land titles for peasants is designed for them – and with rules they 
 
66 In order to get a better feeling for numbers, we can once again consult the Annuaire statistique de la justice, 
annual statistics, which Unicef gathers in the justice sector. As stated previously, this document does not 
specify Unicef’s methodology for data collection. In 2017, for example, out of a total of 655 penal trials held at 
the TGI in Bobo, 602 cases were classed as flagrant délit; in 2016 there were 464 flagrant délit cases out of a 
total of 485 (Unicef 2018: 99). 
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implement, such as no switching of language during an ongoing trial. The outcome is the 
construction of guilty defendants. And this only works with the support of a compliant 
interpreter. We will look at how, exactly, this works in detail in the next chapter, where 
individual cases on trial are discussed. 
It is in the nature of a trial that the prosecutor, as the one accusing the offender in the 
name of the people or society, treats defendants as if they were guilty. Judges, however, 
ideally have a neutral function, they are, as one judge said, the arbiters in a trial. And the 
interpreter should, again ideally, be the relayer of the person’s message whom he is 
translating without taking sides either way (see Ouattara 2018 on the theoretical neutrality 
of interpreters).  
Studies investigating intercultural interpreting in the health sector in the USA have found 
that it is not the number of years of experience that makes you a good interpreter – defined 
as number of translation errors with potential negative consequences – but the number of 
hours of training (Flores 2012; see also Flores et al. 2003 and Flores 2005). If these findings 
can be applied to court interpreting in Burkina Faso – and I am not sure that they can – this 
would mean all court interpreters in Bobo are bad interpreters because they have no training 
as interpreters and their interpreting contributes to negative outcomes for defendants. The 
80% of all defendants in Bobo who are convicted and sent to prison, can be designated as a 
negative outcome from the perspective of defendants. Can findings from studies in the USA 
health sector be applied to the Burkinabe justice sector? Since no studies so far have 
examined the relationship between interpretation and defendants being condemned, we 
have no quantitative material against which we could compare and test our findings. We also 
need to be cautious when applying results from one context to another. 
What we can say, however, is that all studies published so far on interpreting, be this in 
the justice or in the health sector, have looked at situations where those needing translation 
are migrants, asylum seekers, minority speakers or speakers of a language variety different 
from the standard variety in use in legal or health encounters. Here, judges (or doctors) need 
to have faith in the interpreters’ competence and trust in their expertise because they, the 
judges and prosecutors, doctors and nurses, do not understand the defendants’ or patients’ 
language. 
The exception is Fofana’s publication on how the justice system is far removed from the 
everyday reality of citizens in Burkina Faso (Fofana 2018). To demonstrate this (legal) 
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distance, Fofana also mentions how incomplete or imprecise translating by the court 
interpreter can create confusion for defendants, who thus cannot fully participate in their 
own trial (Fofana 2018: 399). In Bobo, the judges presiding trials and carrying out the 
interrogation of defendants, speak and understand Jula, we have seen. Often, they need to 
intervene in the translation process, asking the court interpreter to translate again differently, 
to translate faithfully what he, the judge, had said because the rendering was not as the judge 
had put it. Judges control and correct interpreters. 
This would mean that if, indeed, the way interpreters translate can influence a 
defendant’s case negatively, this automatically also means that judges, too, contribute to this 
negative outcome. In other words, since judges can correct interpreters, and also do so, then 
all trials should by definition be fair and the outcome to the best of everybody’s competence 
– this in the best of all worlds. But if judges can correct interpreters, but do not do so, what 
does this mean? We will see that indeed judges do not consistently correct interpreters. Were 
they not attentive for a minute because, after five or more hours of presiding trials and of 
translating-interpreting, it is very possible that both judges and interpreters get sloppy? Do 
they simply not care one way or the other because for them defendants are guilty by 
definition anyway?  
Translation is, instead of a seamless transfer of information, an interdiscursive practice in 
which various actors are engaged. It is characterized by generating new practices, objects, 
and concepts, but in the context analyzed here, it is important to point out that translation 
contributes to the persistence of social hierarchies over time and space (Gal 2015). The 
construction of facts we see happening in the Burkinabe courtroom today is a continuation 
of the position the interpreters occupy in larger Burkinabe society, mirrored in their lowly 
position at the courthouse. We have established that even though interpreters might get a 
certain amount of respect outside the courthouse as fonctionnaires, they are relegated to the 
tail end of the courthouse hierarchy because of their lack of education, training, and the fact 
that they skipped the usual route to recognition, the concours exams. And the judges are 
hierarchically their immediate bosses during a trial. Outside the courtroom, interpreters need 
to answer to court personnel in general. 
This construction of facts is also in line with the role interpreters have always played as 
intermediaries and allies in the colonial encounter. “Such collaboration was markedly 
asymmetrical in power, which had semiotic implications… [T]hrough translation the texts and 
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knowledge of the colonized were citationally repurposed as evidence for European theories 
of language, law, and religion. In this effort, much depended on colonizers’ presumptions 
about linguistic purity, on their preference for written forms and for routinized performance 
genres, and on their assumptions about how language reflect the minds, bodies, and origins 
of speakers” (Gal 2015: 231; see also Bidima 1997: 28f on legalese and incomprehension of 
defendants during penal trials).  
How do translated statements attain the status of fact in social reality? One example of 
this “fact making” is how the defendant is made to fit the courtroom space (through language) 
and legal procedure (through his/her case being classified as flagrante delicto). Judges and 
prosecutors adhere to what they define as codified rules and regulations, which include the 
use of standard French during trials, thus making cases manageable for them. Bidima as well 
states how procedure always takes precedence over the actual case, judges using a 
vocabulary, language, and rationalization incomprehensible to defendants (Bidima 1997: 
ibid). 
Defendants are actively constructed as guilty, their “outsiderness” (Vigouroux 2005: 243) 
pointed at during the entire legal procedure, starting during the interrogation at the police 
station and culminating in their trial in court. Judges believe that defendants are playing 
games, by, for example, switching languages in the middle of their interrogation or changing 
their stories as they are moved through the legal process. Prosecutors also believe defendants 
are guilty, which corresponds to the nature of their role in a trial, which, in itself, should not 
further concern us. What does concern us, however, is the fact that in the lived reality of a 
trial, the defendant is the only person on the acting team, who is on the side of the defense, 
as the name of his character – defendant – already suggests. 
All other actors in the courtroom construct the defendant as guilty, be this because it is 
part of the character’s role, like for the prosecutor, who “knows that you are guilty”, to say it 
in judge D.M.’s words. Judges, on the other hand, should not behave like prosecutors, which, 
to this same judge’s regret, they sometimes do. Judges should ideally function neutrally, as 
arbiters in a trial. In reality, however, “judges behave like prosecutors” and this “out of 
strategy” another judge told me (judge N.N. 16 February 2017), meaning they are not the 
neutral arbiters between the accusation and the defense, but they too are on the accusing 
side. Which leaves defendants alone on the side of the defense, so to speak. 
 154 
But what of interpreters? Interpreters are members of the court, civil servants hired by 
the Ministry of Justice who have been asked to interpret during trials without being granted 
recognition and status for this work, however. They are also at the tail end in the court 
hierarchy and inferiors to judges both during a trial and in the courthouse in general. And as 
such, they understand their role to be a supporting one to judges and prosecutors during 
trials. 
 
4.5. Court interpreters – their work, their role, their self-definitions 
Antoine together with Salomon, Paul, and Jean in Bobo and as well as with their court 
interpreter colleagues throughout Burkina Faso, are busy organizing themselves. They want 
to create what they call a corps des interprètes judiciaires, a court interpreter association, 
which, they hope, will be officially acknowledged and recognized by the state that hired them 
as civil servants and has introduced them into the job as court interpreter in the first place. 
We have seen that there were and are no fixed hiring criteria for court interpreters; all they 
need is a primary school diploma, which supposedly is proof of their French language skills 
(Ouattara 2018: 46). For the national languages they are hired to interpret from and into no 
language certificate is needed. They had been hired because they were at the right place at 
the right time. Actually, they did not even need to speak the right combination of languages. 
Two out of the four court interpreters in Bobo needed to take Jula lessons before being able 
to take up translating trials. And except for Salomon, none of them were specifically hired to 
translate, but are doing this job next to their other duties as secretary or liaison officer.  
The interpreters’ association they are all striving for will ideally bring them the official 
recognition of the category “court interpreter” by the Ministry of Justice, along with all this 
would entail. According to them and what they want most, they repeatedly tell me, is an 
increase in their salaries. We will look more closely at what they earn and what this means in 
daily life shortly. The four court interpreters are thus not entirely passive wheels in the justice 
system, turning only when given an impulse from their superiors, like they are constrained to 
do during the trials they translate. They can also turn of their own accord, to stay within the 
metaphor, as long as this initiative takes place outside the courtroom. 
They thus have two action arenas that are together, but also separate: the courtroom 
during trials and the larger courthouse. Within the clearly delimited bureaucratic-hierarchical 
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and physical boundaries of the courthouse, they are in the process of carving out a space for 
themselves. Because, in reality, once hired, they were largely forgotten about, and are 
ignored by the bureaucrats who have employed them and the experts they work for. How a 
future official recognition of their job as court interpreter will play on, influence, or potentially 
alter their situation or translating practices remains to be seen.67 
The situation was quite different for the colonial interpreters, also beyond the 
freedom they had in their translations. Not only was their job category recognized by the 
colonial state, it had created this job category and then trained interpreters in the colonial 
schools. In terms of translation, both colonial interpreters Wangrin and Omar Sy, when he 
defended Tierno Bokar, decided, admittedly for quite different reasons, to translate 
divergently from what was asked of them by the colonial administrators (as well as the local 
population, as far as Wangrin was concerned). Both knew that the French administrator-
bureaucrats, for whom they were working, could not double check their oral renderings 
because of their lack of local language skills. 
The monopoly colonial interpreters had on the translating process allowed them a 
status equal or similar to, sometimes even more powerful, than the European administrators’, 
depending on the situation and the fearlessness of the actors involved. Both the French 
administrators and the colonial interpreters were feared and coveted, hated and highly 
admired, respected and ridiculed. Truly ambiguous attitudes and changing feelings. This 
accorded both interpreters Wangrin and Omar Sy a certain amount of agency. Let me 
describe, liberally translated from Hampâté Bâ, one of the many intriguing illustrations of 
Wangrin’s agency as colonial interpreter. He is on his way to the house of the French colonial 
administrator’s or district commander’s concubine:  
Wangrin had decided to pay a visit of respect to the mother of the French 
commander’s African wife, to get into her good graces, knowing that no African child would 
ever disobey her mother. His ultimate goal is of course to be able to all the better spy on the 
commander, flattering the French man’s concubine onto his side. Young Rammaye Bira is 
neither beautiful nor particularly intelligent, which keeps her closeted within her family, being 
 
67 As of 11 September 2019, this professional category does officially exist, as mentioned above. But until now, 
this has had no practical, concrete consequences for interpreters and their work; nothing has changed. Also the 
website http://infos-pratiques.justice.gov.bf/category/professions-judiciaires/, where individual legal 
professionals’ work is described on the state-run website, does not have an entry under the section entitled 
“interpreter”, last accessed 3 June 2020. 
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hung up about her looks and harboring disdain for all African men who had consistently 
ignored her and whom she consequently collectively despises. Wangrin knows how to make 
the chip on her shoulder work for him, so he gets ready to go to Rammaye’s mother’s house. 
Riding his beautiful horse nick-named Cheval-savant, Wise Horse, and clad in festive garb, 
Wangrin is quite a sight to behold. Just before he arrives at Rammaye’s mother’s house, he 
orders his griot to sing his praises. The griot goes about his job with these words: “How 
handsome he is, Wangrin, mouth of governor Gordane and ears of Mister Governor, governor 
of the whole territory and chosen from among three hundred and thirty three governors, all 
of them white whites, whites from Bordeaux and Marseille France…” (Hampâté Bâ 1973: 119-
120).68 The griot’s elaborate lauding of Wangrin, of his horse, Rammaye Bira’s mother, and 
finally Rammaye Bira herself, goes on for several pages. 
In the end, the performance does the trick, the mother is impressed, flattered, and 
taken unawares, which translates into her welcoming Wangrin with open arms as her son 
(Hampâté Bâ 1973: 124). Rammaye Bira, in turn, is happy to take on the role as Wangrin’s 
sister, being his confidante, generously gossiping about her time with the French commander. 
She is, for all we know, the perfect spy for Wangrin. What more could he have asked for? 
Wangrin is satisfied and proceeds to make use of the new intimacy he shares with his new 
sister. Wangrin shopped to his advantage, being an insider to local sentiments and 
imagination.  
French administrators were in fact actively hindered from learning the language of the 
place they were working at by a system of rotation that kept them in one place for only a very 
short period of time, we have seen (Lawrance et al. 2006: 10; Spittler 1973: 211). A situation 
certainly advantageous to their African interpreters, who thus became the French 
commanders’ “mouths”: “Being somebody’s mouth is being his most precious auxiliary, also 
the most indispensable. One could neither talk nor nourish oneself without one’s mouth” 
(Hampâté Bâ 1973: 370).69 Wangrin in the end, we know it, dies a pauper in spite of all his 
elegant, forceful, repeated, and strategic acting.  
 
68 “Qu'il est beau, Wangrin, bouche du commandant Gordane et oreilles de Moussé Goforner [Monsieur le 
gouverneur] de tout le territoire choisi entre trois cent trente-trois Goforners, tous blancs-blancs, blancs de la 
France de Bordeaux et de Marseille....” 
69 “Être la bouche de quelqu'un, c'est être son auxiliaire le plus précieux et le plus indispensable. On ne saurait 
ni parler ni se sustenter sans la bouche”. 
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Today, court interpreters in Bobo must sing their own praises. Jean, who officiated as 
the court interpreter at Bobo’s commercial court until 2017, had repeatedly insisted that he 
carries out his work with love, he knows that he is saving innocent defendants from 
incomprehensible legal procedures, and from their own panic at being at court. He occupies 
a special place in this thesis because it is these following words of his that have inspired me 
to look at the court interpreter’s work: “In fact”, Jean told me, “it is a question of will. When 
you interpret, you are saving an innocent who does not understand something. I have become 
a professional, you see, I can go to any court and immediately start interpreting” (Bobo 18 
March 2015). 
This indeed happened once. The appeals court needed an interpreter for a day of 
criminel trials on short notice, Salomon having called in sick. The court asked Jean to come 
translate. He agreed. But, unfortunately, Jean was not used to penal trials, Salomon told me 
(Bobo, 14 June 2016). The court had to suspend the day of trials due to the substitute 
interpreter Jean not being up for the challenge – he was clearly in over his head. Jean, 
however, is undeterred and feels that, after years of practice, you build up a vocabulary, “it’s 
repetitive, there’s nothing new that will come surprise you, with experience, you acquire a 
vocabulary” (Bobo 18 March 2015).70 He can do any kind of case, be it fraud, or flagrant délit. 
These, of course, are not two different kinds of infractions committed, but fraud is a crime 
and flagrant délit is a legal term denoting that an offender has been caught in the act of 
committing a crime. Even though Jean seems to be somewhat confused about his terminology 
and knowledge of the law, he feels that interpreting is easy, you do not need to study it in 
order to carry out this profession. 
This statement is not unique to Jean. I was told on different occasions and by different 
interpreters that indeed, interpreting was not something you needed to learn, you just do it 
because it is easy. We have seen above how Antoine remarks that taking notes while 
interpreting is unprofessional. You do not need to learn interpreting, you just do it, he as well 
told me. In general, all court interpreters insisted on portraying themselves as being in control 
of the translating process, be this by having good command of the vocabulary needed, endless 
stamina to cope with the long working hours translating, or by their attitude towards their 
work assisting innocent defendants. But we have also seen that in practice, on the ground, it 
 
70 “C'est répétitif, il n'y a pas de nouveau qui va venir, avec l'expérience, on acquiert le vocabulaire”. 
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is judges who control trials – not only rules and procedure, but also what and how much is 
translated how. 
Working in this environment, the state-run justice or legal sector in general and the 
individual courthouse in particular, which is the territory of the educational elite, the experts, 
professionals are expected to carry themselves in a way corresponding to their position in 
society as civil servants, representatives of the state. Above, we have discussed how Bourdieu 
shows up the tacit nature of embodied modes of how people carry themselves, adding to 
Goffman’s personal front an aura of naturalness, of going about one’s business as a well-
formed and conforming member of society. Judges and prosecutors carry themselves in ways 
fulfilling expectations that are not formalized as written rules, but have been inscribed in their 
very bodies (Bourdieu 2013: 15). The front that court personnel show is characterized by a 
certain solemnity, a dignified, measured way of behavior, put on to make visible that they are 
in control of themselves and of court procedure (see also Alou 2006: 168 on the notion of 
solemnity and its impact on the atmosphere at court).  
The men working as interpreters might not be part of the educational elite, they are 
nevertheless part of the environment of the educational elite by simple virtue of working in 
the courthouse. So, they too adapt their behavior and the way they present themselves to 
this environment by emulating their superiors’ way of carrying themselves. Along with judges 
and prosecutors, they perceive themselves as being bearers of highly delicate information. Je 
travaille dans la discrétion, as Antoine had expressed it, meaning, first, that he works in a 
highly delicate environment, and, secondly, that he works discreetly, not revealing anything.  
Goffman can again assist us in understanding this situation. Particularly outsiders are 
vulnerable to believe in appearances and that the appearances put on show by actors 
correspond to actual (social) reality. Outsiders are also expected to interact accordingly with 
actors. Goffman describes this impression management actors engage in like this:  
Society is organized on the principle that any individual who possesses certain social 
characteristics has a moral right to expect that others will value and treat him in a 
correspondingly appropriate way. Connected with this principle is a second, namely 
that an individual who implicitly or explicitly signifies that he has certain social 
characteristics ought to have this claim honoured by others and ought in fact to be 
what he claims he is. In consequence, when an individual projects a definition of the 
situation and thereby makes an implicit or explicit claim to be a person of a particular 
kind, he automatically exerts a moral demand upon the others, obliging them to value 
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and treat him in the manner that persons of his kind have a right to expect. He also 
implicitly forgoes all claims to be things he does not appear to be and hence forgoes 
the treatment that would be appropriate for such individuals. The others find, then, 
that the individual has informed them as to what is and as to what they ought to see 
as the ‘is’ (Goffman 1956: 6; italics in original). 
 
Hence Goffman finds that this kind of impression management goes both ways. While 
interpreters present themselves as part of the educational elite by acting as bearers of highly 
delicate information they cannot reveal in an interview, recorded or not, the outsiders 
receiving this performance need to act as if they have understood and respect this projection 
of the interpreter’s definition of the self. Indeed, it can get difficult to tell who is who (Förster 
2002). And it can get difficult to get any information of importance. 
Goffman’s explanation, Antoine’s discreet working attitude, and Jean’s feeling of 
saving innocents, ties back into our earlier discussion on the educational elite putting on a 
show of its status in society. Interpreters act in the environment of the educational elite in 
ways they deem conducive to their role as court interpreters as they see it and particularly in 
how they wish to be perceived and consequently interacted with by outsiders. They cannot 
put on the same show as the “real” individuals of the educational elite, the judges and 
prosecutors, because they lack the material means to do so. But they can try and they can put 
on a show of attitude, comportment, of how they carry themselves. They can bluff (Newell 
2012).  
Let me illustrate this through a meeting and an informal talk I had with Jean at the 
commercial court. We had an early morning appointment at the courthouse, where our talk 
took place: 
 
We had agreed to meet at the commercial court early, before Jean had to start 
interpreting at today’s trials. I arrive at the courthouse before him and stand around 
outside, chatting with the guards, being offered a glass of hot, strong, sweet tea. Very 
nice. Eventually Jean arrives in his large, white four-wheel drive. Fake fur lines the 
dashboard. A clerk emerges from the courthouse and rushes to go meet Jean at the 
car, opening his car door for him and grabbing his briefcase. The court president’s 
state-issued car is smaller. I am left with no words at this ostentatious show of Jean’s. 
Then he walks towards me, smiling and full of exclamations of “cela fait deux jours, it’s 
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been a while”. Dressed sharply, white shoes and all, and definitely ready for business. 
We go to his office, a smaller one than last time, but still his own office. Air 
conditioning. Later, I get a ride into town with him, which is great because the 
commercial court is far off the beaten track and I would have had to walk for quite a 
while until I found a taxi (Bobo 22 February 2017). 
 
What is the deeper meaning of Jean’s feeling of saving innocents and of his portrayal of 
himself in this showy kind of way? The “underling” (Newell 2012: 17) who rushed to carry his 
briefcase conformed to the way Jean aspired to be treated as, namely as an important insider 
person. This is Goffman’s moral obligation demanded by Newell’s bluffer and, in this case, 
given to him. 
On the one hand this show is surely an expression of Jean seeing himself – and wanting 
to be seen – as important to the court, as indispensable, both of him being personally 
indispensable as Jean, and also of the fact that as an interpreter he is indispensable to the 
court as it is run by the state fonctionnaires today. And it is an expression of how he wishes 
his standing as court interpreter be perceived, namely as an important insider, who helps 
innocent defendants in their trials. Unfortunately, Jean was not in Bobo anymore when I came 
back for my final wrap-up research in early 2018, having to hide out from the law for some 
reason or other, his colleagues told me. Nobody knew where he was. 
Jean’s bluffing, the performance of their selves all court interpreters put on, 
corresponds to or at least emulates in its aesthetics how the educational elite present 
themselves. The interpreters model their behavior and appearance on the educational elite 
they work with daily, believing their representation of themselves to be successful. They 
model their own performance on how they see judges, prosecutors, or court clerks carrying 
themselves. 
Appearance is more important than success, Newell says in his study of young 
bluffeurs in Abidjan, showing how they put on a show of wealth that often leaves them 
despondent (Newell 2012). At the same time, the educational elite in Newell’s study puts on 
a show as well. Even if they cannot afford to do so anymore, they continue, because 
appearance is much more important than success, material attributes are displayed as a 
façade to keep up an appearance of wealth, status, well-being also if this should not be the 
case (any more) (Newell 2012: 158). And all those bluffeurs who would like to be seen as being 
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part of the (educational) elite, conform to these aesthetic material prerequisites.  
All four men whose interpreting work I could follow at the courts in Bobo have 
strikingly different backgrounds and itineraries. Yet they all share how they act out their role 
as indispensable court interpreters, how they present themselves visibly – dress, composure, 
how they act in the courthouse and during trials – and in how they talk about their jobs. In 
2013, the state of Burkina Faso decided to put into action the law ratified in 1999 and Antoine 
was asked to interpret during the correctionel type of penal trails. He continues to be 
employed as agent de liaison. Salomon had gotten a job as secretary at the penal court during 
a government campaign offering struggling young people opportunities in state-run 
(administrative) offices. He, too, was asked to interpret penal trials in 2013 and has 
subsequently been hired as interpreter for the criminel type trials at the appeals court. Both 
Antoine and Salomon have been interpreting ever since. 
Towards the end of my long stay in Bobo, it was early 2017, Antoine and I have agreed 
to meet at the maquis Choco, a bar hang-out, situated right off of Place du Cinquantenaire, 
half-way between where we both live. I set out for our 11am meeting with mixed feelings, 
expecting Antoine to not be very communicative, having consistently and eloquently 
detoured any information of substance as well as a recorded interview with me earlier. The 
maquis was quiet and empty of customers at this time of day, the owner busying himself in 
our vicinity, we, his only clients, being left to talk over a beer and a soft drink, a sucrerie.  
 
Antoine’s story: 
Antoine is the oldest of the four court interpreters working in Bobo, born in 1973. He has 
been translating correctionnel trials since 2010 – or 2013, he is not sure about the exact date. 
He tells me that he left school after taking the BEPC exam, the third-year middle school 
diploma.71 He was looking for something to do work-wise, not quite knowing what to do or 
where to start looking, je me cherchais. He eventually set up his own business, selling animal 
feed and music cassettes, a job he actually liked doing. But his sister-in-law did not agree, she 
wanted to “get him off the streets”, he says. She is employed at the Ministry of Justice in 
Ouagadougou and had arranged for him to get the job as chauffeur for the president of the 
 
71 In the French school system, secondary school takes seven years; after four years you can sit for the BEPC, 
brevet d’études du premier cycle, and then go on for another three years and take the baccalauréat, the BAC, 
the final high school diploma that allows entry to tertiary education.  
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appeals court in Bobo that the court was hiring for. He started there in 2000. The then 
president of the appeals court, judge M.D., liked Antoine so much that he not only employed 
him as his personal chauffeur, but as a live-in personal chauffeur, Antoine tells me. 
So far, Antoine continues his narration, he never took a vacation, he was only sick for 
four days in all the years he has been working at the TGI. I am a bit taken aback with this 
information, not knowing if he is showing off his robust health or his willingness to commit 
unreservedly to his job or both. The two trial days, Tuesday and Friday, are very long and 
tough working days. He has become indispensable to the court, he says, always being 
available is thus a must, in his view. Antoine does not know what the court would do if he 
were not here. In any case, you get used to the long working days, he adds.  
Then he tells me that his former boss, judge M.D. president of the appeals court, 
treated him like a son. He read and explained the penal code to him so that today, Antoine 
has to sometimes explain legal vocabulary to judges in Jula. Antoine had been working as the 
court president’s chauffeur for a number of years, being called to drive the president or his 
family also on weekends, when president M.D. unexpectedly died. Antoine as his chauffeur 
needed a new occupation. So, the court hired him as an agent de liaison. At some point the 
court asked him to interpret during trials, first at the appeals court and later at its twin 
institution, the TGI. He was the first individual in Bobo to work as court interpreter, Antoine 
insists I know. He goes on to tell me how he could, now, take a concours exam to enter ENAM 
and study to become a court scribe. If he wanted to. But he does not want to, he concludes 
his story, being quite satisfied with his job as court interpreter (Bobo 15 February 2017). 
 
HENCE, as mentioned earlier, being indispensable seems to be a feeling, court interpreters in 
Bobo share; even though they have very different backgrounds and itineraries, all four 
interpreters show certain similar characteristics in the presentation of themselves. Just like 
Jean expresses his being indispensable by portraying himself as saving innocents, Antoine 
employs a similar strategy of indispensability, namely by never absenting himself from work.  
Antoine had told me of his career possibilities and the concours exam he could take if 
he wanted to. But since he could not abandon the court and not translate, he was, for now, 
not going to take that concours. Antoine, too, likes to present himself as an “aspiring elite”, it 
seems. And since he also works within this space occupied by the educational elite without 
himself belonging to that social-educational category, he can emphasize other points, like for 
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example that he might, indeed, be part of the educational elite one day by taking the concours 
exam to train as court scribe. 
When I introduced myself and my research to judges and prosecutors, explaining that 
I was interested in the court interpreter’s work, they all launched, unasked, into a speech of 
how unreliable interpreters were, how often they needed to be corrected, how difficult it all 
was, and how important it was that they were there nevertheless. But you could not trust 
them. Concretely, Antoine was the object of quite some frustration on the side of presiding 
judge D.M, whose trials Antoine translates. The judge was upset about how Antoine 
constantly got up and left the room as soon as a trial was not conducted in Jula.  
 
Judge D.M. tells me that he does not appreciate it at all when the interpreter gets sent 
around all the time – when he presides trials, he does not do that. The interpreter is 
there to interpret and needs to stay put. In reality, every time somebody needs to leave 
the room to use the toilet for example, the trial has to be suspended for 5 minutes. He 
also does not like it when the interpreter, when a case is in French, just gets up and 
leaves. He should stay in his place all the time. In fact, we had had such a case today 
(TGI 5 December 2016). 
 
Why does he do that? Il m’énerve, judge D.M. said. Another judge in the trio led by presiding 
judge D.M. – and the only female judge to work at the TGI during my work there – lamented 
the fact that she constantly needed to correct his Jula translations and quite often also his 
French. And really, he never needed to explain Jula legal vocabulary to her, she tells me (judge 
N.N. 16 February 2017). 
Roth had researched young people’s lives, hopes, and possibilities in Bobo and the 
changing generational relationships that have developed over the past 30-odd years. A 
different topic, but she has insights that connect to the way court interpreters present 
themselves in their daily working lives. Roth had written about peoples’ ideas concerning 
their future that lacked a connection to reality: “Even those who have visited primary school 
only for a few years think in categories of public service jobs and a reliably paid monthly 
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salary” (Roth 2011: 12).72 Antoine, just like all court interpreters, might have succeeded in 
attaining these goals to a certain point – they are all public or civil servants earning a reliably 
paid monthly salary – but without the accompanying recognition, respect, and higher salary 
they would like. We have assessed the discrepancy in the way interpreters present 
themselves and the way their superiors treat and see them with Goffman’s ideas on 
impression management, combined with Newell’s explanations on bluffing. Let us look some 
more on how interpreters see themselves. 
The Ministry of Justice and by extension the Burkinabe state do not seem to realize 
just how important their work is, Paul tells me as well. We are sitting outside the cour d’appel 
courthouse in a small, somewhat dilapidated kiosk, discussing interpreters’ jobs and working 
conditions. I try to keep up writing while Paul and Salomon tell me about their working days. 
Paul and I have ordered sucreries, Salomon a bottle of water, which is much healthier, he 
comments. Just this last year, 2016, all court interpreters working in Burkina Faso – one 
woman among them – had organized and met for a first time. Once again, Salomon and Paul 
were telling me that indeed, they might all be asked or hired to interpret during trials, but 
they still did not have either an official status as court interpreters, nor an adequate salary 
corresponding to the work they do, they feel. Paul then tells me about himself. 
 
Paul’s story: 
Paul was born in 1985 and raised in Côte d’Ivoire. His family decided to move back to Burkina 
Faso, where they are originally from, in 2005 or 2006, he is not sure about the exact year. And 
he was not thrilled about having to leave Côte d’Ivoire for Burkina Faso, the country of his 
parents which he had nothing to do with – a real backward place, too, he laments. He was a 
high school student at the time they migrated back here and once installed in Bobo, he 
continued his education at a local high school, one of two large, formal or government lycées, 
situated directly next to each other in a popular neighborhood in Bobo. He used to write a 
lot, poetry and also fiction, Paul tells me. 
Once, the lycée held a writing competition for the visit of President Blaise Compaoré 
to Bobo. Students studying in the last two years were asked to produce a poem. He won this 
competition, as he had expected, he continues telling me. He was very happy because the 
 
72 “Selbst wer die Primarschule nur ein paar Jahre besucht hat, denkt in Kategorien von Funktionärsarbeit und 
Monatslohn als Wunschziel”. 
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winner was supposed to get a motorcycle as prize. But when he went to the ceremony on 
foot, a girl was asked to read the winning text, his text, as her own! She got the moto as prize 
for best poem. Paul protested to the school and his teachers, who knew the poem was his, 
also complained. But all he got was to be kicked out of school.  
He subsequently went to another lycée, a private school, but flunked his high school 
diploma, the BAC – again under strange circumstances. His grades, he says, were all between 
15 and 20 – 20 being the highest grade in the Burkinabe grading scale – which would have 
easily allowed him to pass the BAC exams. Yet for reasons incomprehensible to him, the 
school denied him this final diploma, entry ticket to university, and produced a report card, 
where all grades were solid sevens. So, not giving up, he went to a private university in Bobo 
to study project management. 
Now, in retrospect, he tells me all this with slight irony or even a bit of sarcasm. He 
laughs, saying that he still likes to write and has many ideas and projects in mind. He is an 
autodidact, having always been interested in learning new things. Actually, he had wanted to 
go to Boston to study petrochemistry. He knows a lot, he tells me, surprising people with his 
detailed knowledge. Concluding, he tells me that he assists people in writing their MA thesis. 
(Bobo 6 February 2017) 
 
PAUL had come to work for the justice system because his older sister was the head scribe, 
the greffier en chef at the Juvenile Court in Bobo, the tribunal pour enfants. In 2011, she asked 
him to come help her out with her job, working as her volunteer secretary. He accepted. In 
2013, the Burkinabe state started recruiting interpreters for the courts, giving priority to those 
people who were already working within the justice system. So Paul applied and got the job 
as interpreter at the TI.  
What all four of them have in common – Paul, Antoine, Salomon, and Jean – is that 
they are civil servants and that they work in a job environment for which a concours exam is 
mandatory and in a job they have not trained for. In any other working environment this 
might not make a huge difference, but being in a hierarchically organized government 
institution in which bureaucrats mutually treat one another according to the rung they occupy 
in the hierarchy, interpreters’ position is, at best, undefinable. 
Not having an officially recognized status, they have no lobby, no corps des interprètes 
to represent them and no law or rule states how much they should earn. The interpreting job 
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they do is not remunerated. They are paid for what they are hired for, as secretaries or liaison 
clerks/officers. And even Salomon, who is designated as court interpreter of the prosecuting 
agency (interprète judiciaire au parquet) on his state-issued professional card (carte 
professionnelle) earns the same amount as they all do. This means that in practical terms, his 
designation as court interpreter has no impact on his salary or standing within the court 
hierarchy. In fact, it seems rather strange that he is officially designated as court interpreter 
by his employer, who, at the same time, does not recognize this job category. He earns the 
same salary and is asked to perform the same tasks as his colleague Antoine employed as 
agent de liaison, a clerk whose work is precisely this – to run errands in the courthouse and 
between different institutions across town.  
Paul then tells me, seconded by Salomon, that they get 88’000 F CFA a month. A 
ridiculous amount, Paul drily adds. Who can feed a family of four on that? Paul is married and 
has twins, who are now (end 2016) just one year old. Luckily, his wife has a job as civil servant 
and thus earns a regular stipend as well. Salomon nods, saying that they certainly do not earn 
the salary the recognition of their status would bring them. The court scribes working at the 
court, for example, earned more than double their salary, they tell me, 200’000 F CFA per 
month. Chief clerks, the greffiers en chef who have studied law at university and with their 
maîtrise passed the concours to go to ENAM, even get 300’000 F CFA.  
 
What are 88’000 F CFA a month? 
Antoine, Salomon, and also Paul live in communal compounds. The rent they pay for 
their one or two chambre salon costs an average of 4000 F CFA per month. Of course, 
they participate in the bills the compound as a whole gets every month (water, 
electricity, and garbage – which amounts to maybe another 3000 F CFA all together).  
Here are some examples in a non-exhaustive list of what basic acquisitions cost on 
average: 
à One 25kg sack of rice costs 15’000 F CFA, the lowest quality, and the same amount 
of corn costs the same.  
à Feeding a family of four and all the other family members and live-in help 
necessitates going to the market for the daily food shopping, which amounts to about 
2000 F CFA per day, so about 60’000 F CFA per month. 
à A pair of jeans with the yugu yugu sellers, the second-hand clothes imported from 
Europe, cost 3000 F CFA, a shirt 1500 F CFA. 
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à A nicely made suit at a tailor’s comes to 40’000 F CFA, costs for the material not 
included; an outfit made for a woman costs, always depending on how elaborate it is, 
an average of 5000 F CFA. 
à Having your clothes ironed comes to about 500 F CFA per month. 
à Of course, school fees need to be paid – another 10’000 to 30’000 F CFA per child 
and year depending on the school. 
à And then there are the costs for gasoline for the moto, public transport being as 
good as nonexistent in Bobo. At least 2000 F CFA per month on gasoline is needed to 
get around town, to work and back every day and on errands.  
 
Getting by on 88’000 F CFA is, mildly put, a challenge.  
Salomon, born in Côte d’Ivoire in 1979, always appears at court dressed to the finest, 
often in a suit, and with a body-hugging turtleneck shirt under his suit. I start sweating by just 
looking at him. Sometimes he wears prêt à porter, store-bought shirts with cufflinks. Often 
entirely in black. He translates from and into Jula, Moore, and French at the appeals court, 
there where the really tough criminel cases are tried: gang rape, murder, or armed highway 
holdups with deaths. The courtroom at the appeals court has no air conditioning, the fans just 
barely move. Salomon has just recently bought himself a car. This does not only assure his 
independent mobility around town, but also conveys upon him a certain status. His court 
interpreter colleagues are envious, they even begrudge him his car, he tells me, not having 
saved up enough to be able to afford a car of their own. Maybe they do not have a driver’s 
license, he speculates. But he does not care about their petty bickering, Salomon continues 
to tell me, he worked and saved diligently in order to afford the small four-wheel drive.  
Salomon, just like Jean and Antoine, earns some extra money by working outside the 
courthouse. He takes on interpreting jobs at different notary and lawyers’ offices in town, has 
built quite a good, stable list of clients who regularly ask for his services. This is why he needs 
a car, he explains, so he can easily and quickly get around town when he is not at the appeals 
court. Without this extra work, he says, his salary from his work at the court would not get 
him and his growing family very far. In fact, he, too, is happy that his wife earns a decent 
salary in a government office, doing the finances there.  
While waiting for the official recognition of their status by the state that hired them, 
interpreters share the wish to present themselves as part of the social culture predominant 
in the courthouse they work in. They present and perform themselves in quite similar, yet 
different type of ways, and they share the conviction that they are indispensable to the courts 
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they work for. This feeling of indispensability is accompanied, variously, by Jean, the former 
church interpreter, using a religious rhetoric when describing his work at court, going about 
his work with love, helping innocent defendants to get a fair trial. The way he appears at 
court, he could be the court’s president himself – flashy, big car, shiny shoes, briefcase. Now 
Jean had to save himself from the authorities, it is speculated, having disappeared without a 
trace.  
Antoine elaborates on his potential future as a court scribe by presenting himself as a 
future diplomé. He thus insists on coming across in a way that does not correspond to reality, 
adding some glamour or importance to his everyday work as liaison officer at the courthouse. 
Antoine also likes to stress the fact that he never needed to take a day off because of sickness. 
Or a vacation, for that matter. Without him, the court could not hold trials, he is convinced. 
He is indispensable.  
Paul, again, is the undiscovered genius, continuously fighting for recognition of his 
many talents as writer, creator of projects, poet. He likes to present himself as a leader, 
putting the blame for his multiple failures in the Burkinabe school system on the unfair 
treatment he was repeatedly submitted to by school authorities. And Salomon, always 
impeccably dressed, punctual, efficient, likes to repeat that he consults all kinds of 
dictionaries to prepare himself for trials and that he is interested in continued education. He 
presents himself as the intellectual, taking notes while translating, informing himself on 
interpreting techniques on the internet, as he tells me. He is the only interpreter to 
consistently translate in the first person, which might attest to his self-organized continued 
education in interpreting techniques.  
These performances clash with the position all court interpreters occupy in the court 
hierarchy and the way they are treated and talked about by the civil servants working at the 
two courts. The official court hierarchy is difficult to penetrate, we have seen. The disdain the 
interpreters get from the other civil servants at court comes across in how judges and 
prosecutors speak about them. Antoine has no office space at the TGI, where the court scribes 
refused to let him have a desk in their (large) office. 
Bintou, who has not studied law at university, but instead went to ENAM for her 
schooling for many years, building one diploma on another, until she is now head court scribe, 
nevertheless gets looked down upon by her colleagues in the same position, but who went to 
university, as she had told me. To conclude this discussion of internal court standing, the four 
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court interpreters in Bobo have all attained the status of public servant by a short cut, they 
are, in a certain sense, impostors, having neither studied law nor climbed the career ladder 
from the inside through concours exams like Bintou did. The civil servants they work with let 
them know this every day. 
 
4.6. Conclusion on the Amtssprache and on language use at court 
How can the arguments of the state, more specifically of judges and prosecutors, and of court 
interpreters – in short, of the actors in the courtroom, be assessed in regard to French? 
Arguments that support and maintain historically grown language practices, which are 
anchored in a bureaucratic-administrative system of injustice? What arguments support the 
idea that the justice system and thus the state maintains and perpetuates these language 
practices? And how do bureaucratic processes, which sanction the hiring of an untrained 
interpreter as a public servant, influence interpretation during trials?  
What we seek to understand is how legitimation of inequity occurs. After 
independence, standard French was promoted as a tool for “uniting the nation” (Newell 2012: 
157; see also Bidima 1997: 59 on how the many African languages present on the territory of 
nation states constituted an obstacle for national unity). At the same time and from the 
beginning of colonization, French was imposed to make hierarchical relations clear. French 
also always signified relations of superiority and inferiority. On the one hand, then, Antoine 
and his interpreter colleagues make explicit that the system as it is run today – with and in 
standard French – is kept up and running precisely because of or thanks to their work as 
interpreters. On the other hand, their attitude towards their work and the presentation of 
themselves – being indispensable, on the in-side of delicate information – also makes explicit 
that none of the court interpreters nor the state itself question how the system is run nor the 
fact that only because it is run in this way do they all have this job interpreting in the first 
place. 
Hence, the explanatory framework used by both judges and interpreters for 
translational processes perpetuates the status quo – it supports the continued use of 
standard French at court which, in turn, assures that the power (im)balance and how the 
justice system is made to work remain as they are. And even though, during a very short time 
since Burkina Faso’s independence from France in 1960, Burkinabe French was the standard 
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for trials, these revolutionary ideas were quickly erased and rectified in the successor regime. 
The political reality and situation was quite a different one in Sankara’s TPR trials. 
There, the main defendants were high ranking officials having worked within or for 
the government the Sankarists had just overthrown. The revolutionaries wanted to bring 
these officials to justice whom they accused for having embezzled funds belonging to the 
people. These high-ranking officials, members of the (educational) elite of Haute Volta, should 
use Burkinabe French in their trial so that everybody could follow. But after Sankara’s 
assassination in 1987, the successor regime eliminated all ideas, the format, and procedure, 
pertaining to the TPR trials. The period between 1987 and 1991 was even baptized 
“Rectification Period”; it revoked and annulled all texts describing the TPR trials and brought 
the administration of all state affairs back to the way they had been handled before the 
revolution. Standard French became, again, the language of trials as we find it today. 
So how can we assess actors’ arguments in support of the system as it is? We have 
established – and will elaborate on in the next chapter – that to keep things as they are, 
defendants are constructed as guilty by judges. Interpreters participate in this construction. 
It is a construction that follows an appropriation of legal procedure to the technical-material 
possibilities available, but also to the personal preferences of powerful actors. These personal 
preferences might be there, but the educational elite or the experts can only go as far as the 
boundaries the Ministry of Justice imposes on them. The strategic level, so to speak. 
Defendants’ cases are classified as flagrante delicto cases to stay manageable within the 
system as it is. 
Not that interpreters have much choice, we have seen, their translational work is 
controlled by judges who, first, decide when, what, and how they must translate, and, 
secondly, speak Jula. For reasons of hierarchy, we cannot designate the relationship between 
judges and interpreters as collaborative; interpreters participate, they do not collaborate. The 
concept of collaboration implies that there is an equality in the relationship, a presupposed 
symmetry of relations between actors, which is not the case here. Thus, interpreters 
participate in the construction of guilty defendants.  
Yet there is more to it than that. Beyond this well-established association between 
authoritarianism and the law, we have seen that the professional ideology the bureaucrats at 
court subscribe to includes a strict adherence to codified rules and procedure, an 
unquestioning exaltation or what Le Roy calls the fetishization of the codified text (Le Roy 
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1997: 313) – or, in Eades’ words, we have seen it, an obsessive adherence to a specific format 
of trials (Eades 2000: 181 and 2003: 125). The vocabulary both Eades and Le Roy use to 
describe how judges work – obsessive, fetishization – brings to light the importance accorded 
the written text in the justice system. Bidima as well highlights how in an “occidental penal 
trial” as we find it in Bobo, procedure takes precedence over the actual case at hand (Bidima 
1997 28). A technocratic way of going about work. And because judges feel they need to 
strictly adhere to codified rules, defendants’ cases are classified as flagrant délit, standard 
questions are asked in a standardized form and only allow for answers to be given in a specific, 
prescribed form. The bureaucrat-experts can go on with their job taking defendants to trial. 
Classifying a case as flagrant délit is, on the one hand, indeed an effect of bureaucrats’ 
adherence to codified rules, but is also due to the constraints of the logistical and material-
technical realities at court. In order to bring these accused offenders to court, they have to 
be classified as flagrant délit cases – or let go. Letting them go would show up the weaknesses 
of the justice system and thus question judges’ and prosecutors’ authority as members of the 
legal order, so that is not an option. Bringing offenders to court as flagrant délit cases, 
however, proves the system as they run it works. Once at court, judges and prosecutors are 
again in control of the situation. The defendants get constructed as guilty and condemned.  
So, the justice system is not just the justice system, but it is that what those working 
within it make it to be, appropriating it to their possibilities and to their own ends. Using these 
strict rules, laws, regulations, procedures, so that they can continue working the justice 
system, is within the interpretative prerogative (Deutungshoheit) of judges during trials and 
beyond. During trials, it is not a big thing for judges since they already are, by definition, the 
directors of the play. In addition, the overwhelming majority of people being judged in a penal 
court are illiterate, poor, uneducated young men who cannot and do not dare challenge them 
(the people or the rules) either. They have no idea as to their rights, they possess neither the 
social nor the financial capital – the bargaining power – needed to move through the justice 
system successfully, we have seen. And they have been socialized to submit to those older 
than themselves or to those who have authority. 
Indeed, the justice system is kept upright and running, codified rules/laws and all, 
because the powerful actors within the system, the experts, can domesticate it such that it 
remains manageable within their very real (material-technical and personal) possibilities and 
wishes. Now beyond a description of how powerful actors in the judicial system go about 
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keeping the system upright and running, securing their own power as they go along, an 
understanding of the larger picture is warranted, of how it got to be the way it is now. We 
have seen how the historical circumstances have put power in the hands of the elite. 
In fact, before Burkina Faso – Haute Volta – became independent in 1960, political 
power was transferred to an elite created, formed, and selected by the colonial powers. The 
representatives of the “doubly foreign” (Le Roy 1997: 312) justice system – in content and 
form – were and are not interested in improving the system in terms of making it more 
accessible to citizens. The various government campaigns meant to bring justice closer to the 
people concentrate on physical proximity, i.e. the creation of more courthouses in all 
geographical regions. They do not include considerations as to normative and conceptual 
changes of and in the system. Through the example of rural land ownership we have discussed 
how the state tries to facilitate legal procedure, to bring it closer to the people, while keeping 
the system itself – required documents, payments, prerequisites – as it is. The concepts of law 
and procedure are not modified to better fit (include, accommodate) traditional or local ideas 
of legality and land ownership.  
 A domestication of the rules and of laws of the actual system – Korbeogo’s 
domestication cadastrale – did not take place, a phenomenon we can observe very well in 
court. The only part that was and continues to be domesticated is procedure within the 
system as it is run by the experts, while codified rules, laws, and regulations are not. In fact, 
a domestication of procedure at court allows the experts to continue applying rules, 
regulations, and laws without modifying them or having to think about them. This way of 
making the system work also gives birth to the court interpreter, making his job necessary 
and indispensable. Without him, this way of running the justice system could not work. The 
interpreters themselves have gotten a unique chance to become fonctionnaires, a coveted 
position in society not easily accessible and not open to all. At court, interpreters are asked 
to translate during trials, thus making defendants fit the territory of the courtroom according 
to how the experts run the system of justice. The administration of the state-run bureaucratic 
system can be kept up and running.  
Let us now look at some concrete examples of communication in the courtroom, at 
courtroom speak, and of interpreted penal trials at the TGI. Judge D.M. and his team will 
work for the entire day, deciding on pending cases at the TGI. Antoine will translate. That 
side of the courtroom reserved for the audience is usually full to bursting, people spilling 
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out into the hallway, trying to squeeze into the doorframe to get a glimpse of the trial they 
have come to follow. The defendants are already seated, having been brought to court 
before the arrival of the audience and court members. They are dressed in their own 
clothes, which reflect their social standing or profession. There is no prison garb at the 
prison in Bobo, the MACO. Since most defendants are poor, young men, working as menial 
laborers or animal tenders, often unemployed, their clothes are simple – T-shirt, seldomly a 
button-down shirt, jeans or cloth pants and flip-flops. Musa as well is wearing his own 






CHAPTER 5: DURING TRIALS – is this Jula? 
 
Prologue – A day in court cont., Part 5 
 
Today, finally, Musa will be brought to court for his trial. He has been waiting for this day for 
months. Being in jail is no fun, it is cramped, it is difficult to find enough space to stretch out 
at night. Some prisoners even sleep on the wall surrounding the toilets, considering 
themselves lucky to have gotten there first. Being in jail is also humiliating, Musa cannot 
imagine going home to his father’s compound, the shame of having to look at his family 
members, being in their midst, a man accused of stealing, awaiting his trial in prison. He will 
be treated distantly once he’ll go back home, whenever that will be, with the bare minimum 
of care and attention paid him. And he will also feel ashamed of going outside into the 
neighborhood, having to greet people he’s known all his life, forcing them to acknowledge 
him, trying to make conversation. These are his thoughts, but for now, he needs to 
concentrate on his trial. 
The penal court begins work a bit after eight, he knows, the prison truck is ready, 
parked in the large courtyard of the prison. It is a huge, dark blue affair, with only three small 
interspersed barred openings along the sides. It has a platform in back, closed towards the 
inside with a heavy iron door, half open towards the outside. MAISON D’ARRET ET DE 
CORRECTION DE BOBO DIOULASSO is written in large, white letters along the side of the truck. 
The prisoners have to climb in one by one, he saw that the other day when some of his fellow 
interned were hauled off to the courthouse. 
Musa is called together with about twenty other young men by the prison guard. They 
have to stand in front of the truck, two by two, holding hands. Roll call. Today Honoré is on 
duty, a nice guy, young like himself. They sometimes talk a bit, but since Honoré does not 
speak Jula, their conversations are limited to basic French exchanges, greetings, or inquiries 
as to the other’s health. Honoré has only just been transferred to Bobo from Ouagadougou, 
where he went to police school, finishing his education by specializing as penitentiary guard, 
as they are called officially.  
So now it is Musa’s turn to climb into the back of the truck, where another prison 
guard is standing, machine gun at the ready, hurrying them along. The platform opens into 
the inside of the truck, secured by double doors with barred windows along the upper edge. 
The guard will continue standing there after the doors have been locked, riding along on the 
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platform for the short trip to the courthouse. Two more guards ride in front with the driver. 




The ride through town is uneventful and does not take long, in 15 minutes they have arrived 
at the TGI. There, the procedure is reversed. The prison guards stand outside guarding the 
back of the truck, Musa and his companions jump down from the platform one by one. Get 
in line, two by two, hold hands. Flanked by the three prison guards, they are marched up the 
two floors to the courtroom. Along the way there are a lot of people bustling along the 
hallways of the courthouse; visitors wait patiently outside the different offices, sitting on long 
benches along the walls. People squeeze themselves flat to the walls to let the procession of 




In the courtroom, the prison guards bark orders, gesticulating for them to proceed. Antoine, 





Soon they are seated on their designated seats, long benches arranged right next to where 
the audience sits, but separated by a long, broken bench laid down on its side, marking a one 
and a half meter corridor from the rows of benches occupied by the audience. Musa sits 
down, glad to be among his fellow defendants. There are a lot of people in the courtroom, it 
is crowded. There are written signs stuck to the courtroom walls. Musa cannot read so he 
does not know that they inform people that cell phones are prohibited in this space. Outside 
the room, in the hallway, a lot more people stand around, peeping into the courtroom. The 
prisoners all face an empty space with a huge desk, separated from the rest of the room by a 
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wooden fence. There another two desks are placed on the right and left side in this separated-
off space, with one chair each. Another shorter, free-standing railing or fence is opposite the 
huge desk dominating the scene. And a free-standing chair is sitting in the middle of this 
arrangement of furniture. Musa has no clue what to expect. The prison guards are seated 
along the wall next to the two doors, machine guns on their knees. He sees Honoré sitting on 
the other side of the room. 
Suddenly, a bell is rung. Musa strains his neck to see what is going on. “La cour!”, a 
male voice calls out loudly, and Musa sees that the man who has shooed them into the room 
is now holding open the door on Musa’s right. Five men walk in solemnly. They are all wearing 
a black boubou-type uniform, with wide arms and a white collar down the front in the middle 
of their chest. Everybody gets up. Noisy shuffling. Three of the five men go sit behind the huge 





Among the three behind the huge desk, the middle one starts talking. In French. 
Everybody sits back down. He continues talking, Musa hears names being read off of the 
folders the black clad man has sitting in front of him. His name, too. Surprisingly, he is the first 






The man sitting on the free-standing chair who had just a minute ago held open the door for 
the black clad men barks orders at him in Jula to come forward, to hurry, to stand HERE, no 
hands on the railing. Everybody speaks French and the man who has held open the door is 
now translating. But he does not always repeat in Jula what the man sitting in the middle said. 
It is somewhat sporadic, the translation, or so it appears to Musa. In any case all he 
understands is the Jula part of what is being discussed in front of him. 
 
4.1. Description and discussion of select court cases 
When I started this research in June 2016, the penitentiary guards were on strike demanding 
better working conditions and better pay. Without penitentiary guards, no trials. Magistrates 
of all orders went on strike as well at the same time, demanding more pay. They eventually 
got what they wanted, while the prison guards are still waiting for their demands to be 
satisfied. And all are back at work. 
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This anecdote illustrates how having enough or no bargaining power can influence 
decision making processes. Judges and prosecutors have a more visible, powerful, and maybe 
also a better organized lobby to voice their demands. Like the prison guards, also court 
interpreters have no lobby in Burkina Faso. In fact, they have even less bargaining power, the 
government not acknowledging their job category. They are on their own, needing to 
negotiate their place and position in the courthouse pecking order daily. More importantly, 
Antoine and Salomon, Jean and Paul are on their own in designing and carrying out the job of 
translating and interpreting during trials. No training guides them, no manual instructs them 
on how to go about their job. In addition, they are not aware of any of the glossaries and 
dictionaries produced for the Jula language and for legal vocabulary. So how do they decide 
what role to play at court and as employees of the Ministry of Justice? What criteria, both 
translational and in terms of loyalty, do they follow when translating during trials?  
I make sure to get up early so I can eat a copious breakfast because I know I will not 
be able to eat or drink during trials. Once, the court scribe collapsed in the middle of a trial, 
probably due to dehydration, court personnel speculated. Il est souffrant, I was told, he might 
suffer from diabetes or a similar ailment that haunts many over forty-year-olds here in 
Burkina Faso. The trials were adjourned, defendants sent back to prison, and court personnel 
went back to their offices. The court scribe took some few days off. 
The wooden benches for the audience’s and defendants’ convenience are 
excruciatingly uncomfortable, consisting of three long, parallel bars of wood with wide gaps 
in between. It is an anatomic challenge to sit comfortably, however you sit – lower back bent 
into a slump or overstretching like a seal begging for fish – your ischial bones get stuck in the 
gap between the wooden bars. So, I was very happy when I was accorded a cloth covered 
chair. Luckily not one covered in plastic like court personnel occupy. They must sweat 
copiously, sitting on and leaning into those huge, high backed, fake leather chairs.  
That the hierarchical order be visibly established in the courtroom is important to the 
smooth running of a day of trials. Since court personnel all wear the black robes and can thus 
not be told apart it becomes even more important to establish a visible who-is-who, according 
each individual member of the court his or her place. An illustrative anecdote I was told is 
that some few years ago, a judge refused to accept to sit in a smaller, less impressive chair 
than his colleagues during trials. His usual chair was broken, an adequate replacement not 
immediately available. But he made it clear that he would not work under this condition of 
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degradation, so a chair needed to be found quickly. The presiding judge of the time solved 
the problem by replacing all three judges’ chairs, giving them all the same inferior ones. Cases 
could resume normally, harmonically, and in hierarchical entente.  
The first case opens at a bit after 8am and the day can go on as long as until 6pm. Up 
to 15 cases can be heard in one working day. Many are adjourned for different reasons, like 
when not all persons needed for the trial to be held are present or specific documents are 
missing. With no or only very short breaks and court personnel working a full shift, days can 
get quite tough. The interpreter works, speaking uninterruptedly, getting a break only when 
a case is heard in French, which, in Bobo, is about one in four or five cases.  
Antoine, the interpreter-cum-clerk, alerts the public to the imminent entrance of the 
members of the court by submitting the audience to a variety of reprimands before he is 
satisfied. With a snapping of fingers and an impatient gesture, he signals individual people 
sitting in the audience to not cross their legs, to sit up straight, take off that hat, and turn off 
your phone. Bizarrely, I had mentioned it, this last order is stuck to the wall all over the 




The court members’ entrance is quite a performance. Antoine rings a small hand-held bell 
and shouts “La cour! – The court!”, gesturing for everybody in the audience to stand up. Enter 
the three judges, the prosecutor, the court scribe, who all proceed to settle themselves at 
their designated places. Bourdieu had remarked that ways of carrying oneself are embedded 
in one’s very body, not only in one’s physical postures, but also in the form of mental 
dispositions (Bourdieu 2013: 10ff). The slow, dignified walk of judges and prosecutors when 
entering the courtroom is not simply a way of carrying themselves based upon a set of rules 
or a code of conduct but is the visible result of a complex set of strategies. An important 
person or a person “of a certain social standing” in Burkinabe society is expected to walk, to 
carry himself – I was talking to a man – with restraint, not running along, hurrying to an 
appointment, into the courtroom, or into the building from the parking space. 
The interpreter already being there, he, too, goes and sits in his chair, facing the 
judges’ desk and the defendants’ railing, his back to the prosecutor. The judges and 
prosecutor enter the courtroom with measured gait, in a dignified manner of walking, serious 
look, giving the solemnity of the event about to take place a face. They enter, settle 
themselves in their seats, and the presiding judge opens the proceedings. 
 
 
As usual, the prosecutor makes a speech at the end of the trial, in which he summarizes the 
case and makes his proposition as to the sentence to be given the defendant. This particular 
trial had taken almost an hour. The prosecutor’s speech is hardly ever translated by the 
interpreter; sometimes he summarizes it. The only part he must translate, he will later tell 
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me, is the proposed sentence. And then the final verdict spoken by the presiding judge. It is 
not clear according to what criteria this has become an unwritten rule, a habit, or a 
convention for interpreters. Salomon had once explained to me that the reason why the 
prosecutor’s speech does not get translated is that it already is a summary, i.e. what he says 
in his wrap-up speech has already been said during the case at hand. Salomon himself 
summarizes only if defendants did not understand, he tells me. How he evaluates this is 
unclear as well. 
This time Antoine translates neither. After the prosecutor’s speech, the presiding 
judge addresses the defendant: “Vous avez donc écouté le procureur – So you have heard the 
prosecutor” (7 February 2017), which cannot mean anything to this particular defendant 
because his entire trial had just been translated into Jula. He neither understood the 
prosecutor’s speech nor what the judge had just said to him. Yet this moment is decisive in a 
trial because now the defendant gets the word. Or, to say it in the judge’s words, “He is 
accorded the last word to defend himself; you’re defending yourself in a case you have been 
saddled with”73 (judge D.M., 9 February 2017). It is the moment a lawyer would give his 
plaidoyer. 
In the trials I attended, hardly any defendant had the support of a lawyer; defendants 
practically always defended themselves. Fofana had noted this as well in his empirical study 
of trials in a small town not far from Bobo. The only defendants who were represented by a 
lawyer were employees of certain companies such as bus drivers (Fofana 2018: 403) or 
employees of an editing house. Moreover, procedure is not explained to defendants, they 
cannot grasp the importance of this moment. The presiding judge simply asks defendants if 
they have anything to say. This question is crucial, opening up a space for defendants to 
elaborate, to state their view of the case, to rectify, to justify, to explain. To defend 
themselves. All they answer, however, is that they have nothing to say or that they are sorry, 
like now. 
In this chapter, I will explore instances of interpretation during trials which are both 
due to and an outcome of a bureaucratization of court procedure. Or, to express it differently, 
the justice system and how it is applied on the ground, shows that bureaucratization has 
taken place. One effect upholding this system has is the presence of the court interpreter. 
 
73 “Il a la parole en dernier pour se défendre; tu te défends d’un cas qu’on a collé sur toi”. 
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With bureaucratization or a bureaucratic way of going about carrying out work I want to point 
to the strict adherence to written rules, to an organizational order that is an inherent part of 
the justice system as the experts present in the courtroom deem it to be. These experts – the 
three judges and the prosecutor – appropriate or translate these imported rules and 
procedure according to different criteria, we will see. The space the interpreter has to 
navigate this system is narrow. His undefined position at court allows no deviance from 
established rules and procedure. At the same time, interpreters assure that these rules and 
procedures are implemented and followed. 
They are thus both an integral part of the system, making sure it functions as it must, 
while themselves being constrained to strictly follow prescribed rules, to act within the 
boundaries they are accorded, like the delimited space of the courtroom during trials. The 
repetitive feature of all penal trials is visible to the onlooker: the always same vocabulary, the 
specific legal formulas used, the procedure, the prescribed roles all actors perform, and that 
all of this is done exclusively in French. We have gotten a first look at that above when we 
discussed the Goffmanian nature of trials. The script. The immutable nature of these rules – 
they cannot be changed, skipped, replaced, or ignored – is one reliably repeated feature of 
all penal trials that the legal professionals present in the courtroom say they must follow.  
Yet is it really that straight forward? In the following I will describe select moments of 
two specific trials. In these we can see how trials are directed by the presiding judge in form 
and in content. These moments during the two trials illustrate on the one hand the strict 
adherence to codified procedure by judges and prosecutors and, on the other, how this strict 
adherence is used as an instrument of power by the director of the trial. As a consequence, it 
also defines the work of the court interpreter, how he acts or is made to act, and the limits of 
his action.  
What we will look at are two specific instances during the interpreting process. The 
first one is what I will refer to as aberrant translation and the second one is the way the 
presiding judge and the interpreter interact. Aberrant translation includes adding or omitting 
information as well as moralizing or stating a personal opinion by the interpreter. It also refers 
to the decision taken by the presiding judge to not interfere and demand a correction of a 
wrongly translated utterance. We remember that the judge speaks Jula and also that the 
interpreter occupies a nebulous position at the courthouse. During trials, he is part of the 
acting team by the simple virtue of him being there to interpret. 
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At any other time, i.e. outside the courtroom and during trials, the interpreter’s status 
at the courthouse and his integration as a member of the team is highly contested among the 
legal professionals working there, we have seen as well. He is the only person at court who 
had not gone through either the education or the protracted employment process, 
particularly the concours exam. This, I have mentioned it, is reflected in the position 
interpreters are accorded or that they occupy in the court hierarchy. And this position at 
court, again, impacts how they can go about their job translating during trials.  
Here, we will look at how the interpreter participates in a trail, how he works and how 
he interacts with, mostly, the presiding judge. I have chosen two correctionel cases for closer 
analysis. Both have been transcribed from the aforementioned audio recordings by a Jula 
native speaker, by a Jula expert, and by myself.74 Both trials took place at the TGI in Bobo, in 
both cases the interpreter was Antoine, the liaison officer working at the TGI who habitually 
translates the correctionel trials. Both cases are thus representative of all correctionel trials 
held at this TGI; the presiding judge is a Jula native speaker. The reason why I have chosen 
two correctionel trials and none of the criminel variety is quite banal. 
First of all, criminel trials take place only rarely. During the accumulated six months of 
research in Bobo, I was witness to criminel trials (including all penal appeals trials) only on a 
total of six days and for roughly twenty cases. But more immediately, the only trials I was 
allowed to record were correctionel trials. This in itself might suffice as an explanation, but I 
believe a second look at the limiting circumstances can be enlightening. Only one out of three 
judges presiding penal trials – that is, correctionnel and criminel trials – allowed me to record 
“his” trials. Judge D.M. had decided for himself that I was to be trusted since my research was 
purely academic and thus pedagogical and found no objection to audio record trials he 
presided. 
At the same time, however, he did not inform his two colleagues, who conduct the 
correctionnel trials with him. Penal procedure demands that there always be three judges 
present at penal trials, or simply an uneven number. Judge D.M. did not inform his two 
colleagues because he did not want to risk them being against the recording, leaving me 
empty handed, he explained. This in itself shows some leeway is possible in the way he goes 
 
74 Jula transcriptions and backtranslations into French were done by myself and a nameless Jula speaker with 
no Jula writing skills in case study 1. Case study 2 was transcribed and back-translated by my colleague, 
sociolinguist and Jula expert Mamadou Lamine Sanogo from the INSS/CNRST in Ouagadougou. 
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about interpreting legal laws and procedure. The other judge presiding correctionnel trials, 
judge A.P., did not consent to any kind of recording, neither of trials he presided nor of an 
interview with him. He was not the only person declining a recorded interview. We have seen 
that the president of the appeals court had refused me any kind of research, including 
interviewing the court personnel working at “his” court – and he did not change his mind 
during the entire two years my research lasted.  
So, criminel trials, which involve the heavier infractions such as murder, rape, or 
armed robbery, take place only rarely. They might be, by their very nature, more exciting to 
follow since there is considerably more at stake. Burkina Faso still knows (but in practice never 
carries out) the death penalty. And condemned criminel offenders can get sentenced to 
anything running from more than five years to twenty years of imprisonment. During my 
wrap-up field work of two months at the beginning of 2018, only one day of criminel trials 
took place. 
We have seen that the explanation Salomon, the interpreter translating criminel trials, 
suggests is that the Burkinabe state has no money to pay for the lawyers it has recently 
institutionalized for criminel cases. The accused offenders wait for their trial in prison. And 
since criminel cases hardly ever come to trial, these offenders can wait up to 30 years for their 
trial to take place. Indeed, one of the rare criminel cases I attended dated from the early 
1990s. The fact of not having any money to pay for the mandatory state lawyer of course does 
not explain why criminal offence perpetrators have to wait for their trial for such a long period 
of time since the free lawyer system has been in place only as of 2016 – what happened before 
that?  
Now let us look at specific moments of one correctionnel case, which took place at the 
TGI in Bobo on 24 January 2017. The members of the court enter the courtroom after Antoine 
rang the bell. The audience is standing. Being a judge, prosecutor, scribe, or other court clerk 
instills in this civil servant a certain status. This status, in turn, requires these civil servants to 
carry themselves in a certain way – dignified, solemn, in charge. This is how they enter the 
courtroom, emerging from the backstage. 
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Case Study 1 – Le procureur du Faso contre Gaousso Amadou et Sanogo Issa – The prosecutor 
of Burkina Faso versus Gausso Amadu and Sanogo Issa (TGI Bobo Dioulasso, 24 January 2017) 
Cast: 
Interpreter:   Antoine 
Defendants:    Mister Amadu Gausso and Mister Issa Sanogo  
Presiding judge/director: D.M. 
Two supporting judges 








On this particular Tuesday, two defendants are standing trial at the TGI, it is the first case of 
the day. The prosecutor has just finished his speech, proposing to release one defendant on 
probation and to condemn the other one to five years in prison plus a fine of one million 
francs CFA (approximately 1660 CHF).75 The case had taken a long time, it was murky, full of 
 
75 See www.umrechnung.org/waehrungen-umrechnen/waehrungs-kurs-umrechner.htm, 5 January 2020. See 
preceding chapter for what an amount in F CFA is worth in daily life. That the condemned will not be able to pay 
his fine is a given. The question is, rather, why the court continues to impose fines that everybody knows can 
never be paid; why it continues to adhere to rules that make no sense on the ground.  
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unclear passages. Now is the defendants’ turn to give their point of view, to defend 
themselves. As codified penal procedure demands, each defendant is addressed singly by the 
presiding judge, who tells them what sentence the prosecutor has demanded. Antoine 
translates. Then judge D.M. asks the first defendant – again following penal procedure strictly 
– what he has to say in his defense.76 This the interpreter translates simply as “What do you 
have to say?”.77 Leaving out part of the judge’s question by omitting “in your defense”, the 
interpreter actively alters the question – and omits a clue word the defendant could respond 
to or act upon. Being asked to say something in his defense is motivating and gives an idea as 
to the direction this question is aimed at. Being asked to say something without specification 
is unclear or confusing at best, it does not invite an answer by giving a hint as to where this 
answer should or could go. The defendant thus misses his last opportunity to speak up.  
Defendants are not informed about procedure and they do not know their rights, as I 
was repeatedly told by different law personnel such as the presiding judge himself or a lawyer. 
Both defendants in this case and at this point had nothing to add. Later, however, after the 
definite sentences had been announced by the presiding judge, after the interpreter had 
translated these into Jula, one of the two defendants asked to speak. 
At this point and according to the codified rules, trial procedure does not provide the 
opportunity for defendants to speak anymore. He was consequently silenced by a “Non, c’est 
fini – no, it is finished/done” by the presiding judge, who continued by saying that the 
defendant had had the opportunity to speak, but now and at this stage, he cannot speak 
anymore if it is not by appealing the sentence within 15 days. This the interpreter translates 
as “if you have something to say, go do an appeal in 15 days if you want to”.78 This ends the 
case.  
 
76 “Qu’est-ce que vous avez à dire pour votre défense?” (transcript lines 1522-1523, p. 56) 
77 “mu lo b’i fɛ ka fɔ?” (transcript line 1524-1525, p. 56) 





Let us now look at some more translational instances in this trial, going back a bit in time to 
the beginning of the trial involving the two men above. They had been accused of different 
infractions. Mister Gausso is 47 years old, “employed in the commerce sector”79, and stands 
accused of having driven a vehicle without a driver’s license. The second defendant, Mister 
Sanogo, apparently committed three infractions, namely of having procured and distributed 
false currency. Secondly, he wanted to exchange these fake US dollar bills with Mr. Gausso, 
getting francs CFA from him in exchange by telling him he could easily go to any bank with 
the US dollars and change them into franc CFA. Mister Sanogo is 28 years of age and has 
already been in prison once before. The third infraction is that he was using a fake ID.  
During their trial, we can observe different moments of imprecise or wrong 
translation. The presiding judge corrects these false translations only once during the entire 
trial, which took one hour and 41 minutes. We will see how the judge interrupted the 




79 “…Vous êtes employé de commerce,…” (transcript line 15, p. 1) 
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Abbreviations as used in transcripts: 
(1) Number of example 
445 line number in transcription 






… Speaker pauses 
s’en est débarassé Loud utterance 
 
(1) 445 J  
 
Oui, mais, est-ce qu’il s’en est débarrassé ? 
Yes, but did he get rid of it? 
 446 INT K’i y’i depense kɛ n’a ye wa? 
Did you spend these bills? 
 448 J  Non, est-ce qu’il s’en est débarrassé ? Dès lors qu’il s’est rendu compte 
que le cadeau qui lui a été fait était composé de faux billets. Est-ce qu’il 
s’en est débarrassé ? 
No, did he get rid of it? As soon as he realized that the present he had 
gotten was made up of fake bills, did he get rid of it? 
 450 INT ko wakati min o i kun ma bɔ wari nin kalama, i y’a ye ka to yen wa? 
As soon as you knew that you had fake bills, did you get rid of them?  
 452 DEF ɔnhɔn ale la i y’i wari nin ye ka to yen. 
Yes, I put them away right then. 
 454 J Immédiatement? 
Immediately? 
 
Why does the judge correct the interpreter specifically here and only here during this trial 
and not in other instances of wrong translation? Note, too, that the judge intervenes directly, 
interrupting and correcting Antoine’s Jula translation thus making it clear that he understands 
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and speaks Jula. Let us first look at some other instances of translation during this trial before 
analyzing these. 
The trial had started off unfavorably for the two defendants because presiding judge 
D.M. had asked the standard initial question as to what language they wanted to use as “Vous 
parlez français – do you speak French?”. The more neutral wording of this question, we have 
read above, is “Which language do you express yourself in?”. By putting French in the position 
of default language, the judge creates a situation for the defendants, in which they need to 
justify their non-command of French. Here, both opted for Jula. 
There are moments in the trial I have termed aberrant translation. They are an 
endeavor undertaken by the presiding judge and the interpreter together. The interpreter’s 
choice of words when translating and the judge’s choice not to correct and rectify moments 
of aberrant translation construct specific facts. The interpreter and the judge work to 
construct a guilty defendant. Let us look at excerpts illustrating the construction of a guilty 
defendant.  
We are at the beginning of the trial, judge D.M. has just completed reading the 




Est-ce qu’il savait que … qu’il n’avait pas le droit de conduire ce type 
de véhicule sans permis de conduire ? 
Did he know that … that he does not have the right to drive this type 
of vehicle without a driver’s license? 
 INT 105-
106 
Ne ko est-ce qui b’a kalama ko mobili façon nin ti ka boli sans permis 
ti fɛ wa? 
Are you informed that this type of vehicle cannot be driven without 
a driver’s license? 
 DEF 108 Bon, n t’a kalama 
Well, I don’t know that 
 INT 109 Ça dépend 
It depends  
 J 110-
111 
Il veut nous faire savoir qu’il ne savait pas qu’on doit posséder un 
permis de conduire … avant de circuler avec un tel engin ? 
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He wants to make us believe that he did not know that one has to 
have a driver’s license … before circulating with such a vehicle? 
 INT 112-
113 
K’i b’a fɛ ka fɔ ko hali ni ma kalan kɛ ko mɔgɔ tɛ lɛ mobili façon nin 
boli n’a ma permis sɔrɔ wa? E t’a kalama wa? 
Do you want to say that even if you are illiterate, you do not know 
that this type of vehicle cannot be driven without a driver’s license? 
You do not know that? 
 DEF 116 ɔnhɔn, n b’a kalama 
Yes, I know it 
 INT 117 Il dit qu’il ne savait pas 




The interpreter translates the words of the defendant into French differently (2:109), altering 
the meaning of the defendant’s utterance from the clear statement I don’t know that to a 
non-committing it depends. The judge (2:110-111) wants to reconfirm this vague answer by 
asking if the defendant was not aware that he needed a driver’s license before driving this 
type of car. In his translation of the judge’s question into Jula for the defendant, Antoine 
suggests (2:112-113) that the defendant is illiterate instead of unaware of rules as the judge 
had worded it (2:110-111). And again, the defendant’s answer (2:116) gets turned around by 
Antoine (2:117) translating the contrary of what the defendant had just said. In neither of 
these three instances of aberrant translation does the judge intervene.  
This is one instance of what I see as a construction of facts by both the presiding judge 
and the interpreter. The fact they construct is a guilty defendant that can be condemned. The 
strategies employed by judges and the interpreter are, on the one hand, intervening actively 
in the translation process. At court, the defendant is at a disadvantage by definition: he comes 
from the outside, he is the only actor on stage with no script, he does not know how to 
navigate the justice system or his trial, and he speaks no or only minimal French. He is not 
informed as to procedure. He has no defense lawyer. The interpreter constructs defendants 
as guilty by translating minimally, wrongly, or not at all. The judge constructs defendants as 
guilty by not intervening in the translation process, by not asking the interpreter to translate 
faithfully, and also by how he addresses defendants, we will see shortly.  
How do we assess this non-intervention of the judge? We know that he understands 
Jula, so is he reluctant to repeatedly correct the interpreter because this would make 
individual trials take even longer and, in addition, would make Antoine lose face if he were 
constantly corrected? A mere speculation. Following the line of reasoning that a guilty 
defendant is being actively constructed by the judge and the interpreter, the non-intervention 
in the translation process by the judge feeds into this argumentation. The defendant’s 
answers are portrayed as inconsistent (2:109) when responding to the repetition of the same 
question (2:117) and the defendant himself as confused (2:109) and illiterate (2:112-113). 
On the one hand, from a legal point of view, it is irrelevant if the judge responds 
directly to the defendant or waits for the translated version because the written court record 
is in French, which means the interpreter’s words are recorded, not defendants’. The trial 
logbook constitutes the memory of a trial and together with the defendant’s file – equally 
preserved for posterity in French alone – these are the documents which record a case from 
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beginning to end and form the basis for a potential future appeal. In this regard it is not 
interesting what the judge believes or thinks, only that what is written has any legal weight. 
And that what is kept in writing is the interpreter’s translated French version of defendants’ 
utterances. Those he translates, that is, because since the judge speaks and understands Jula, 
the interpreter translates defendants’ utterances into French only rarely; the judge usually 
answers defendants directly in French. On the other hand, however, it is relevant what the 
judge believes or thinks or wants because his decisions guide how he responds to the 
defendant and thus influences the direction the trial will take. And it determines what the 
scribe will put into writing. 
We might also ask ourselves how the court scribe carries out his job. It is physically 
impossible to write as fast as one talks, unless done in stenography, which is not the case at 
the TGI in Bobo. So how does the court scribe decide what to write, how does he prioritize 
and sieve out information for the record? What does he deem neglectable and consequently 
leaves out, and what does he write down and why? Court scribe F.S. explains that he and his 
colleagues write directly in the plumitif during trials. In a neat handwriting and in blue and 
red ink, court scribes make visible those utterances they highlight as important. How they 
decide what needs to be written down and what is important in any trial, F.S. tells me, they 
learn during their training at ENAM. You learn pretty quickly what is important to keep on file 
and what is negligeable, he says (TGI Bobo 15 December 2016). 
That written documents are manipulated along their way from the police station to 
the courthouse, we have seen with Göpfert. He discusses the position written French is 
accorded in the gendarmerie in Niger. During a trial, the judge, the interpreter, and the court 
scribe – and the gendarme who had written the initial report – are working to put defendants 
behind bars, not to let them go, Göpfert found (2013: 331). They are interested to produce a 
guilty defendant. 
But let us return to the case at hand, because later, again, the interpreter alters the 
judge’s utterance completely: 
 
Judge:    We do not impose any kind of procedure on people, 
we ask you questions, answer the questions calmly  




Here we could of course say that the judge’s statement as to not imposing any kind of 
procedure on people is ludicrous since the entire trial is choreographed down to the last 
details. A choreography based on codified law, eternalized in the penal code, and well known 
to the experts and the interpreter present in the courtroom, but not to defendants. In this 
instance, the judge wanted to reassure the defendant, who had just said that everything 
needed to be taken into account (line 839). But the interpreter decided for himself what the 
judge meant, interpreting the judge’s utterance as meaning the defendant should hurry up 
with his answers.  
In another moment of translation, the interpreter adds information, voicing his own, 
personal opinion: 
 
Judge:    And why have you given it to him?  
Interpreter translating: This is not good, you gave it to him? 
(lines 571-572) 
 
Here, he changed an open “why” question into a closed question, which demands a yes or no 
answer. He also puts his personal view of the situation into his translation by moralizing – “it 
is not good” – about what the defendant did. 
How do we assess these situations, where the interpreter translates by 
omitting/adding information, by stating an opinion, or by translating differently or not 
faithfully? Aberrant translations constituted my working hypothesis before coming to Bobo 
for an extended period of time to watch penal trials, but in quite a different form, influenced 
by Jean’s statement as to saving innocent defendants. But here we can see that even though 
Antoine does indeed translate differently, it is hardly to defendants’ advantage. How can we 
assess the intervention or, rather, non-intervention by the judge in aberrant translating 
instances? As a native Jula speaker, he can control the interpretation process. He does this 
only once in this particular trial, we have seen. 
Before analyzing more closely, let us now see how Musa fared in his trial, which took 
place at the TGI a week before Mister Gaussu’s and Mister Sanogo’s case. 
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Case Study 2 – Le procureur du Faso contre Ganou Moussa – The prosecutor of Burkina Faso 
versus Ganu Musa (TGI Bobo Dioulasso, 17 January 2017) 
Cast: 
Interpreter:   Antoine 
Defendant:    Mister Musa Ganu  
Presiding judge/director: D.M. 
Two supporting judges 







Musa’s trial was also the first one of the day, which means he did not have to wait for an 
unpredictable time for his own case to be decided on, but then had to sit in the courtroom 
for the remainder of the day, waiting for all other cases to come to an end. Musa is 22 years 
old, a shepherd, and he stands accused of having stolen two metal bars out of a garage. He 
says that he had only sat on the bench in front of the garage to take a rest walking home from 
his mother’s. Until this day, Musa had never been accused of any kind of misdemeanor. 
He is asked by the presiding judge in what language he expresses himself. Musa opts 
for Jula. This information, together with his current living address, date of birth, his marital 
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status, his parents’ names, and the question as to having done military service or been 
decorated, is asked and verified at the beginning of each trial and for every defendant.80 
Musa’s trial has begun. The presiding judge now proceeds to read the accusation from 
Musa’s file. As usual this is a long, arduous speech containing a lot of legalese expressions. 
Antoine summarizes. To conclude, the judge asks Musa the standard, legally required 
question if he has understood what he is being accused of and if he accepts the accusation as 
stated. This is where our description sets in:  
 
(3) J 29 Est-ce qu’il a compris ? 
Did he understand? 
 INT 33-34 O b’a fɛ ka sonɲani la i kan walima – i ma sonɲani kɛ? 
One wants to accuse you of theft – did you steal? 
 J  
39-40 
[interrupts interpreter, addressing defendant] 
Monsieur Ganou, avancez s’il vous plaît. Est-ce qu’il a compris la 
prévention ? 
Mister Ganou, please come forward. Did he understand the 
accusation? 
 INT 41 U y’i jalaki cogoya min na i y’a faamu? 
That what you have been accused of, did you understand it? 
 DEF 43 ɔnhɔn, n y’a faamu 
Yes, I have understood 
 J 45 Mais est-ce qu’il reconnait les faits? 
But does he accept the accusation? 
 INT 46 Kɛwali minu fɔra tan o b’a yira ko ele lo tun b’a fɛ ka sonɲani kɛ 
walima ele tɛ ? 
The facts as described here show that you wanted to steal or not? 
 DEF 48 cɛn cɛn na, ne nana sigi baan kan le… 
 
80 These same questions are asked of all defendants, men and women, including the ones pertaining to military 
service and decoration. Compulsory military conscription for either men or women has been abandoned in 
Burkina Faso in 1990 (see https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/bf-personnel.htm, accessed 20 




In reality, I just came to sit on the bench 
 INT 50 Il dit lui il ne reconnait pas les faits 
He says that he does not accept the facts 
 
The interpreter translates the questions quite differently from how the judge had worded 
them. The judge does not intervene and correct. He asks the defendant if he understood 
(3:29); the interpreter translates by asking a different question (3:33-34), namely if the 
defendant wanted to steal. Both questions are yes/no questions. If Musa answers “no”, 
responding to the interpreter’s Jula question if he wanted to steal, he is theoretically 
answering the judge’s question as to if he understood what he is being accused of. The way 
Antoine had translated – worded – this question, it becomes a suggestive question, implying 
that the defendant had the intention of stealing. The interpreter again entirely alters the 
question asked by the judge. The judge does not correct the interpreter, nor does he ask him 
to go again, translating more faithfully. 
We can see the same translation pattern when the interpreter translates the judge’s 
next question, asking if the defendant accepts the accusation as stated (3:45). The judge is 
required to ask this question exactly in this way, it is a mandatory part of legal procedure at 
the beginning of a trial to solicit an answer as to the defendant pleading guilty or not (see also 
Fofana 2018: 399; Ouattara 2018: 28f). Let us look at this one question. 
The interpreter does not translate “does he accept the accusation” into Jula, he again 
alters the judge’s words into something more suggestive, asking Musa if he had wanted to 
steal or not (3:46). A yes answer means, legally, the defendant accepts the facts as stated and 
thus pleads guilty. But Musa’s answer is that all he was doing was sitting on the bench (3:48). 
He does not oblige the court by saying either yes or no. Antoine translates this utterance by 
Musa again incorrectly as “he says that he does not accept the facts”, which is not what Musa 
had stated, and legally means that Musa pleads not guilty – a fact/situation Musa is unaware 
of. 
In theory, pleading not guilty complicates matters because it means you do not go 
along with what the prosecutor has suggested, which would make for a more lenient 
sentence. Pleading not guilty means you have to have access to a good defense, usually a 
legal professional such as a lawyer, hoping to reduce the sentence the court will give you. Like 
the majority of defendants at the TGI in Bobo, Musa has no lawyer. Let us get back to Musa’s 
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trial because Antoine had also introduced Musa’s statement with a “he says that”, using the 
third person. 
It is not a matter of not adhering to generally agreed upon interpretation standards, 
like not translating in the third person, of interpreting standards developed in the global 
North. Antoine has never been trained as an interpreter and is thus not necessarily aware of 
these interpreting conventions in use elsewhere (see Lebese 2015 or Kiguru 2007, 2014 on 
South African and Kenyan court interpreters, respectively, having to rely on training 
developed for interpreters in the global North). And even if he were aware of interpreting 
conventions here or there, the fact I wish to draw attention to is Antoine’s translational style. 





Antoine has the habit of translating plaintiffs’ or victims’ and defendants’ utterances 
from Jula back into French in the third person, as seen here (3:50). Instead of translating 
Musa’s statement as he had uttered it, namely “… I just came to sit on the bench”, Antoine 
says “he says that he does not accept the facts”. Not only did he translate the entire utterance 
wrongly, he does so in the third person and by introducing his translation with a “he says 
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that”. This might not be the best instance to show up this aspect of Antoine’s translation style, 
but since it has now come up, we can look at it.  
This translational pattern is 
observable only in Antoine’s 
translations of those actors in a trial 
that come from the outside – plaintiffs 
and more commonly defendants. 
Many of their utterances involving 
their first-person accounts are 
translated with the introductory “he 
says that”. To quantify: there were 76 
instances where Antoine translated 
Musa’s or the plaintiff’s utterances 
into French for the court. Of these 76 
translational instances, 35 were 
translations into French of Musa during interrogation by the judge. And of these 35 
translations, 20 were in this “othering” style, so more than half.  
Judges’ and prosecutors’ utterances, by contrast, Antoine renders as if they 
themselves had spoken Jula. This translational style Antoine employs – first person for the 
civil servants working for/at the court, third person for those coming to the court from the 
outside – I will refer to as “othering”, making somebody into an outsider. Defendants are 
outsiders to the court(room), they do not belong. On the one hand, they need to be made to 
fit the courtroom by being translated into French. But at the same time and by one aspect in 
this translation into French that makes them fit, defendants are also being “othered” – 
marked as not belonging and as being outsiders. It can also be read as Antoine associating 
himself with the judge, siding with the court or feeling compelled to do so as an employee of 
this court. His feelings of loyalty towards his employer can be expressed by him siding with 
the institution that has commissioned his services as interpreter.  
But yet, the defendant himself is not aware of being othered since he does not 
understand French. The translation into French is for the court’s benefit, who, we know, does 
not really need this translation since the presiding judge is fluent in Jula (see also Ouattara 
2018: 40 on the interpreter not translating for the judge, who understands the language of 
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the defendant). We have also seen that defendants’ Jula utterances are not consistently 
translated into French. But when Antoine does translate, for whom is the French translation 
meant? One answer that seems plausible is that it is for the court record, the logbook.  
Some last examples from Musa’s trial illustrate how Antoine aberrantly translates 
Musa’s statements into French and how he “others” Musa: 
 
(4) DEF 97-98 bon, muru tun ti ne bolo… dɔ lo yi muru bila ne kɔrɔ, k’olu bi ne 
sɔgɔ. Ko ne tun b’a fɛ ka bare nin sonɲa. 
I did not have a knife in my hand. Somebody put it by my side 
saying that they will beat me. That I wanted to steal the metal 
bar there. 
 INT 101 Il a déclaré qu’on a pris un couteau contre lui dans l’intention de 
le poignarder… 
He says that they used a knife against him with the intention of 
hitting him… 
 …   
 DEF 138 Koo min tɛmɛna ne ti olu lɔn, o kama lo ne ma sigi. 
Since I did not know them, this is the reason why I did not sit down 
with them.  
 INT 140 Il dit qu’il ne les connait pas 
He says he does not know them. 
 …   
 DEF 205 Parce que a yi n gɛn le. N lɔra ka to kuma na. 
He chased me and I stopped to be able to talk to him. 
 INT 207 Il m’a pourchassé. Il dit que lui s’est arrêté pour échanger un peu 
avec lui. 
He chased me. He says that he stopped to talk a bit with him. 
 …   
 DEF 352 Non! ko n sigɛnna le. Dusukundimi bi n na, n sigɛnna le. N lɔra ka 
lafiɲɛ dɔɔni pour que n bi taga soo quoi. 
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No! I was tired. I suffer from heart burn, I was really tired. I 
stopped to relax a bit so that I could go home. 
 INT 356 Lui, il est souffrant, il s’est reposé et s’est levé après rentré à la 
maison. 
He, he is a bit sickish, he relaxed and got up to then go home.  
 
Antoine decides to shorten or even summarize Musa’s explanation (4:97-98), but by 
translating in this way (4:101) he paints a picture for the written court record that distorts the 
actual story as Musa told it. This also leaves out half of what Musa said. It goes on along these 
same lines of aberrant translation all through Musa’s interrogation (4:138). The “othering” 
instances, too, can be clearly heard and constitute the majority of Antoine’s renderings of 







Musa will get released on the benefit of the doubt, so we can let him go. But now, the plaintiff-
victim – the proprietor of the garage Musa supposedly wanted to steal the metal bars from – 
can give his version of what had happened. He was woken up at one or two in the morning 
by a phone call, he cannot recall the exact hour. The guardian hired to keep an eye on his 
garage called him, asking him to come and check, saying that there was a man here who 
wanted to steal some stuff out of the garage. The plaintiff tells his side of the story in Jula, 
Antoine translates.  
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(5) P-VIC 373 la, n tagara sisan… 
I went there at that moment… 
 INT 375 Je me suis rendu sur les lieux… 
I got there 
 P-VIC 376 ka taga a sɔrɔ, demisɛnw b’a bugɔra. A lanin lo duguma. 
I found that some kids [adolescents] were hitting him. He was lying 
on the ground 
 INT 378 Il était couché à terre. 
He was lying on the ground. 
 …   
 P-VIC 592-
593 
bon, komi mɔgɔ minu tun b’a bugɔra nin, olu tora k’a fɔ ko muru 
lo tun b’a bolo, ko a tagara k’a bi taga nigɛ ta… 
When I got there, they were hitting him and saying that he had a 
knife in his hand, that he had come to steal metal… 
 INT 596 Qu’il avait un couteau sur lui quoi. 
That he had a knife on him. 
 PR 598 Il avait un couteau sur lui ? 
He had a knife on him? 
 P-VIC 599 Bon, o kɔ i yi muru yira ne na ko muru… 
Well, they showed me a knife and that knife… 
 INT 600 On m’a montré le couteau… 
I was shown the knife… 
 
The interpreter leaves out half of the plaintiff-victim’s utterance (P-VIC, 5:376) in his 
translation (5:378). The plaintiff-victim had given a lot more information as to what was 
happening when he arrived at his garage. Musa was not simply lying on the ground, as the 
interpreter suggested (5:378), he had been beaten up by some kids and as a consequence 
was lying there. It is the shortened translated version, however, that will be written down and 
preserved. Antoine does not translate the victim’s utterance in its entirety, he only renders 
the second half of his sentence, leaving a listener with no Jula skills perplexed as to why the 
defendant was lying on the ground. Of course, the judge has heard and understood the entire 
sentence; the written protocol, however, will only retain the interpreter’s utterances. 
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Antoine again leaves out half the wording (5:596) of the plaintiff’s utterance (5:592-
593), translating suggestively by focusing on only one part of the narration, namely when the 
kids’ told the plaintiff that the defendant had carried a knife – no mention is made in the 
translation that the defendant was being beaten up. This same pattern of translation 




PR 621 He… C’est quel genre de barre de fer que vous avez dans votre 
garage? 
Hmm… What type of metal bar do you have in your garage? 
 INT 622 Ko nɛgɛ façon juman lo a tun b’a fɛ k’a sonɲa? 
What type of metal bar did he want to steal? 
 
Again, this is a suggestive translation (6:622), making the defendant into a thief when all the 
prosecutor wanted to know (6:621) was what kind of metal bars the plaintiff had in his garage. 
But Musa was released on the benefit of the doubt. This decision both the presiding 
judge and the prosecutor alike seem not to appreciate much, however. Their job is to put 
people behind bars, not to let them walk. After the case is closed, they send Musa off with 




Alors le tribunal […] publiquement, contradictoirement en matière 
correctionnelle et en premier ressort, relaxe Ganou Moussa au 
bénéfice du doute, condamne le ministère public aux dépenses… 
So the court ?? publicly and contradictorily in this correctionnel trial 
and in first resort, acquits Musa because of the benefit of the doubt 
and condemns the Ministry of Justice to cover all expenses…  
 J2  [interrupts] whispering 
 J1 727-
728 
… oh, condamne le trésor public au dépenses. 
… oh, the public treasury to cover expenses. 
 J2  
729 
addressing Musa 
Merci c’est votre travail, vous allez revenir ici. 




Tribunal y’a yira k’a fɔ wo. K’i jalakira cogoya min na nin. Sigasiga be 
yen. Sigasiga nin kɔsɔn, o y’i labila. I bina taga soo. I y’a faamu wa? 
The court has shown that there are doubts as to your fault and 
because of that you are released. You can go home. Did you 
understand? 
 DEF 734 N y’a faamu.  
I have understood 




Aujourd’hui on vous a laissé, mais c’est sûr que vous allez revenir, 
c’est votre travail, vous allez revenir ici 
Today we released you, but it’s sure that you will come back, this is 
your job, you will come back here. 
 J2 738 Ok bonne journée à vous. 
Ok have a good day. 
 
Releasing a defendant is not the goal of a trial; condemning them to a prison sentence is proof 
of a functioning justice apparatus. Having to let Musa go was commented on by both the 
presiding judge and the prosecutor. Judges and prosecutors regularly engage in this type of 
talking down to defendants, not only when defendants are released. 
Here are some select excerpts from my diary, from the early days sitting in on trials at the 
TGI (all from trials on 18 November 2016): 
- the defendant is a lycéen, a high school student, so the judge tells him, that as an 
intelligent person, he should know that you do not steal stuff 
- this defendant gets called terroriste by the prosecutor because he is a repeating offender  
- the prosecutor tells the defendant that he is indeed a smart guy because he waited for 
the 5 years of his probation to be up in order to start his business of stealing again 
 
and from later on during my research in Bobo: 
- When you’ll get out [in 5 years] and will continue on this road, you will experience real 
sentences raining down on you here (judge to defendant, 6 December 2016) 
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- Just come back here after the 5 years, we will triple your prison sentence 81 
 
Judges and prosecutors talk in this way to those coming into the courtroom from the outside, 
mainly to defendants. This way of addressing outsiders is part of a more encompassing type 
of talk I have designated as courtroom speak.  
The excerpts we have looked at here include different aberrant translations – wrong 
renderings, omitting – and what I have called the othering of defendants. As an interpreter, 
Antoine’s action arena (his Spielraum) is limited to the space of the courtroom and the two 
days a week penal trials are held. During trials, his translations are controlled by the presiding 
judge, a Jula speaker and the director of the play. It is the director of any play who establishes 
the limits of the artistic freedom of the acting team; the director decides who says what how, 
when, and to whom (see also Fofana 2018: 406 on how judges determine who can speak 
when and on coordinating communication between the four people involved). 
So, Antoine’s translations, his entire job as an interpreter, are a reflection of the justice 
system and of how the experts make it function. These experts, we have seen, are themselves 
a product of the system having trained at the state-run institution ENAM. They come both 
with the system and at the same time, they are an integral part of it. It is a closed circuit, a 
system that reproduces itself. The job of the experts, as legal professionals, includes an 
insistence on strictly keeping to codified rules and procedures. In this, their interpretative 
freedom is limited as well; a choice of language seems not to be an option. Rules and 
procedure might prescribe how trials are to be held, which, in turn, includes they be held in 
French. This fact makes the interpreter necessary. But within the boundaries of these rules, 
the experts do have some freedom of choice. 
Decisions as to how and which rules to follow when is a decision up to the director, 
the presiding judge. The form a trial takes is up to the judge-director. One symptom of the 
French legal system – civil law as imported and practiced in Burkina Faso – is based on written, 
codified paragraphs/laws, which means cases are decided upon according to codified rules 
alone; precedent is not taken into account. The court does not keep an archive (neither 
digitally nor as hard copy), each similar case is theoretically the same and as such decided on 
 
81 “Quand vous sortez et vous continuez dans cette voie, vous allez voir les vraies peines tomber ici” and “Vous 
avez qu’à revenir ici après les 5 ans, on va tripler la peine” (TGI, 6 December 2016). The earlier excerpts are not 
given in their original French version here because they are not part of the audio recorded trials.  
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with the same verdict. This means presiding judges have the freedom of decision as to how 
to conduct a trial and thus can influence its outcome. 
Courtroom speak itself is a bureaucratic construction. It leaves very little maneuvering 
space for legal professionals, but it does leave some. Where judges and prosecutors can 
become creative is in the interpretation and subsequent application of the codified, i.e. the 
written rules and regulations. Also the work of the court interpreter during penal trials, how 
he can translate, the fact that he is present in the first place, and how he interacts with judges, 
is symptomatic of an ongoing bureaucratization of the justice system and of judges’ decisions. 
More immediately, the interpreter’s work shows us how powerful actors construct courtroom 
speak, be these powerful actors themselves or those emulating or modeling their behavior 
on them. The court interpreter thus is essential to the way the experts make the justice 
system work. He and his work translating language secures the experts’ position of power at 
court. And because they are in this position of power, the experts can bend – adapt, 
domesticate – the organizational order of the justice system so that it can function locally, 
while at the same time securing their powerful position. All this bending they do within the 
bounds of existing bureaucratic legal rules and within the closed circuit of the justice system.  
 
4.2. Conclusion: The art of administering and administrating justice  
Historically, Europeans, the tubabu, needed interpreter-translators to communicate with the 
populations they colonized. Administration of the justice system, the bureaucracy that comes 
with it, legal procedure, codified rules, and definition of jobs and careers are all modelled on 
the French system of justice. We have seen that civil servants working in state administered 
jobs are colloquially referred to as tubabubaarakelaw, as whites, Europeans, or French – in 
short, as people carrying out a European person’s job, while the job in a state institution itself 
is a tubabubaara.  
According to Bidima, African political and intellectual elites, to the latter of which we 
count the experts of the justice system, despise traditional ways of meting out justice, instead 
preferring a rigid, western idea of the law, codifying everything (Bidima 1997: 9; see also Le 
Roy 1997: 317). So, in this sense, they indeed are tubabubaarakelaw. All civil servants are an 
integral part of the state’s justice system which they run. Certain civil servants function as 
experts, in charge of the form a legal service takes, but also bound to follow a strict regime. 
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Adhering to or ignoring rules is thus the prerogative of the experts and at the same time a 
manifestation of how they make the legal system work. We remember the refusal of one 
court’s president to allow me access to the court he presides because I am a spy, according 
to his rationalization. Another manifestation of how the justice system is made to function 
while showing that it works, is putting defendants behind bars. This goal is attained through 
the communicative construction of a guilty defendant by the presiding judge and the 
interpreter. 
Thus the French justice system in its local appropriation is upheld the way it is by the 
experts because, on the one hand, it provides the source to legitimize their position at court 
and all the freedom of decision-making that comes with this position as experts. Being part 
of the educational elite, they are fluent in French, an attribute their clients – everyday citizens, 
defendants, and all those coming to the court from the outside – do not share for the most 
part. Of course, judges and prosecutors will shop for that institution which supports and 
consolidates their position of power – and what serves them better than the French 
language? Only they can use it with ease; particularly legal language is their prerogative. 
On the other hand, however, the French language in its standard form (Halaoui calls 
it “academic” form, Halaoui 2002: 348) is an integral part of the Burkinabe justice system as 
it is today. The official language has been imposed also on its experts by the system, not by 
any codified legal regulation (Halaoui 2002: 350). So the experts as well are, to a certain 
degree, victims of a machinery bigger than them. But differently than all other civil servants 
and particularly all outsiders, experts have a certain interpretive freedom on how to direct 
trials. 
This encounter between the highly formalized institution of the court and everyday 
citizens is, in itself, not particularly different in Burkina Faso from situations found throughout 
the world. In Burkina Faso the French language adds another complicating layer, however, 
giving it a special touch. The normative assumptions the system lays down for the experts, 
such as a strict adherence to prescribed procedure and the use of French in the courtroom, 
are expressed and translated into local or individual norms – when to correct a translation, 
how to address outsiders – by them, i.e. by those court members who run the justice system 
at a local level.  
In this environment court interpreters act and are made to act. We have established 
that they are hired for bureaucratic reasons. To keep the system running as it is, it needs the 
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French language, which, in turn, creates the basis upon which court interpreters are hired and 
consequently made to act. The interpreters themselves know of their fragile position at court 
– they are replaceable, their room to act limited, their work controlled by julaphone judges. 
In their work as court interpreters during trials they do not have much space to maneuver, 
but nevertheless they can tame their fragile employment conditions through action, for 
example by translating aberrantly, siding with judges. Aberrant translations – omitting, 
adding, wrong translation, and moralizing – are not only an expression of a lack of training, 
but also of the radius of action given them by presiding judges. Outside of actual trials, their 
taming tactics include the way they present themselves as bearers of important, even secret 
information, as being irreplaceable, and by using courtroom speak when addressing 
outsiders, their hierarchical inferiors. 
How, then, can the work of the court interpreter contribute to our understanding of 
the justice system as it is? It is not so much a matter of how interpreters translate, of the 
aberrant translations, but the fact that they do so and are not corrected that is relevant to 
how the system is made to function and interpreters’ role therein. The translational style of 
the interpreter is relevant to the running of the justice system in so far as he complies with 
what the presiding judge asks him to do. What keeps the system up and running in its present 
form are the decisions made by the experts as to how and what Antoine is to translate. That 
judges do not intervene in the aberrant translations, by correcting them, asking the 
interpreter to translate again or more faithfully and so on attests to the smooth running of 
the trial in compliance with the director’s way of seeing it.  
So, interpreters are made to act. Their options to alter, change, or improve their 
position at court, their employment conditions such as salary, or their position within the 
court hierarchy, are restricted to actions outside the courtroom. Here, how interpreters 
present themselves, how they recount their lives, becomes relevant to how they want to be 
perceived by their interlocutors. During trials, the expert-bureaucrats in charge of running the 
justice system do not give interpreters the space to act on their own. Here, the interpreter is 
a kind of regulator of the bureaucratization process. Through the interpreter’s work 
translating during trials, the judge can continuously adjust and re-calibrate the running of the 
justice system, making it work according to how he, the expert, can interpret rules. All is on 
track.  
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The translational strategies Antoine employs are, on the one hand, a reflection of him 
not being trained in interpreting. Yet more importantly, they are a reflection of his limited 
room to maneuver in a space defined by the experts of the justice system who are his 
immediate superiors. Or, as Fofana puts it, the distortions in the translation are due to the 
interpreter seeing an exact rendering as insignificant to the outcome of the case, which is, 
according to him, already decided on (Fofana 2018: 399). By accepting to translate penal 
trials, Antoine and his colleagues have accepted to ally themselves with presiding judges. At 
the same time, they give the justice system legitimacy through their regulating presence. And 
they participate actively in constructing a guilty defendant.  
Constructing a guilty defendant who gets sent to prison keeps up the illusion of a fair 
and functioning constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) and a justice system at work and working. 
The way judges and particularly prosecutors see it, the efficiency of the justice system and 
the Rechtsstaat can be measured in the number of guilty verdicts, by how many defendants 
get sent to prison. In Bobo’s correctionnel trials, 80% of all defendants brought to trial were 
convicted in 2016 and 2017; in 2015 it was 88%.82 Ratified international Human Rights 
conventions are fulfilled through the hiring of a court interpreter. 
Trials, convictions, and the application of an “intellectual justice”, which is elitist and 
occidental in form (Le Roy 1997: 312), is reminiscent of colonial law, geared towards the 
state’s control of citizens. And today? The distance the state justice system has to its citizens, 
can at least partly explain the general avoidance of the state-run system of justice by citizens 
(Le Roy 1997: 311). Also Bidima discusses how the justice system creates a legal and linguistic 
distance from users, which become psychologically difficult hurdles to overcome (Bidima 
1997: 27ff; for a discussion of distance judiciaire, see Fofana 2018). Following and watching 
trials over a long period of time also makes evident that wealthy, well-connected, “important” 
citizens, i.e. those people with a lot of bargaining power, do not go to trial. They have the 
means to keep outside of this system (see e.g. Hagberg 2002 and his analysis of the struggle 
against impunity after the assassination of the investigative journalist Norbert Zongo in 1998; 
 
82 See chapter 4.3. on the language used in court, Amtssprache, and the Annuaire Statistique 2017 de la Justice, 
V4 www.justice.gov.bf/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/ANNUAIRE-STATISTIQUE-2017-DE-LA-JUSTICE-V4.pdf, 
which gives the total number of defendants appearing in court, organized by their accusation (Unicef March 
2018). See also table 1. 
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Mazzocchetti 2009: 87ff. on the same topic; Bierschenk 2008: 129f on the means needed and 
tactics employed by “big” people to avoid an accusation or having to go to trial).  
The experts of the justice system, the judges and prosecutors, Le Roy calls them “les 
hauts magistrats”, keep the system running (Le Roy 1997: 325). They are the legal actors who 
appropriate the system, choosing how to implement procedure and form to serve their 
interests best. Together with their disregard for fundamental aspects of everyday cultural 
values and practices of defendants brought to trial – cultural values and practices they share 
– combine to construct guilty defendants, silencing them (Eades 2003: 125). 
We have seen instances of downtalking of judges and prosecutors when addressing 
defendants. Also young judges downtalk to older defendants, a behavior highly inappropriate 
to the cultural sensitivities of all Burkinabe. We remember the anecdote of the old man who 
refused to take off his hat in front of the considerably younger judge at his trial. We have also 
seen moments of aberrant translation, during which the interpreter translates wrongly, omits 
entire passages, and “others” the defendant, thus doing his part in the construction of a guilty 
defendant. By downtalking to defendants and by not correcting the interpreter’s aberrant 
translations consistently, judges construct condemnable defendants. 
Tacit rules thus exist between the interpreter and the judge pertaining to the role of 
translation during trials. A discourse of “guilty without a cause” operates among the civil 
servants at court, who see defendants as being out to cheat them. Particularly judges and 
prosecutors see defendants as wanting to complicate trial procedure by switching languages 
in the middle of their trial, by remaining vague, or by saying something different than what 
they had said before to the prosecutor or to the police (interview judge D.M. 9 February 2017; 
interview prosecutor H.O. 9 February 2017). For the court, then, seeing defendants as being 
guilty is taken-for-granted. They are offered a choice of language, but in practice, the 
presiding judge decides which language will be used during the trial. If the defendant speaks 
French sufficiently well to the judge’s ears, the trial will be held in French.  
But the judge is neither a linguist nor a language researcher or teacher. In fact, his 
evaluation of defendants’ language skills has nothing to do with the level of language 
competence of defendants. Judges deem it propitious that a trial be held in French. It is a 
strategic decision. We have seen that in the majority of cases, judges ask defendants if they 
speak French at the beginning of their trial, replacing the more open question of asking them 
in what language they express themselves in. Like this, defendants who choose Jula are made 
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to feel wanting or that they need to explain themselves. And any other language but Jula 
could not be offered anyway. Neither Antoine nor any of the other employees translating 
trials in Bobo can master all 60-odd languages spoken in Burkina Faso. This is beside the point, 
however, since Jula is the language of the public space in Bobo that everybody speaks.  
What is not beside the point, thought, is being marked as guilty from the outset, the 
opportunity of defending themselves at the end of their trial is, again, a fake opportunity for 
defendants. It exists in the void created by the absence of (affordable) lawyers and knowledge 
of procedure. The opportunity goes by unrecognized because it is not communicated clearly 
as such by the presiding judge, as we also saw in Fofana’s article. Since court interpreters do 
not translate trial communication consistently, allowing defendants to follow their case in its 
entirety, being translated by an interpreter is thus a fake opportunity as well. It simulates 
equality and justice when in fact, defendants are seen as guilty by the court even before their 
trial, during which they then actively get constructed as guilty. Interpreters thus participate 
in the process of constructing a guilty defendant. Like this, the organizational order of the 
justice system is reproduced and perpetuated. The imposed or unfree choice of language is a 
productive part therein. 
Where does this leave court interpreters? Antoine describes himself as an 
irreplaceable asset to the court, teaching judges legal vocabulary in Jula, while Jean sees 
himself as the savior of innocent defendants. This attitude towards the interpreting process 
or towards defendants is not reflected in the way they translate, however. Interpreters do 
not have much room to maneuver during trials. In presenting themselves in this way, they 
construct a life world for themselves, however, and with it a context for action. And it allows 
insights into the way they wish to be seen by outsiders. 
In practice, interpreters cannot save innocent defendants, since they act under the 
control of Jula speaking judges. In addition, they were not hired upon merit or training, but 
because they were at the right place at the right time. Anybody willing can theoretically be 
hired as court interpreter, replacing them. The only precondition the state demands of a 
future court interpreter is a primary school certificate (Ouattara 2018: 46). By presenting 
themselves as saviors of innocents or as irreplaceable, we can see how actors narrate their 
practices. The way court interpreters present themselves sheds light on two aspects. 
First of all, it illuminates the ways in which they construct contexts for action. In other 
words, we are looking at how interpreters tame their fragile employment conditions through 
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action, how they enable themselves to act upon their circumstances. And, secondly, their 
narration and the way they present their stories, including how they perform themselves, 
sheds light on how they want to be perceived by their interlocutors. Listening to their stories 
and watching them act thus provides access to grasp what they aspire for and also the limits 
imposed on their aspirations.  
In some rare cases, defendants get acquitted. Releasing defendants like Musa does 
not really fit the argument that the system needs to legitimize itself by convicting defendants. 
But in order to remain believable, the justice system has to show that is works fairly. Some 
few defendants need to get released. That judges and prosecutors do not like doing this we 
see in their remarks aimed at the retreating backs of acquitted defendants. Our calculations 
have shown that in 2017, 80% of defendants got put behind bars in Bobo’s correctionnel trials. 
The remaining 20% include not only those that were acquitted like Musa, but also cases that 
were never brought to trial, cases dropped for different reasons. The art of administering 
justice thus bears characteristics of an anti-politics machine.  
The French language is important to the functioning of the justice system. A complex 
history underlies this condition and an equally complex machinery keeps it up and running. 
Certain practical outcomes of a seemingly strict adherence to legal procedure in the highly 
formalized state institution of the court, are for example when judge D.M. says to the 
defendant, in French “you have heard what the prosecutor said” at the end of a trial which 
was just translated into Jula. French is the language of everyday business not only at court, 
however. In all state-run institutions in Burkina Faso civil servants select French as their daily 




CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION, OUTLOOK, AND END 
 
Prologue – A day in court, The End 
It is 5pm, not all cases have been treated yet, but an end is in sight. Antoine is thirsty, he has 
been talking all day translating, sitting on his “interpreter’s chair”. Once again, I am happy 
that I can leave the courtroom and go drink something. After a judge had once sternly looked 
at me, slightly shaking his head and making a discreet drinking motion during a trial, I did not 
dare show my plastic bottle anymore. I adhere to the unwritten rule scrupulously. But Antoine 
cannot get up right now and leave the room to get a drink. Also the defendant-prisoners are 
getting a bit fretful, having sat in the hot, stuffy courtroom all day long. And on these 
damnable benches, hard, uncomfortable, unanatomical. They are shuffling their feet, 
changing sitting positions, muttering quietly. It has been a long day. When judge D.M. finally 





The judges, prosecutor, and court scribe rise from their desks, inspiring Antoine to an upward 
wave of his hand in the direction of the audience, making them understand that they need to 
get up for the court’s exit. We all get up. When the black clad members of the court have all 
disappeared through the door reserved for them, leaving files, ledgers, and other documents 
behind, it is time for Antoine to make sure the audience leaves the room through the door on 
the other side of the room. He herds them out, again waving his hand at them a bit 
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impatiently, greeting one person or the other. I, too, leave the courtroom by the pedestrians’ 
door. 
Once the courtroom is empty, the penitentiary guards get to work, ordering the 
defendant-prisoners to stand in rows, two by two, holding hands. Then they are marched 






Antoine has some last tasks to do and then he too can leave. All the files, ledgers, and 
documents need to be brought back to where they belong. Down to the presiding judge’s 
office with the pile of files, back up, grab court scribe’s ledger, go down to the ground floor – 
almost done. I take off in the direction of the main street, happy to be able to stretch and 
move about. Swap heels for flip flops as soon as the courthouse is behind me. Now I have to 
find a taxi to take me home, which means a long walk first. Before Antoine will leave the 
courthouse, he goes by the presiding judge’s office to see if anything urgent needs to be taken 
care of today. But he, too, has already called it a day and gone home. No wonder, it is already 
past 5pm and the new working day ends at 3pm. Journée continue with an early end is a joke 







His gets his moto which is parked outside the courthouse and joins his interpreter colleagues 
Paul and Salomon at the little kiosk in front of the appeals court for a drink and a chat before 
they all head home. A good idea. Settling down, once again sitting, Antoine, Paul, and 
Salomon tell each other some anecdotes of their working day. It is not easy, c’est pas facile, 
Paul contends. He has been issuing ID cards all day long, getting into discussions with citizens 
who did not bring along the right kind of documents and had to be sent back home. For this, 
he sat behind the barred window of the secretaries’ office on the ground floor, facing the long 
line of people patiently waiting their turn outside. Salomon grins – he was in town all day 
long, translating at a notary’s office and then had to go supervise the mechanic fixing his car, 
or rather making sure the guy finished the job today. The gear shift, a complicated story. And 
expensive.  
The streetlights had just come on, their yellow glow immediately attacked by millions 
of flying creatures. The dust floating in the air becomes visible in the pale shine. Salomon asks 
himself if he should go running tonight, with all this dust in the air. The dry season was the 
worst, but how else stay in shape? He takes a long drink of water, as usual only drinking the 
store bought, local bottled water. No soft drinks or beer for him. Looking at his colleagues 
Paul and Antoine, who seem to be engrossed in a discussion of where it was worth buying a 
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piece of land for cultivation, Salomon sits back and consults his cell phone. It has indeed been 







The study you are reading is an account of my search for answers to various questions I had 
in regard to the work of Jean, Salomon, Antoine, Paul, and their court interpreter colleagues. 
Throughout Burkina Faso, court interpreters work in a place that largely dictates the 
conditions of their job, of how they are supposed to go about carrying it out. And why are 
they there in the first place, anyway? This is, in essence, what this study is about. 
By investigating the role of the court interpreter – both an outcome of 
bureaucratization and a manifestation of this being an ongoing process of the justice system 
in Burkina Faso – I have explored many and widely different aspects of interpreting work: we 
went to the colonial past, looking towards Wangrin and Moussa Soumaré for answers to 
questions pertaining to their role as allies to the colonial endeavor and their part in it. And 
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together with Omar Sy and the interpreter in old Meka’s quest to obtain the promised medal, 
we have come to realize just how ambiguous their role as colonial interpreters was. They had 
a lot of room to maneuver as colonial interpreters and a freedom to act court interpreters 
today do not enjoy. 
In order to grasp today’s court interpreter in the upholding of the organizational order 
within the state institution of justice, we also looked at many newer, contemporary ideas on 
court interpreting. These, mostly linguistic and sociolinguistic publications, cannot fully grasp 
the very unique nature of court interpreting in Burkina Faso. They have, however, illuminated 
situations of an uneven distribution of power and knowledge and how these get utilized by 
those with the most bargaining power to strengthen and perpetuate these existing relations 
of power. The rationalization that underlies civil servants’ upholding the working order within 
the justice system in Burkina Faso includes employing the services of a court interpreter. He 
himself, however – we have seen it – has not much space to act on his own. He is nevertheless 
an indispensable part within the larger rationalization mechanism that allows the experts to 
work the machine of the justice system in their own best interests. He is one drop of the oil 
that keeps the machine running without too much squeaking. It still squeaks, and for these 
places the experts need to continuously find the right kind of oil, i.e. the rationalizations to 
buttress how they go about running the system. Hence, I have referred to the court 
interpreter in Burkina Faso as a regulator of the bureaucratization process. All is kept on track.  
The justice system as we find it today in Burkina Faso has been modelled on the 
imported French system of justice. In the definition of hierarchies and posts, of the rules 
regulating career paths, the codified laws, and legal professionals’ education, it is a copy of 
the French system of justice. The term copy is, of course, an ambiguous and loaded 
designation, implying a lack of imagination or effort. The determination and resolution that 
civil servants put into upholding the idea of the original form is considerable and defies the 
unflattering associations copying implies. Because, while they copy, the bureaucrats who are 
in charge of running the justice system – at least those who have the administrative power to 
do so, those whom I have called the expert-bureaucrats – make the system into something 
new. 
This new thing we can see in other domains beyond form. Here, the experts-
bureaucrats are not always successful in copying the system. Upholding prescribed 
procedures becomes challenging. Procedure can include collecting evidence with specialized 
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technical tools, hiring professionals to carry out lab tests and other forensic investigations, or 
educating court interpreters to become professional translators into the many Burkinabe 
languages. The financial and technical means the experts running the Burkinabe justice 
system can dispose of today do not suffice to carry out these technical investigations. To run 
the justice system as a French justice system becomes impossible, an ideal strived for. The 
model needs to be rethought, so they have to become creative. 
Indeed, the term model and the verb modelling become visible. The way the 
Burkinabe justice system is run today in form and procedure, is necessarily a product of its 
original and also a product of its evolution through time. Now it is that what the experts 
running it have made it to be (and continue doing so). The one central thing the justice system 
in any of its forms has always been used for is that it was and is the government or the state’s 
way to secure its administrative power, which it does through how it makes the justice system 
function.  
The justice system that was imported with French conquest and occupation into the 
territory of western Africa, knew different phases and different forms over the course of its 
history. Based on decrees and in the absence of settlers, the colonial project was, first, a way 
to assert the administrative power of the colonizing forces over the territory and peoples they 
wanted to control. To an increasingly expansive system of courts, the colonial administrators 
went about securing the support of local dignitaries (or those they believed were dignitaries), 
allies in the project of the civilizing colonial mission. To this, they added the indigénat system 
in the late 1880s to better secure their power.  
The court system and particularly the indigénat served as legitimation, as legal basis, 
for administrators to rule. Once the bureaucrats of the colonial administration realized that 
it could be opportune to include customary law in the administration of justice, a hectic frenzy 
broke out in the colonies to collect these “customary laws”. In quotes, because, we have seen 
it, for both Africans and Europeans it was difficult and near impossible to do. This collecting 
became in turn its own opportunistic mission, allowing the colonial fonctionnaires and their 
African allies alike to choose, interpret, and selectively codify those strands of local custom 
they could and wanted to identify as law. So, local ways and ideas of conflict solving were 
taken into account as long as they did not run counter to the project of the French civilizing 
mission or certain individuals’ interests. 
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Today, the administration and running of the state institution of justice in Burkina Faso 
is a product both of this history and of the way the experts who run the system have 
appropriated the copy to their own local needs and ends. Their “civilizing mission” today is to 
keep this appropriated system up and running, keeping it functionable by adhering to 
prescribed or codified form and procedure. Also the expert-bureaucrats like the president of 
the TGI or the judges and prosecutors working there, can only act within the constraints 
imposed by the larger system. They do, however, have enough leeway to interpret these 
constraints. They bent, adapt, and domesticate the system both in order to keep it 
functionable and to fit their own ends and interests. These ends and interests might 
correspond to the way expert-bureaucrats believe a successful justice system should look like, 
like by condemning as many defendants as possible. Like this the system itself is shown to 
work according to its function. 
Domestication is discussed, variously, as a process of adaptation or appropriation to 
local conditions of something that is already there; nothing new is invented or made from 
scratch. In this case, the appropriation of objects or institutions is done by people who are 
not familiar or have not been trained to use these objects or institutions. They thus have no 
preconceived ideas on how to handle and use the things. We remember Beck’s often cited 
diesel motor in the Sudan. The justice system, however, comes as a package deal, replete with 
rules, regulations, and with its own educative facility, which breeds the expert-bureaucrats, 
who are also those who appropriate it. It is a system appropriated from the inside. It is a 
closed circuit. 
In fact, first, this state-run school was called ENA and was responsible for the 
education of all civil servants aspiring to a government job. This is the name those French 
schools in France have until today that the Burkinabe school is modelled on. The M for 
magistrature, for legal professions, was added later. The legal professional became a 
bureaucrat educated and trained in-house to administer the state-run system of justice. 
Bureaucratization at its best. But also a closed circuit allows for creative freedom in the 
interpretation of rules and regulations, even if this creative freedom be small. 
Hence, the French system of justice as it has come to West Africa is today organized 
in a formal, bureaucratic kind of way based on a specific form of rationalization. One such 
rationalization is its organization. The organization into professional hierarchies, the running 
of the institution by its own bureaucrats organized into these hierarchies, and the 
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classification of work into organizational categories and cases determines the working order. 
The organizational order provides the template for how the system and all things within have 
to be handled. An example of this working order would be the disregard for local social 
sensibilities in the administration of cases, which becomes possible precisely because of the 
bureaucratic organization of the system: the keeping of files and the organization of cases 
into classifiable types make the system as a whole manageable. Taking local social sensibilities 
into account, like for example gerontocratic or age hierarchies, is not part of this 
rationalization. This is the conflict zone the expert-bureaucrats move in.  
This conflict zone the experts encounter in their daily work is the outcome of a long 
process conceptualized by the colonizing forces and later perpetuated by the leaders of the 
new independent state. Through formal education a system that has come to western Africa 
with French colonization and has equally remained French in form, structure, procedure to 
this day, African allies to the colonial project were bred. At the same time, a protracted 
process was set in motion, ultimately resulting in what Bidima designates as “mimétisme des 
‘évolués’”, a kind of reproduction or copying of French governmental practices by the African 
elites (Bidima 1997: 61). Bidima uses the expression in his discussion of the single party 
system installed in postcolonial African states. The legitimation for a single party made use of 
the same rhetoric as those lobbying for a single official language to be used in all government 
run affairs, namely to unite the numerous ethnic groups and languages under the banner of 
one nation state (see Bidima 1997: 57ff).  
Education was at the basis of the colonizers’ mission civilisatrice, supporting and 
advancing this civilizing mission. Education was imparted in French, which was positioned as 
the only language adequate and capable to impart knowledge and content. With short and 
few exceptions, other languages such as Wolof or Arabic did not last long as languages of 
instruction in western Africa. African peoples were taught, continue to be taught, and have 
come to internalize and believe that French alone is capable of transporting knowledge. 
Today, the expert-bureaucrats working the justice system – and all “évolués” alike – believe 
that French alone can express the complexities of legal language, form, and procedure. So, 
the civil servants working the justice system today are educated to run the system within a 
well-established tradition of rationalization. The figure (Banégas & Varnier 2001) or type 
(Macamo & Neubert 2008) of the bureaucrat and of the institutional administrator is 
modelled upon a well-established template.  
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Through the example of how penal trials are enacted, we can see what the 
administration of the justice system concretely looks like. The expert-bureaucrats running the 
system are bred by the internal educative facility ENAM, which makes them into expert-
bureaucrats in the first place. Moreover, they are modelled on a system the institution 
perceives as successful. The society the system operates in is not static, however, creating a 
dilemma for the bureaucrat-expert. Impulses creating unstable situations are not taken into 
account in the expert-bureaucrats’ education at ENAM. Also the codified rules and 
regulations upon which the justice system is built and according to which they make it 
function, has not foreseen any instability in the system. In addition, a script for types not 
coming out of ENAM has not been conceived of either.  
At first, situations of instability as well as undefinable types are difficult to read, to 
place or classify, a hitherto unheard of situation for the experts-bureaucrats. In order to keep 
the system running over time, adaptations to unforeseen, new situations becomes necessary 
on multiple levels. First, impulses coming from outside the system, such as international 
Human Rights laws, make adjustments necessary. How to deal with this new occurrence not 
taken into account in expert-bureaucrats’ script? They solved the dilemma creatively by 
making room for new types. Experts classify certain external types as indispensable and as 
insiders so that they, the experts, can keep the system upright and running. Such a regulating 
type is today needed to keep penal trials functionable and functioning within the foreseen 
working order, the script, according to the rationalization of the justice system. 
The court interpreter is the solution to keep this impulse reaching the closed circuit of 
the justice system from the outside at bay and to make the system manageable again. He 
saves the system from coming to a grinding halt. Citizens who, through a chain of unfortunate 
incidences, have been brought to trial, are forced to deal with the bureaucratic organization 
of the court which speaks to them in French, in writing and orally. The court interpreter 
assures that penal trials can continue functioning in the way they have been managed all 
along. The type or figure of the court interpreter is born.  
The experts running the system have thus repaired a situation threatening instability. 
In a certain sense, they have also contributed to its creation because the tacit rule keeping 
French as the only language the court can communicate in is not questioned. The 
rationalizations the experts bring forth to support the continued use of French at court 
stipulates that only French can express the complexities of legal concepts. This neatly fits into 
 224 
earlier rationalizations for the use of French (or the single party). By using French, they believe 
ethnic-linguistic favoritism is being circumvented. This same rhetoric has been used, 
unchanged, from colonial times through the fight for independence, during the installation of 
the first independent state, through the revolutionary Sankara years all the way into the 
present day. A closed circuit as well. Or a cat biting its own tail.  
The experts had to find a solution, they had to fix the instable situation that had 
installed itself with the ratification of international Human Rights laws in order to keep the 
system running in its prescribed way. For how can you hold a trial today if the defendant 
cannot speak the language of the court? They fixed it by getting an outsider to join the 
organizational structure and the court hierarchy, the interpreter. The ratified international 
Human Rights laws offered the expert-bureaucrats the opportunity to act so they could keep 
the system running as it was. All they had to do was to hire interpreters.  
The type or figure of the interpreter is, in fact, the perfect solution to the dilemma the 
experts face, but his presence created a new dilemma. Soon, the expert-bureaucrats realized 
that since the interpreters they hired had no script, they needed to be made to fit the 
institutional working order. They needed to be made to act within the limits the expert-
bureaucrats prescribed for them. This was achieved by, first, whom the expert-bureaucrats 
chose as interpreters. They decided to offer civil servants already working at the courthouse 
the position of interpreter, a most prestigious position particularly for those working in 
hierarchically low positions. A position to strive for. 
The job of court interpreter bestows upon the agent de liaison or the secretary or the 
volunteer a respected status in the eyes of citizens. Now they have become employees at the 
courthouse, who have something to say, even if only during the trials they are asked to 
translate. But as interpreters, they also have to insert themselves into the organizational-
bureaucratic working order of penal trials, not only of the justice system as a whole. Being 
hired as a civil servant continues to be one of the most coveted types of jobs imaginable to 
citizens in Burkina Faso. Being hired for a respected, admired job within the category of civil 
servant is even better. By being offered the job as court interpreter, the four men in Bobo got 
promoted. More than that, they were offered a chance to become a part of the system 
without any effort invested on their part. A job within the hierarchy of the juridical court 
personnel is normally only attained through years of schooling and tedious concours exams. 
The court interpreters could skip all of this. The experts who hired them were content as well. 
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In these men they had found not only employees already working within the justice system, 
but also people willing to take on extra work at court with no extra remuneration. Or rather, 
the prestige they gained needed to suffice. And, most importantly, thanks to court 
interpreters’ work, the experts can keep the system running as before. A classic win-win 
situation.  
Hence, as the experts who run the system see it, interpretation is the perfect solution 
the Human Rights problem and French present during penal trials. It is their way of taming 
the situation created by the presence of too many languages and intruding Human Rights 
laws in the contact zone of the courtroom, a situation they consequently do not need to 
question. The state, again, can work. Now, interpreters need to be made to act according to 
the way experts run the system. In fact, with the interpreters, the expert-bureaucrats have 
found the perfect allies. By making them into insiders in a system that actually has not 
foreseen their type, and by hiring men not educated in any legal domain, the expert-
bureaucrats have created a regulator through whom they can keep the system as it is.  
The court interpreter thus straddles multiple classifications. He is both insider and 
outsider. He is an insider to trials by virtue of being hired by the court as a civil servant and 
interpreter. And this, in turn, assures he is working for the court. Along with judges, the court 
interpreter participates in the construction of guilty defendants. Like this an outsider, who 
has not come with the system nor been educated by and in it, has been made into an insider, 
an ally to the system as run by the expert-bureaucrats.  
Hence, the organizational order of the justice system demands the creation of different 
types of people in the courtroom so that a penal trial can work according to the rules and 
regulations of the justice system. 
 
Type 1: insiders – the experts (judges, prosecutors, court scribes) 
Type 2: outsiders – the cases (defendants, plaintiffs, victims, audience) 
Type 3: outsider-insiders – unclassifiables (interpreters, lawyers) 
 
What these types show is that people continue to be classified and thus made up which, in 
turn, determines how they can act; it also has repercussions on their ability or space to act. 
This process of classification, of making up people, is operable and it is ongoing and tacit. The 
justice system creates, in this way, those types of people it needs to run the system. The 
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creation of a special outsider-insider category for the court interpreter opens up the 
possibility for the justice system to produce or give birth to its own regulator. The 
perturbation of the working order that followed the ratification of Human Rights laws can be 
relieved, even overcome, thanks to his intervention. The system is re-calibrated and again 
functionable.  
In what concerns the court interpreters, they see themselves confronted with another 
level along the insider-outsider continuum. Being classified as insiders, they might be 
hierarchically topping outsiders, but are also confronted with an internal court hierarchy. This 
internal court hierarchy is set in stone in the code of penal procedure, which makes it rigid in 
structure. The bureaucrats running the system are educated to see it as unalterable – it is the 
rationalization for the way the system is run. It is also a prerequisite to keep organizational 
order intact. This, in turn, creates if not a dilemma, then at least a situation of unease for the 
court interpreters. 
The interpreter, as an outsider, has no place in the set-in-stone internal court 
hierarchy, but he is there anyway. The expert-bureaucrats have called him, giving him the 
accessory coveted in larger society – position of interpreter and of civil servant – and can thus 
secure his loyalty. Which does not mean he is classifiable within the set-in-stone court 
hierarchy, which he is not, we have seen. An own category needed to be created for him. 
Antoine roams the corridors of the courthouse when he has no immediate errands to run 
because he has no office space as agent de liasion. A liaison officer needs no desk, he is meant 
to run errands. Also Salomon prefers to leave the appeals court when his interpreting duties 
are done. Outside of trials, he has no place to sit he can call his own, either. Paul has a desk 
because he is hired as secretary. Secretaries need to write, so they need desks. All three of 
them interpret trials as extra or additional work on top of their usual duties as secretaries, 
liaison officers, and secretaries, we have seen. 
There are also subtle nuances in the everyday lived hierarchies, as we have seen with 
Bintou. Even though in a hierarchically legitimate and well-situated position as head of court 
scribes and according to the internal, organizational order, even though she has all the 
attributes and accessories the educational elite puts on show to claim status, she is denied 
acceptance as an equal by her colleagues. And this simply because she did not go to university 
for a law degree.  
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What unites all individuals working for and at the court is their status as civil servants. 
But even though united under this umbrella status, not all public servants are the same, it 
seems. Bintou is not the same as her colleagues by virtue of having climbed the career ladder 
from within, instead of having studied law at university. The men working as court 
interpreters in Bobo today are not the same because of their lack of both education and 
concours-induced career climbing from within. They defy a neat classification into either the 
insider-outsider categorization or into any clear hierarchical position. Theoretically they have 
not attained any hierarchical status. At best, they are considered employees placed at the 
lowest end of the hierarchy at court; at worst, they are seen as imposters.  
To outsiders, the court interpreters in Bobo describe themselves as being 
indispensable members of trial procedure. They are, of course, right. The experts have 
indirectly created this space for interpreters, bringing them into trials. In this sense, then, 
court interpreters indeed are indispensable – their job category, not the specific individual 
who carries out the job. When Antoine claims that a day of trials would have to be cancelled 
if he were sick, he is presenting himself in a way coming closer to wishful thinking than 
describing actual procedure. The presiding judge would simply ask another civil servant 
present at the courthouse or a member of the audience to come translate. Like we have seen 
he did when there was a defendant asking for his trial to be translated into Moore. A hassle, 
but manageable. 
The classification of courtroom participants concretely manifests itself and becomes 
visible also to outsiders in a certain courtroom discourse, what I have termed courtroom 
speak. Judges, prosecutors, and interpreters alike talk to and about defendants in a specific 
way, constructing an outsider. Embedded in this courtroom speak is also the strategic 
translation court interpreters (are made to) engage in. Salomon, Antoine, and Paul want to 
not only keep their jobs, they want official recognition by the state that hired them, official 
recognition as court interpreters and all this entails in terms of job security, salary, and career 
opportunities. Particularly salary. To attain this goal, they all act. In order to improve their 
bargaining power within the organizational state court structure, they have organized 
nationwide, fighting for legal status and official recognition by the Ministry of Justice as a 
group. It is a tight rope walk. Since they do not officially exist as court interpreters in any 
organizational chart, they could at any time be replaced by somebody else. Or asked to go 
about their work in compliance with their contract and without stirring up any dust. 
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Interpreters’ room to maneuver is indeed limited. In their two action arenas – the 
courtroom during trials and the courthouse for work in general – they are granted a clearly 
defined radius of action. For now and while waiting for official recognition, interpreters play 
along with the tacit demands placed on them. In exchange for a respected status in society as 
a fonctionnaire and a court interpreter – their insiderness – they are expected to translate in 
the court’s favor, following the lead of judges and participating in the construction of a guilty 
defendant. This is also possible because they have not had any legal training and are thus 
unencumbered in their handling of penal trials – again like Beck’s Sudanese farmers were in 
their handling of the diesel motor. This freedom from knowledge of the law and their low 
hierarchical position assure they can act along with judges, creating guilty defendants.  
For now, court interpreters in Burkina Faso are regulators, they are necessary to the 
functioning of penal trials, at the same time upholding the idea of a constitutional state at 
work, fulfilling ratified Human Rights laws. And more than that, the interpreters work so that 
the system can continue to function in the way the experts make it run. They assure, by their 
very presence, that prescribed rules and regulations need not be questioned. French can 
continue being the mandatory language used in the justice system. At the same time, they 
can take advantage of a system that allows them access to the coveted status of fonctionnaire 
and to a respected insider position to court business without the usual entry exams and years 
of education. Out of convenience and because of a chronic overloading of the system of 
justice, people get asked to carry out tasks they are not qualified to do. Salomon and Antoine, 
as well as Paul and Jean, have accepted the challenge to carry out this task. 
So, in Burkina Faso, the hiring of an untrained interpreter continues to be a pragmatic, 
bureaucratic decision. The context of courts in Burkina Faso thus imposes certain rationalities 
that subordinate local conditions to its rules. It also serves to legitimize the justice system as 
an institution of the Burkinabe state. Court interpreters and the system they work in can thus 
also be designated as an anti-politics machine. Interpreters are indispensable to this anti-
politics machine. 
 
Outlook and End 
In West Africa, there is one noteworthy exception to how trials are handled. In Senegal, court 
interpreters are recruited according to set criteria and have been receiving specialized 
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training since 2014. All six African languages mentioned in the Senegalese constitution as 
national languages are covered in the court interpreter training program and six interpreters 
are on stand-by at the courthouse in Dakar during criminel penal trials. What is noteworthy 
as well is the fact that in Dakar, all correctionel trials are conducted in Wolof.  
Why can this work in Senegal but is so difficult to achieve in Burkina Faso? This is of 
course a question making room for more empirical research. What it shows, however, is that 
even a system as regulated as the justice system can be adapted, domesticated, and changed 
more radically than has been the case so far in Burkina Faso. Other outside impulses 
disturbing the system can occur at any time, making it an ongoing business for the expert-
bureaucrats to be creative so as to keep the system functionable.  
The fact that legal professionals are taught to follow rules, procedure, and codified 
law is, in itself, nothing new and can be found the world over. Also the intimidating nature of 
a courthouse and a trial, the fact that as an outsider you feel at a loss, is not unique to Burkina 
Faso. But if citizens are being judged in a language they do not understand or speak in their 
hometown, we find ourselves in a truly unusual, even bizarre situation. Or at least this is what 
it seemed like to me when I watched this first trial at the commercial court in Bobo in 2015 
this account started out with. The interpreter only seemed to confuse matters more. My 
friend Mohamed the judge insisted the defendant speak Jula facing him, the judge, and not 
the interpreter because even though it was the interpreter who was going to answer the 
defendant it was him, the judge, who was the one deciding on this case.  
Now, four years later, not much has changed at the courts in Bobo. Jean has 
disappeared, Paul is in Ouagadougou at ENAM, studying to become a court scribe. The 
language used during trials is still French, so Salomon and Antoine continue their work at the 
two courts interpreting penal trials. They allow the system of justice to function the way it 
has been made to work so far – they are the regulators needed to bring it back on track if and 
when necessary.  
This is why this chapter cannot be designated as Conclusion because there is nothing 
conclusive; expert-bureaucrats will continue to translate the system; new and unforeseen 
perturbations will disturb the working order of the justice system. Both the perturbations 
from outside as well as experts’ handling them are ongoing, dynamic processes. Creating the 
space for a new type within the working order of the justice system is just one way the expert-
bureaucrats have solved this one dilemma they were faced with. My quest for understanding 
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the language regime at court in Bobo during trials has focused on the court interpreter’s role, 
triggering research on and insights into the bureaucratization of a state institution. Through 
court interpreters’ translational work during penal trials, we can see how the state-run 
institution of justice goes about reproducing itself on multiple levels, but particularly in how 
it functions. Experts’ rationalizations reveal how civil servants perpetuate a system they deem 
to be successful through the translation of organizational-bureaucratic rules into their daily 
work. 
The concrete translational practices of court interpreters also show how the shape of 
the justice system is kept as it is through ongoing processes of bureaucratization. With shape 
I refer to the codified rules and regulations, the strict “set in stone” procedures that need to 
remain intact. It is a bureaucratization because by creating a working slot for the interpreter 
within the system – by handling him and his work administratively –, the existing bureaucratic 
working order is affirmed and perpetuated at the same time. We can see that a lot of effort 
is poured into keeping the justice system running as it is. 
How the justice system is made to function is, at the same time, an outcome of and 
the reason for tension expert-bureaucrats experience in their work. They have to maneuver 
or navigate between the exigencies of their own social-cultural sensibilities as Burkinabe men 
and women, exigencies that often run counter to rules and regulations they need to follow as 
civil servants. They have found solutions in how to explain and rationalize situations such as 
the old man refusing to take off his hat for the much younger judge that fit into the legal 
framework they need to move in. But new situations will present themselves again and again, 
so recalibrating the system needs to continuously be negotiated. For now and for this 
problem, the expert-bureaucrats who run the justice system have found solutions. 
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Epilogue – Antoine, Salomon, Paul, and Jean in 2020 
“What should I have done?”, Paul writes to me in a WhatsApp message in May 2020. “I was 
getting tired of waiting and hoping”. He had been very active, organizing the court 
interpreters across Burkina Faso, writing to the Ministry of Justice, insisting. They had actually 
managed quite a lot. In 2017, Paul together with an interpreter colleague working in another 
town in Burkina Faso, were finally invited to present their ideas with the Minister of Justice 
himself. They had gone to Ouagadougou for a short three days and talked about their working 
lives, how they needed the official recognition as court interpreters from the Ministry of 
Justice their employer. This had now come through towards the end of 2019, it seems. 
But so far, nothing has changed. They still earn 88’000 F CFA a month, they are still 
working both their jobs as secretaries and liaison officers and as court interpreters, they still 
do not get much respect or recognition from the other civil servants working at the 
courthouse. “The association of court interpreters in Burkina has no future for now… because 
there is still a lot left to do. And this is too bad. We did what we could for the official 
recognition of the association and this is already a lot… ” (p.c. 3 June 2020). So, Paul decided 
it was time for a change. 
He is now in Ouagadougou, studying to become a court scribe at ENAM. With his 
middle school diploma BEPC he can make something of his status as civil servant and access 
a job with corresponding diploma from the inside, just as Bintou had done. Not a bad thing, 
he feels, being quite content with his new life. Him and his wife had, for the last couple of 
years, worked in different towns. The twins lived with him in Bobo, while the new baby was 
with his wife in Dano. Moving to Ouagadougou thus did not really affect his private life, his 
wife still works in Dano, they thus continue to live in different towns. 
Salomon has now taken over Paul’s duties as president of the court interpreter 
association and good luck to him. Paul is happy that it is not him anymore who has to deal 
with all this waiting, hoping, getting frustrated, “il fallait vraiment que je me sauve – I really 
had to get out of there”, he concludes our WhatsApp conversation.  
Salomon is not as verbal as Paul but seems to be content in his new role. He – the 
intellectual, well organized, always professional – does his best to bring the newly and 
officially recognized court interpreter association to bloom, but he too has to be patient 
because “the status has been recognized by the cabinet of ministers, now certain details have 
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to be wrapped up… the public service department has to organize exams to put all 
interpreters into a higher category and after that an increase in salary will follow” (p.c. 14 
June 2020). 
We are currently working on developing court interpreter training for them and their 
successors in Burkina Faso. Wish us luck. Of course, Salomon will continue to offer his 
interpreting services to his clients around downtown Bobo. They built up a good working 
relationship over the past couple of years. The only thing he is not too happy about is that his 
wife has decided to move to Ouagadougou where she was offered a better paying, more 
interesting job. What could he do? Now they, too, live in two different towns. Salomon had 
only sighed when he told me two years ago that his wife was thinking about moving away. It 
seems that now it has indeed come true. C’est pas facile.  
For Antoine, things run on smoothly, as they had always done in his opinion. He 
continues to tend to his guinea fowl and chickens at his compound and the cashew trees he 
had planted some years back are starting to produce nice nuts. Actually, he is a farmer by 
heart, he had once told me, and spends as much time in his champ, his small plantation 
outside Bobo, as he can. The soil around Bobo is very fertile, highly coveted as a consequence, 
and many people are interested in buying pieces of land there. Some of his mango trees are 
also producing nicely – in fact, mango trees are easy to tend to. You plant, they produce in 
some short years. Nothing much can go wrong, you just do it. Like interpreting. 
It would be nice if I could conclude by telling Jean’s story to its end, that court 
interpreter who got this entire study rolling. But Jean has never reappeared, nobody knows 
where he is or what, exactly, has happened. Or nobody tells me. So, here, we can only 
speculate what has befallen him. Maybe one of the countless businesses he ran on the side 
has fallen on hard times, or maybe he has overestimated himself and borrowed money from 
the wrong person. Or maybe he has gotten too successful and showing this success was not 
to everybody’s taste. We simply do not know. At the commercial court, somebody else has 
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